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ABSTRACT 
The 2002 Stellenbosch African National Congress Policy Conference discussed and 
agreed on a short- to medium-term programme aimed at reducing unemployment and 
alleviating poverty. Subsequently, the Republic of South Africa‟s ruling political 
party, the African National Congress, announced the Expanded Public Works 
Programme through President Thabo Mbeki‟s “State of the Nation” address in 
February 2003. The President‟s announcement endorsed the Government‟s adoption 
of the position towards correcting unemployment levels in South Africa. However, 
during November 2002 Modimolle Local Municipality (formerly known as 
“Nylstroom”) had already embarked on an on-the-job labour-intensive programme. 
The programme was intended to introduce and implement labour-intensive 
construction methods in all the Municipality‟s infrastructure projects. The above 
background formed the basis for the purpose of this research project which aims to 
discuss, analyse and evaluate Modimolle Local Municipality‟s nine (9) – six (6) 
water projects (including the pilot project) and three (3) sewer projects – labour-
intensive infrastructure projects undertaken between November 2002 and March 
2007 in comparison with experience gained on similar projects in Africa, with 
specific reference to their contribution to job creation. The research found that the 
success of Modimolle‟s programme was due to long-term political support; adequate 
training; the availability and willingness of unskilled people to be employed as 
casual labourers; the pilot project that was carried-out before the main or core 
programme, and the ability to transfer experience and lessons learnt from the pilot 
project to the other projects. The research concludes that labour-intensive 
construction methods are economically feasible for water and sewer infrastructure 
projects and can reduce unemployment and alleviate poverty. 
KEYWORDS: 
Expanded Public Works Programme,  Modimolle labour-intensive work programme,  
construction projects,  construction methods. 
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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 
ANC African National Congress. The African National Congress is the ruling 
party in the Republic of South Africa. Their Policy Conference is held once 
every five years and this is where the election of their President takes place, 
who, after the country‟s next national elections, is elected to be State 
President of South Africa. It is at this conference where the ANC puts 
together their five-year plan and strategies to deliver over the next five 
years until their next conference. 
CBPWP Community-Based Public Works Programme 
COUNCIL Modimolle Political and Administration Structure 
EPWP Expanded Public Works Programme 
IDP Integrated Development Plan 
KRARP Kenya Rural Access Roads Programme 
Modimolle Modimolle (formerly known as “Nylstroom”) is a Category B municipality 
in Limpopo Province, which is within the Waterberg District Municipality. 
This municipality is located ~130 km north of Pretoria along the N1 and 
~155 km to the south-west of Polokwane. 
NGO(s) Non-Governmental Organisation(s) 
SMME(s) Small Micro and Medium Enterprise(s) 
TBVC Four pre-1994 independent states within the Republic of South Africa, 
namely: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. These states were 
subsequently re-incorporated into the Republic of South Africa. 
TLB Tractor/Loader/Backhoe 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In 2002 the level of unemployment and concomitant poverty in the Republic of 
South Africa stood at 30.4 %, with Limpopo Province being in the lead at 34.1 % 
(SSA 2009: Labour Force Survey Historical Revision: September Series, 2000 to 
2007). Apart from these problems of unemployment and poverty, the newly elected 
African National Congress (ANC) Government, which came into power in 1994, 
inherited infrastructure backlogs, illiteracy and a lack of skilled personnel from its 
predecessor. In 1994 the Government of National Unity embarked on programmes 
aimed at addressing these problems by introducing the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme during the 1994 fiscal year. 
South Africa, as a developing country, has the responsibility to address the problem 
of unemployment, and to alleviate poverty and its attendant social consequences, 
while addressing infrastructure backlogs. The Nationalist Party Government (which 
was in power prior to 1994 before the Government of National Unity) was not 
completely indifferent with regard to the challenges of unemployment, poverty and 
infrastructure backlogs; hence there was an intervention by that Government which 
introduced the Strategic Oil Fund programme in April 1991 (funded from the sale of 
strategic oil reserves) which was aimed at addressing unemployment and alleviating 
poverty while addressing infrastructure backlogs. 
Developing countries such as Kenya, Botswana, Malaŵi and Lesotho, for example, 
have embarked on labour-intensive construction methods to address their 
infrastructure backlogs, with the positive outcome of addressing unemployment and 
its attendant problems. 
Prior to 1994 and post 1994 the South African Government has implemented large-
scale, labour-intensive programmes such as the Strategic Oil Fund, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme and many other programmes without 
success. The labour-intensive projects introduced by Modimolle Local Municipality 
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in November 2002 won them first prize in the 2003/2004 Municipal Vuna Award;
1
 
they were the Limpopo provincial winner of the 2006/2007 Govan Mbeki National 
Award
2
 and they received third prize nationally in the 2006/2007 Govan Mbeki 
National Award. Modimolle‟s labour-intensive programme is among the few that 
have been considered successful in South Africa. This project report intends to 
describe and evaluate this programme. 
1.2 LABOUR–INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
“Labour-intensive construction” is defined as the “economically efficient” use of as 
much labour as is technically feasible to produce as high a standard of construction 
as demanded by the specification without compromising time, cost and quality 
(McCutcheon, 1993, 1995, 2003). 
The phrase economically efficient,
3 
means it must be cost effective when compared 
with other methods of construction and also be within project budget. 
As much labour as is technically feasible,
3
 means – since emphasis is put on 
employing more labour – labour must not be used without considering the work they 
have to carry out and making sure that a “fair day‟s wage” versus a “fair day‟s task” 
principle is being applied. 
To produce as high a standard of construction as demanded by the specification,
3
 it 
means that quality should not be compromised for the sake of job creation, meaning 
compliance with specifications must not be affected by the method of construction. 
It is therefore important that the implementation of projects using labour-intensive 
methods of construction must not compromise quality, quantity, time or budget 
(money) in the name of employing more labourers. 
                                                 
1
  The Vuna Award is the award introduced by the then National Minister of Local Government, Mr Sydney Mufumadi, in 
which the municipalities competed against each other in each province according to different defined criteria and 
categories and the best municipality in each province and category would then compete with the winners from each of the 
nine (9) South African provinces at national level. 
2
  The Govan Mbeki Award is the award introduced by the then National Minister of Housing, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu, in which 
all the best municipalities in each province competed at national level and Modimolle obtained third prize out of 226 local 
municipalities in the country. For this award, focus was on service delivery and employment creation. 
3  
This is the researcher‟s interpretation based on the knowledge he acquired on the subject over 10 years. 
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1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Between November 2002 and March 2007 the Modimolle Local Municipality 
adopted a direct employment approach to implement nine (9) projects using labour-
intensive methods of construction: six (6) water projects (including the pilot project) 
and three (3) sewer projects. This research report focuses on the information 
collected during the period November 2002 to March 2007 as the research was 
initiated within this period. 
While the Municipality also carried out projects that involved contractor 
development and labour-intensive construction, the focus of this study is the nine (9) 
projects (including the pilot project) implemented by direct employment. During this 
period the researcher was in the employment of the Municipality in the role of 
Technical Director. 
1.3.2 METHODOLOGY 
The following resources were examined to compile this research report. 
1) A study of literature on the topic of labour-intensive construction 
programmes undertaken in Africa, including journal articles and reports 
(Chapters 2 and 3). 
2) An analysis – to identify the success factors – of the six (6) water and 
three (3) sewer projects that took place between 2002 and 2007 in 
Modimolle Local Municipality, Limpopo, South Africa. 
3) Compilations of data from, for example, monthly reports which were at 
the researcher‟s disposal. 
4) Interviews with one (1) general worker, one (1) supervisor, three (3) 
former Councillors of Modimolle municipality, 7 (seven)  employees of 
Council (including a former University of Technology student), two (2) 
emerging contractors, two (2) individuals from materials suppliers, and 
one (1) consultant who was directly involved in the project. 
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5) The sample selected was purposive in that the interviewees were chosen 
specifically as they had been directly involved in several aspects of the 
Modimolle projects and were able to articulate their opinions clearly. 
6) Prior to the interviews taking place, the interviewees were apprised of 
the purpose and need to obtain the information sought and they were 
assured of confidentiality. 
7) Whilst it is hard to eliminate bias, one question was composed which 
was used for all interviews, irrespective of the level of education or 
literacy of the interviewee. The question posed was: “What is your view 
of the current “force-account system” used by the Modimolle Local 
Municipality to implement all their projects internally?” 
8) Because the question asked was qualitative in nature, the researcher 
was able to probe (triangulate) the answers obtained from each 
interviewee to ensure reliability of the responses. Positive and negative 
answers were captured without modification. 
9) Notes were taken during the interviews and transcribed immediately 
after each interview to ensure accuracy of the transcription. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
1.4.1 MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The four (4) main objectives of the research were to: 
1) analyse the pilot project and the training that was carried out in 
Modimolle Local Municipality prior to commencement of the 
programme, 
2) document the successes, shortcomings and experiences of the projects, 
5 
 
3) detail the work carried out in labour-intensive (direct employment 
approach) client-based projects,
4
 and to 
4) describe, discuss, analyse and document the Modimolle labour-
intensive construction projects to help strategic future labour-intensive 
programmes and projects in South Africa. 
1.4.2 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of the research is to analyse the contribution of the direct employment 
approach, client-based in the Modimolle Local Municipality. 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research is limited in that it discusses only the six (6) water projects (including 
the pilot project) and three (3) sewer projects implemented in the Modimolle Local 
Municipality within the period November 2002 to March 2007, even though there 
were other projects (such as roads
5
 and stormwater projects, trenching for electricity 
projects, sidewalk projects, housing projects and taxi rank projects) which were also 
implemented within this period using labour-intensive methods of construction. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
The first chapter provided the definition of the term “labour-intensive construction”. 
It also stated the objectives and the purpose of the research. 
Chapter 2 contains a literature survey from a regional perspective of labour-intensive 
programmes in Malaŵi, Lesotho, Ghana, Kenya and Botswana which will be 
evaluated and analysed. Best practices, reasons for successes and lessons learnt from  
                                                 
4
  The “direct employment approach” is an approach where the main participants are the Client and the community 
(Mthombeni 1996; McCutcheon 1993), this method is also known as “direct employment by employer”. Emphasis on this 
approach is put on the Client having in-house capacity. According to Gertzen (1999), the Client keeps the community 
liaison, planning, design, documentation and execution of the project within his organisation while the community is 
directly involved as individual workers, managerial support, capacity building and financial control are all handled by the 
Client in this approach. 
5
  When the Council of Modimolle Local Municipality adopted the use of labour-intensive construction methods to be 
implemented also on all their internal roads, interlocking paving blocks were adopted as a surfacing layer, which in itself is 
labour intensive. 
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these major programmes will be outlined. This information will then be used in 
Chapters 4 and 5 when analysing the labour-intensive projects in Modimolle Local 
Municipality. 
Chapter 3 focuses on literature from labour-intensive programmes in South Africa 
including a detailed discussion on the Strategic Oil Fund and the Community Based 
Public Works Programme (CBPWP) as well as the Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP). 
Chapter 4 contains a discussion and analysis of the pilot (water) project that took 
place in Modimolle Local Municipality between November 2002 and June 2003 and 
the training, focusing on the planning phase that took place within this period and 
evaluating it in line with experiences elsewhere in Africa. 
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the five (5) water projects and three (3) sewer 
infrastructure projects implemented in Modimolle Local Municipality between April 
2002 and March 2007. These projects are analysed and evaluated and compared with 
successful programmes elsewhere in Africa (Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 6 an overall analysis is provided of the findings from the pilot project and 
the evaluated projects. The researcher discusses the factors that contributed to the 
successes of the Modimolle Local Municipality labour-intensive projects. 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter of this research report and conclusions are drawn based 
on the success of the pilot project and all the evaluated projects. Thereafter, lessons 
learnt are documented and recommendations are given for future projects of a similar 
nature based on the experiences gained in Modimolle Local Municipality. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE REVIEW FROM A REGIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa‟s national problem remains the high level of unemployment associated 
with the high percentage of unskilled labourers, poverty and a high crime rate. 
Additionally, there is a need for infrastructure development to reduce the current 
backlogs on basic infrastructure such as roads, storm water, water, sanitation, 
electricity and housing. 
The chapter examines examples of labour-intensive projects from a regional 
perspective. 
2.2 LABOUR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS IN AFRICA 
From a regional perspective, several labour-intensive projects in Africa are discussed 
in order to provide a broader setting. Table 2.1 (at the end of this chapter) contains a 
summarised comparison of successful completed programmes in developing 
countries, with the focus being on Malaŵi, Lesotho and Ghana as compared with 
Kenya and Botswana. 
2.2.1 MALAŴI 
Malaŵi started with their first labour-intensive District Road Improvement and 
Maintenance Programme in the 1980s, followed by other poverty alleviation 
programmes such as the Malaŵian Social Action Fund in the 1990s (Quainoo, 
2010:179). Both programmes are discussed more fully below. 
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2.2.1.1 DISTRICT ROAD IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
PROGRAMME 
Quainoo (2010:184) notes the District Road Improvement and Maintenance 
Programme took more than a decade (1974 to 1990), signifying the need for a 
programme approach to poverty reduction through employment-intensive infra-
structure development. 
Malaŵi‟s District Road Improvement and Maintenance Programme was a huge 
success: by 1987 it had constructed over 5 000 km of good quality roads and 
transferred capacity to previously unemployed local residents (Quainoo, 2010:185). 
The programme outputs are summarised below (Quainoo, 2010:190): 
Scope of work Actual: >5 000 km constructed and maintained 
 
Was there a pilot project? Yes 
 
Employment created 6 800 casual labourers 
 50 % female casual labourers employed at improvement 
sites 
 
Wages 38 % of project cost 
 
2.2.1.2 MALAŴI SOCIAL ACTION FUND 
Another labour-intensive construction project, the Malaŵi Social Action Fund, was 
divided into three phases. Phase 1 – a three (3) year programme – was implemented 
from 1995 to 1999; followed by Phase 2 from 1999 until 2003 (a five (5) year 
programme). Phase 3 commenced in 2003 and is scheduled to end in 2015 (a 12-year 
programme) (Quainoo, 2010:194). 
Quainoo (2010:200-201) asserts the Malaŵi Social Action Fund‟s achievements 
were: 
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Scope of work 9 000 km of non-designated earth roads by the year 2001 
 
Was there a pilot project? Yes 
 
Employment created 13 million man-days
6
 
 Between 197 000 and 200 000 people were given direct 
employment 
 Over 50 % of labourers employed were women, and 
simultaneously approximately 40 % were in the Project 
Management Committee board 
 
Wages ~38 % of total road construction budget went to labour. 
 
2.2.2 LESOTHO 
Pama (1992:1) claims that in 1992 Lesotho had a total population of 1.7 million and 
an estimated labour force of approximately 0.6 million. A conservative estimate was 
that over 0.4 million people were either unemployed or underemployed. 
Two (2) labour-intensive projects are summarised below. 
2.2.2.1 LESOTHO LABOUR CONSTRUCTION UNIT 
The Lesotho Labour Construction Unit was established as a pilot programme in 
1977. The Ministry of Works and Municipal Authorities shared joint ownership and 
responsibility for the country‟s road network, with a total road network of more than 
5 000 km (Quainoo, 2010:213). 
Quainoo (2010:213) posits that under the former ministry responsibilities were 
decentralised as follows: 
                                                 
6
  For consistency, the term “man-days” (and hence “man-years”) has been used throughout this document even though 
source documents referred to used “people-days” or “person-days”. 
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 The Roads Branch was responsible for all classified gazetted roads 
including the development and management (traffic control and 
maintenance inclusive) of all primary and secondary roads, 
 The Lesotho Labour Construction Unit was responsible for upgrading 
over 2 000 km of rural earth roads to engineering standards, as well as 
their maintenance and re-gravelling using labour-based methods, 
 The Civil Works Section was responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of over 1 500 km of local earth roads, tracks and 
footbridges to a lower standard than the Lesotho Labour Construction 
Unit roads using labour-based methods. 
Quainoo (2010:221) notes the Lesotho Labour Construction Unit‟s achievements 
were: 
Scope of work 2 200 km of road 
 
Was there a pilot project? Yes 
 
Employment created 23 000 man-years 
 In 1985 the annual average number of labourers employed 
was 1020, an increase from about 700 in 1980 
 Labour intensity increased from 40 % to 44 % between 
1985 and 1997 compared with just 6 % for (contractor) 
equipment-based methods 
 
Wages 60 % of total project cost as at 2002 
   
Financial Labour-based construction techniques were 25 to 35 % less 
expensive than conventional techniques 
  
Training A training facility was built. 
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2.2.2.2 DEPARTMENT OF RURAL ROADS 
The government of Lesotho has since adopted a long-term (20 years) labour-
intensive road construction plan to service 2 000 km of road by the year 2010 
(Quainoo 2010:215). 
Twenty (20) years of successful “force account” system7 construction operations are 
indicative of the viability of a labour-intensive system when tightly monitored and 
controlled (Quainoo 2010:222). 
Quainoo (2010:234) maintains a major challenge to the implementation of the 
20-year expanded programme was insufficient capacity. This has resulted in the 
commencement of a contractor development programme under the Department of 
Rural Roads – a merger of the Lesotho Labour Construction Unit and the Civil 
Works Section – to train local residents in labour-based methods of road construction 
and maintenance to be responsible for the country‟s feeder road network. Quainoo 
(2010:234) observes the Lesotho Labour Construction Unit adopted a three-pronged 
strategy to overcome the situation:  (i) training and development of small-scale 
contractors to execute all maintenance and rehabilitation road works; (ii) increasing 
labour-intensive teams by training more supervisors; and (iii) strengthening in-house 
capacity by orientation and employment of local consultants. 
Quainoo (2010:238) notes that the Department of Rural Roads‟ achievements were: 
Scope of work >60 km of earth access roads to all-weather gravel roads 
 
Was there a pilot project? Yes 
 
Employment created >4 000 temporary jobs generated by 2006 
 23 000 man-years of employment created by 2002 
 
Wages 60 % of project cost 
 
                                                 
7
  A “force account” system means permanent, salaried staff who were seconded to, or worked on, the project or programme. 
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Financial The scope was achieved at a cost of LSL20.98 million  
 
Training Planned: 36 contractors 
Achieved: 24 contractors in 1997 in road maintenance and 
re-gravelling. Each batch of graduates was given a stretch 
of road network as a contract to execute. 
24 additional contractors from Limpopo Province were 
trained in 2004 on road maintenance and re-gravelling 
(including Ms Lokoloane who worked on the Gundo Lashu 
and the Phagameng Extension 8 projects – see 
Sections 5.1.3.2 and 5.1.4.5, and Annexure A). 
The final achievement was 105 contractors trained to 
execute various labour-intensive road works by 2006. 
 
Quainoo (2010:244) holds the two (2) successful programmes implemented before 
and after 1993 highlight the feasibility of operating two (2) delivery systems (“force 
account” and contracting). However, the contracting approach is the method 
preferred by several donor agencies because of perceived better cost effectiveness 
and efficiency. 
2.2.3 GHANA 
Ghana, a sub-Saharan West African country with an area of 238 500 km
2
, in 2008 
had >42 623 km of road network of which about 32 600 km are feeder or rural roads 
Quainoo (2010:128). 
Quainoo (2010:129) suggests that years of lack of maintenance (due to budgetary 
constraints until the mid-1980s) resulted in the rapid deterioration of the good road 
network Ghana once possessed. To alleviate rural poverty and unemployment, Ghana 
launched its first Economic Recovery Programme in 1983 with key objectives to 
stimulate economic growth, promote Private-Sector investments, and reduce the role 
of the state in economic activities. The programme was first piloted in 1987 to 1989 
to identify local institutional, technical and administrative modifications to the 
Kenyan model. 
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The Ghana Feeder Roads Programme (essentially a labour-based road improvement 
programme) started in 1986 with the main purpose of boosting agricultural 
productivity by way of providing access roads for farmers. Ghana embarked upon a 
small-contractor development approach. The Feeder Roads Programme was first 
piloted at Sefwi-Wiawso in the Western Region. The Department of Feeder Roads 
was forced to decentralise and manage the programme through 110 district 
authorities. 
Quainoo (2010:145) states the Ghana Feeder Roads Programme‟s achievements 
were: 
Scope of work 10 000 km of roads maintained as at 1997 
 
Was there a pilot project? Yes 
 
Employment created 4.4 million man-days  
 
Wages There was creation of 34 000 jobs, for which wages 
accounted for about 40 % of the total project costs.  
 
Financial An average cost of USD4 885 per kilometre was achieved 
for maintenance and rehabilitation work and analysis 
indicated that labour-based methods of construction created 
approximately 15 times more jobs per kilometre than 
conventional methods executing similar works 
 
Training 21 contractors after three (3) training courses. 
By 1992 the programme had trained 110 labour-based 
contractors and they had formed their own labour-based 
Contractors‟ Association. 
By the end of 1997, the programme had trained 93 small 
contractors with approximately 60 % (54 contractors) fully 
equipped for rehabilitation work. The remaining 40 % were 
used for specific maintenance. 
As at 1998, 639 personnel had been trained consisting of: 
  93 Small contractors 
380 Supervisors and foremen 
102 Department of Feeder Roads‟ foremen 
  64 Department of Feeder Roads‟ engineers 
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2.3 NOTEWORTHY LABOUR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS 
Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa a contribution to resolve these problems was 
through the implementation of projects and programmes using labour-intensive 
methods of construction, with Kenya and Botswana being good examples. The topic 
of labour-intensive construction has been thoroughly researched and well 
documented (McCutcheon 1993, 1995, 2003). The Malaŵi, Lesotho and Ghana 
labour-intensive programmes are analysed and compared with the Kenya and 
Botswana labour-intensive programmes in Table 2.1 (at the end of this chapter). 
Lessons learned from the Kenya and Botswana perspectives will be drawn for use as 
the criteria for analysing the labour-intensive projects in Modimolle Local 
Municipality. In the sections that follow a background and brief discussion of both 
programmes is given, and the achievements and the successes of these programmes 
will be discussed. This chapter concludes by summarising the factors that contributed 
towards the successes of these two programmes, followed by an overall tabulated 
summary in Table 2.1. 
2.3.1 KENYA: THE RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROGRAMME 1974 
2.3.1.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROGRAMME 
The Kenya Rural Access Roads Programme (KRARP) is the largest and longest-
running programme, having commenced in 1974 (McCutcheon 1993). In 1970 the 
responsibility for construction and maintenance of all classified roads in Kenya was 
centralised within the Ministry of Works. In 1972 the International Labour 
Organisation was commissioned by the Government of Kenya to look into the 
unemployment problem in Kenya. The International Labour Organisation 
recommended the use of labour-intensive methods of rural road construction with the 
view to increasing employment. 
McCutcheon (1993) notes that in 1974 the programme started as a pilot project. In 
1975 the programme was initiated within the Special Project Branch, which was 
housed within the Ministry of Works, which had two district programmes: (1) a 
gravelling, culverting and bridge-building programme (this was not labour intensive) 
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and (2) the rural access roads programme (KRARP) which was labour intensive. In 
1976 KRARP was initiated as a pilot project. 
2.3.1.2 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROGRAMME AS AT 
DECEMBER 1986 
McCutcheon (1993) notes that the major achievement of KRARP has been the large-
scale demonstration of the technical feasibility and economic efficiency of labour-
intensive methods. 
2.3.1.3 PROGRAMME OUTPUT AS AT DECEMBER 1986 
McCutcheon (1993) posits as at December 1986, the programme output was: 
Scope of work   
Total earth roads Planned: 
14 000 km  
(revised to 9 000 km) over 
eight (8) years 
Achieved: 
7 753 km 
(55 % of the original 
planned target or 84 % of 
the revised target) over 
seven (7) years 
Gravelled roads Planned: 
14 000 km 
Achieved: 
5 812 km 
(42 % of the original 
planned target) 
Roads not requiring gravel 462 km  
Earth (unpaved roads) 1 479 km  
   
Number of districts involved 
Number of districts Planned: 23 Achieved: 26 
Number of units Planned: 74 Achieved: 46 
 
Employment created 
Number employed at peak 14 450 casual labourers 
Number employed in 
construction 
9 696 casual labourers 
Number employed for 
maintenance 
4 754 casual labourers 
However, in December 1986, >5000 casual labourers 
were employed as maintenance contractors 
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Years of employment created 
Casual labourers Planned: 
84 000 man-years 
Achieved: 
70 000 man-years 
Supervisory employment Planned: 
6 000 man-years 
Achieved: 
6 000 man-years 
   
Training   
Labourers trained Planned: 
3 441 over five years from 
1976 to 1980 
Achieved: 
   484 by 1980 and 
1 013 by 1984 (trained for 
2 % of the programme) 
Breakdown of labourers 
trained 
Of the 1 013: 
  41 as officers-in-charge 
  11 as maintenance inspectors 
474 as overseers (construction, gravelling, structures, 
maintenance) 
Training facilities The field Training Unit was replaced by a large, specially 
built Training School at Kisii 
 
Financial 
Overall expenditure 
 
USD35 million according to the World Bank evaluation at 
the end of 1984 (deflated to the 1975 price) 
or 62 % of the amount originally projected for about 56 % 
of the projected output (an ~11 % unit cost overrun)  
Investment US35 million USD24 million (69%) 
remained inside Kenya 
Wages 56 % of the cost of the programme 
Since 1980 wages have varied from 60 to 71 % of the 
direct costs 
   
Quality of workmanship In 1979, the Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
gave a favourable report. 
In 1982, an internal study expressed concern about the 
quality of almost half the roads. 
In 1983 a study by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners 
revealed that of the 6 970 km which had been constructed 
to earth road standard, only 1 111 km (representing 
15.94 % of the contract) required rehabilitation. 
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World Bank’s reasons for 
KRARP’s success 
 An effective and successful organisation structure was 
planned for the headquarters, district and construction 
units. It was implemented in 23 districts through 
44 labour-intensive construction units. 
 Construction units, especially the earthwork subunits, 
managed to construct rural access roads in full 
compliance with the design standards, even though 
there was a low supply of skilled technical staff to 
provide continual guidance in the typical cross-section 
layout. 
 Production rates of the exclusively labour-based 
construction units (that of formal-level construction 
units) achieved on average 67 % of the estimated 
45 km per annum per unit and, for two (2) years, 
100 %. The low accomplishment of 33 % on average 
of the planned production rate in the gravelling 
operation was mainly due to inadequate investigation 
of the availability of gravel material leading to the 
inappropriate selection of hauling equipment. Even in 
the gravelling operation, labour-based activities (such 
as quarrying, loading/unloading, and spreading of 
gravel) were not constraints to achieving the planned 
production rates.  
 
2.3.1.4 WORLD BANK’S CONCLUSIONS FROM THE KRARP 
EXPERIENCE 
McCutcheon (1993) asserts the World Bank stated that the following conclusions 
may be drawn from the experience of KRARP: 
 The use of labour-based methods for construction and maintenance of 
rural roads in Africa is technically feasible and financially cost-
effective. 
 Labour-based methods can bring significant economic benefits, in 
addition to having a positive impact on income distribution and the 
quality of life in rural areas. 
 Major donor involvement may be needed at the early stages of a project 
in order to convince local decision-makers that labour-based methods 
can be successful. 
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 A heavy initial input of technical assistance and a well-prepared 
training programme can have a high pay off in developing viable, self-
sustaining institutions to manage rural transport infrastructure. 
 The time necessary to achieve this result is, under the best of circum-
stances, likely to be longer than the normal World Bank project period 
of about five (5) years. 
 To maximise unit productivity, adequate tools, fuel and spare parts for 
equipment should be procured and made available to field units in a 
timely fashion. 
 Technical and financial management of a labour-based rural roads 
programme should be decentralised to as low a level as possible. 
 To execute more equipment-intensive tasks (such as road gravelling or 
structures), small local contractors may be used more effectively than a 
“force account” system. 
 Following the execution of a labour-based programme of road 
improvements, it is relatively easy to initiate a “length-man” system for 
routine maintenance of rural roads. 
 Local involvement in planning for a rural roads programme will 
facilitate its execution and will strengthen local capacity for develop-
ment planning more generally. 
 A monitoring and evaluation programme, though expensive, offers 
additional opportunities to support the development of local institutions 
for more effective planning in the future. 
 The [World] Bank can play an important role as a catalyst for 
innovative programmes, but the active participation of several different 
donors may be needed to sustain such a programme over time. 
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McCutcheon (1993) opines the major reasons for the success of the programme 
were: 
 The initial intellectual assessment of the feasibility of using labour-
intensive methods was sound: productive employment was created 
which resulted in good quality roads. 
 Technical aspects received concentrated alteration during the pilot 
project and the early stages of the national programme through the 
medium of a Technology Unit which also developed all the systems and 
the training material for the programme. 
 Organisation was strong and there was a balance between the 
decentralisation essential for grassroots operation and the centralisation 
required for a national programme: initial selection of roads and 
construction itself were decentralised, but overall planning, budgeting, 
monitoring, systems control and training were centralised. The re-
porting and monitoring system which was worked out during the pilot 
project was effective, while the momentum and capacity existed to 
ensure that it was done thoroughly; eventually it could not sustain its 
dual role and had to be revised. 
 Training was extensive and good at what it set out to do, namely, the 
training of site supervisors and officers in charge of several teams of 
workers, vehicle and tractor drivers. 
 There was long-term political support from key senior officials, first 
within the Ministry of Works, and later within the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. 
 There was long-term financial commitment from the Government of 
Kenya and the eight (8) donor agencies. 
 There was good co-ordination between the Government, the 
Programme and the eight (8) donor agencies. This was partly facilitated 
by technical assistance from the International Labour Organisation. The 
co-ordination assisted the development among all parties of flexibility 
on points of contention to accommodate the views of one another to the 
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betterment of the programme as a whole. This flexibility on the part of 
Government, donors, programme and technical assistance was of 
crucial importance in a programme of this size extending over such a 
long period of time. 
2.3.2 BOTSWANA: THE DISTRICT ROADS LABOUR-INTENSIVE 
IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME 
2.3.2.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROGRAMME 
McCutcheon (1992) opines, closer to South Africa – in Botswana – there is an 
example of a programme which was based upon District Councils which were a more 
decentralised institution than KRARP: the District Roads Labour-Intensive 
Improvement and Maintenance Programme: Local Government 34 (the LG 34 
Programme). In 1974 the Botswana Government initiated a rural roads programme 
within the Ministry of Works and Communication. In 1980 a pilot project was 
initiated in the Central District for labour-intensive district road construction and 
maintenance. 
Between 1980 and 1989 (a 10-year period), 145 people were trained for one (1) year 
as road builders, while 17 people received further training. The standard of 
construction was higher than Kenya‟s KRARP. 
An animal-drawn (donkey) haulage system (McCutcheon 1992) – as opposed to an 
equipment-intensive operation – was adopted. By December 1986 District Council 
Labour-Intensive Road Units had been established in all nine (9) District Councils of 
Botswana. 
2.3.2.2 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROGRAMME AS AT MARCH 
1990 
McCutcheon (1992) notes the achievements of the District Council Labour-Intensive 
Road Units as at March 1990 were: 
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Scope of work >2 000 km of roads upgraded 
 
Districts 
Number of districts  9   
 
Employment 
Number employed at peak 7 150 casual labourers at peak (July 1980 to December 1986) 
 
Number employed in 
construction 
2 812 casual labourers 
of whom ~37 % were female 
Number employed for 
maintenance 
935 casual maintenance workers 
Casual labourers 1 973 casual labourers (April 1986 to December 1986) 
Supervisory employment 180 gang leaders 
 
Training   
Labourers trained   145 supervisors and other senior staff trained by 1990 
Breakdown of labourers trained 81 gang-leaders 
19 senior gang-leaders 
21 maintenance team leaders 
18 technical assistants 
6 technical officers 
40% women supervisors 
Training facilities :  Were established at the Road Training Centre of the Ministry of 
Works and Communications 
 
Financial 
Overall expenditure 
 
BWP3.01 million (1979 to 1985) 
Investment BWP3.01 million BWP1.96 million was retained 
as wages (65 %) 
Wages Employment generated: >10 000 of which >70 % were casual 
labourers. 
 
Quality of workmanship High quality of workmanship. 
 
The only sophisticated equipment was the four-wheel-drive utility vehicle which was 
essential for the senior supervisor and wage payments. Haulage was by donkey carts 
which were specifically designed for the programme (McCutcheon 1992). The carts 
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were locally manufactured and owned by the District Councils, while donkeys were 
hired from local people. 
All construction and maintenance operations were carried out by labour-intensive 
methods. The roads were constructed by gangs of up to 25 labourers working under 
the strict control of supervisors (technical assistants). Senior gang leaders, who were 
responsible for 50 labourers (two (2) gangs), were also trained. One (1) supervisor 
was in control of 100 to 150 labourers (that is, four (4) to six (6) gangs). The 
supervisors were also trained. The process of selection, training and post-training of 
supervisors resulted in gang leaders who were technically competent and capable of 
understanding instructions from technical assistants. 
After construction the roads were maintained by highly labour-intensive methods: 
that is, by an assistant road builder and 6 (six) to 10 maintenance labourers who were 
responsible for 6 to 10 km of road (McCutcheon, 1992). 
2.3.2.3 LG 34 PROGRAMME’S SUCCESSES 
According to McCutcheon (1992), the following factors contributed towards the 
successes of the LG 34 Programme: 
 Government support or long-term political support. 
 Training at different levels: both formal and informal (on-the-job) 
training. 
 The availability and willingness of unskilled people to be employed as 
casual labourers. 
 Community‟s involvement or buy-in which they ensured by appointing 
people in local areas where they were working. 
 The pilot project that was carried out before the programme‟s 
implementation and lessons learned from KRARP. 
 The support by the International Labour Organisation – both financially 
and technically. 
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2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Labour-intensive construction has been advocated, explored and successfully 
implemented in Malaŵi, Lesotho, Ghana, Kenya and Botswana. This chapter has 
further highlighted that training has played a major role with regard to the success of 
these programmes. In all five (5) programmes a pilot project was first implemented 
and then followed by the programme that incorporated lessons learnt from the pilot 
project. 
Based on the number of years of employment created, it is evident that labour-
intensive methods of construction are a solution for countries with a high percentage 
of unemployed and unskilled people and can alleviate poverty. Labour-intensive 
construction methods have been extensively documented and, therefore, developing 
countries such as South Africa – with a high percentage of unemployment and 
poverty – have no reason not to replicate and learn from other countries how to 
implement such programmes successfully. 
In conclusion, it is technically feasible and economically efficient to implement 
projects using labour-intensive methods of construction. 
Finally, long-term political support and donors providing long-term financial 
commitment played a crucial role towards the success of both KRARP and the 
LG 34 Programme. 
The success of the Kenya and Botswana programmes was adopted by the Modimolle 
Local Municipality, and Modimolle wanted to replicate these programmes. 
Experience and lessons learnt provided a sound foundation and the base for 
Modimolle‟s labour-intensive programme. For Modimolle‟s successes these two 
programmes were used as a benchmark and, therefore, to evaluate Modimolle‟s 
projects, KRARP and the LG 34 Programme will be used for comparative purposes. 
The next chapters focus on the local experiences and lessons learnt on labour-
intensive construction methods, from a South African perspective – specifically in 
the Modimolle Local Municipality – while shortcomings will also be discussed 
together with lessons learnt. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of successful completed programmes in Africa 
 
Programme name 
 
Was  
there a  
pilot  
project?  
(yes/no) 
Pilot project  
duration 
(years) 
Programme  
duration 
(years) 
Number  
of  
casual 
labourers 
employed 
Number  
of  
casual 
labourers 
trained  
Quality of 
end 
product 
Number of 
jobs created 
(man-days) 
Money that 
went to 
labour as 
wages  
(%) 
Total roads  
maintained  
and  
upgraded 
(km) 
Malaŵi: 
Labour-intensive 
road construction 
programmes* 
Yes 2 27 6 800 1 538 High 13.6 million 38    14 000 
Lesotho: 
Labour-intensive 
road construction 
programmes* 
Yes 3 20 4 000 
105 
small 
contractors 
High 6 732 60    891 
Ghana: 
Feeder roads 
programme* 
Yes 2 8 34 000 639 High 4.4 million 51.4 10 000 
Kenya: 
KRARP** 
Yes 1 12 14 450 1 013 High 20.1 million 56    13 565 
Botswana: 
LG 34 Programme** 
Yes 2 10 7 150 145 High 7 150 65    2 000 
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CHAPTER 3:  
LITERATURE REVIEW FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter focused on literature with respect to labour-intensive 
programmes undertaken in countries outside South Africa‟s borders. This chapter 
focuses on labour-intensive experiences from a South African perspective. Labour-
intensive methods of construction have been advocated and explored in South Africa 
prior to the introduction of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP),
8
 which 
will also be discussed shortly in this research report. 
The previous Nationalist Party Government and the Government of National Unity 
initiated programmes with the aim of addressing the high level of unemployment and 
the poverty associated with it. However, prior to 2002, South Africa had not been 
successful in implementing any programmes of this kind. 
This chapter focuses on the labour-intensive programmes implemented in South 
Africa before the 1994 general election and post-1994. These programmes will be 
discussed briefly and their methodology critiqued or shortcomings outlined and 
conclusions drawn from any lessons learned. 
The three (3) major programmes implemented in South Africa that this research 
report will focus on are: the Strategic Oil Fund, the Community-Based Public Works 
Programme (CBPWP) and Phase 1 (April 2004 to March 2009) of the Expanded 
Public Works Programme (EPWP). 
                                                 
8
  After several attempts to implement national programmes which would generate more employment and generate skilled 
personnel, South Africa launched the EPWP in April 2004. The main aim of the EPWP was to create 1 million job 
opportunities in a five (5) year time frame in order to alleviate the increasing unemployment problem (EPWP 2004). 
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3.2 THE STRATEGIC OIL FUND (OCTOBER 1991 TO 
MARCH 1994) 
3.2.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROGRAMME 
The Strategic Oil Fund was a programme established in 1991 by the government of 
South Africa funded from the sale of strategic oil reserves (Greyling 1994). Greyling 
notes the United Nations imposed an oil embargo on South Africa on account of the 
system of “apartheid” being enforced by the Nationalist Party South African 
government. The government decided to secure large quantities of oil reserves. As a 
result of several initiatives taken by the State in the reform process, the oil embargo 
was relaxed and the State regarded the reserves as being an unproductive form of 
investment which needed to be reconsidered. 
The reserves did not contribute to South Africa‟s economic growth nor did they 
provide job opportunities. On 29 April 1991, during a budget debate in Parliament, 
the then State President, Mr FW de Klerk, in his speech, announced that the sum of 
approximately ZAR1 billion would be released from the sale of a portion of the oil 
reserves. These funds were to be used for specific projects within a special 
programme. 
The President emphasised that because the funds were once-off, project applications 
had to be of a once-off nature and that the application of these funds was not in 
opposition to the State‟s firm control over expenditure. He further stated that all 
existing resources had to be used as effectively as possible and that communities had 
to be involved in all aspects, including project implementation and responsibility for 
the work carried out. 
The programme was established to address the decline in economic growth and 
concomitant increase in unemployment and it focused mainly on the rural road 
infrastructure. Labour-intensive construction methods were stipulated. The 
implementation of the programme was based on the principles of the World Bank 
and the International Labour Organisation experience in terms of the quality of road 
construction, their cost effectiveness and the extent of job creation. 
27 
 
The programme was planned to commence in October 1991 and to end on 31 March 
1994. During this period South Africa comprised 14 distinct states and provinces, 
namely: 
 Four (4) provinces (Transvaal, Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State) 
 Six (6) self-governing territories (KwaZulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, 
Gazankulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa). 
 Four (4) independent states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei – known as the TBVC). 
The Department of Transport was given the task of co-ordinating the funds to be 
used for the road infrastructure. A sum of ZAR204.2 million was approved for the 
four (4) provinces and for five (5) of the self-governing territories (except for 
QwaQwa). A further ZAR45.5 million was approved in December 1991 and 
allocated to QwaQwa and the TBVC. 
The projects in the four (4) provinces and five (5) of the six (6) self-governing 
territories commenced in October 1991. QwaQwa and the TBVC‟s project began in 
early 1992 as their budget was only approved on 4 December 1991. 
By the end of March 1994, 95 % of the project was completed. In 1994 the 
Department of Transport announced that the funds could be rolled over to 1995, 
which resulted in projects being completed in 1995. The methods of construction 
used during the implementation of this programme differed from one province to 
another. 
Greyling (1994) asserts labour-intensive construction programmes have been 
established successfully in other African countries for the following reasons: 
 All the parties involved were fully committed to the objectives of their 
respective programmes (that is, government departments, funding 
agencies, technical experts and communities). 
 A long-term national perspective was followed. 
 The need for adequate preparation and analysis was identified early in 
their respective programmes. 
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 All the countries researched implemented pilot projects with extensive 
training programmes at all levels. 
 The programmes were all gradually expanded to a national programme 
in line with the institutional and organisational capacities of the 
executing departments. 
3.2.2 CRITIQUING THE METHODOLOGY 
Even though labour-intensive construction methods were stipulated for this 
programme, many important aspects were ignored or neglected: 
 No pilot project was implemented before the commencement of the 
programme. 
 No time was allocated for training. 
 The time allocated for the programme was appropriate for a pilot 
project, not for an actual programme. 
3.2.3 SHORTCOMINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE STRATEGIC OIL 
FUND 
Greyling (1994:218-223) notes: 
 The concept of labour-intensive construction was not adequately 
promoted prior to the implementation of the programme. Consensus 
was not reached by all the parties involved with respect to 
conditions of employment and methods of construction, for 
example. 
 The need for institutional development was ignored (pilot project). 
 No technical research and development was carried out (pilot 
project). 
 Generally, road authorities had little previous experience in the 
planning of labour-intensive road construction. 
 Project costs were badly estimated, existing expertise was not 
consulted neither was international experience taken into account. 
 The biggest failure of the inception and planning phases was that 
insufficient time was permitted to develop the necessary 
technology, establish training programmes (through pilot projects) 
and develop the institutions in general. 
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 Generally, supervision was inadequate because: 
 a. There was no effective training for supervisors, overseers  
  and gang leaders. 
 b. Insufficient funds were budgeted for supervision and  
  training. 
 c. Insufficient power was granted to project managers by the  
  works department to control plant and labour. 
 The effort required to achieve full community participation was 
underestimated by the majority of project managers, contractors and 
state authorities. 
 Payment by means of a fixed daily rate was preferred over incentive 
schemes for the following reasons: 
 a. It was easy to organise. 
 b. The payment system could be used for any form of work. 
 c. It was traditionally done in this manner. Generally, there  
  was a lack of awareness of the need for incentive payment  
  schemes in labour-intensive construction. 
 The fact that 60 % of the budget went to capital-intensive projects, 
indicates the failure of the cost-per-man index (to prioritise 
projects) and the general reluctance by provincial authorities to “go 
the labour-intensive route”. 
 The community-run projects were the least effective, as inadequate 
preparation (particularly training) took place beforehand. 
 Projects were generally badly managed as a result of poor planning 
and little institutional development (including research and 
development). 
 Experts, with extensive international experience in labour-intensive 
construction, were not consulted. 
 Quality control was inadequately budgeted for. Appropriate simple 
field tests were generally not used. 
 Although it was clearly stated that the funds were of a “once-off” 
nature, most road authorities did not consider how future 
maintenance requirements would be funded. 
 Projects run by contractors were generally of better and more 
lasting quality. The opposite could be said for community-run 
projects. 
 The quality of products was neither affected by the prevailing wage 
rate nor by the method of payment. 
 The productivity of labour was generally lower than predicted by 
Coukis [in 1983]. It was also much lower than that achieved in 
established programmes. Insufficient time for experimentation, 
30 
 
planning and training in effective construction methods was 
allowed. 
 There was very little improvement in production over time. 
 Supervision costs were highly variable (between 8 and 37 % of total 
costs). 
 The large variation in gravel road unit costs can again be ascribed 
to the lack of central guidance as well as to the fact that no research 
and development took place prior to and during the programme. 
 The organisational structure used by the Department of Transport to 
co-ordinate the programme was ineffective. 
 The lack of sufficient support in the Department of Transport 
resulted in emphasis being placed solely on expenditure rather than 
coupling it to physical progress. 
 Where additional time was granted for „planning‟, projects con-
tributing to job creation were generally more successful than others. 
 The variation in the figures for actual and planned employment 
generation is a direct result of the lack of previous experience in 
estimating the resources required, as well as the failure to consult 
experts. 
 Some 60 % (ZAR150 million) of the allocation was spent on con-
ventional capital-intensive projects. Labour-intensive construction, 
on its own, accounted for approximately ZAR20 million (or 8 % of 
the total allocation). 
 A total of ZAR61.072 million (approx 25 %) was of direct benefit 
to the community (in terms of wages). 
From the shortcomings noted by Greyling (1994), it is clear that there was a 
commitment from the previous government to address unemployment while 
addressing infrastructure backlog. However, authorities tasked with the responsibility 
to implement the projects labour intensively failed to fulfil the government‟s 
stipulated objectives as only 8 % of the total budget allocation of ZAR1 billion was 
used for labour-intensive construction methods. 
3.2.4 EXTENT TO WHICH THE STATE PRESIDENT’S 
REQUIREMENTS WERE MET 
Greyling (1994:223) observes: 
 There was firm control over expenditure (accountability of funds). 
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 Economic growth and job creation were addressed only marginally 
and were effective only in the short term. The “alleviation of 
unemployment with specific reference to labour-intensive methods” 
was effective only in isolated cases. 
 Projects were not of a “once-off” nature as most of the completed 
products required ongoing maintenance. 
 Community participation was only partially addressed and, in 
general, the projects aimed at job creation were not cost effective. 
 Insufficient time was allocated to “meet the needs” of the com-
munities. 
From Greyling‟s (1994) observations, it may be concluded that the State President‟s 
requirements were not met because, when the President announced that projects were 
of a “once-off” nature, the authorities responsible for maintenance after the projects 
were completed were supposed to make necessary adjustments to their respective 
operational and maintenance budgets to ensure that the newly constructed assets are 
maintained after hand-over and this did not happen. 
3.2.5 MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
STRATEGIC OIL FUND 
Greyling (1994:224-225) opines: 
A programme approach could not be taken for this initiative owing to its short 
duration. From its inception phase onwards, emphasis was placed on 
implementing projects as soon as possible, resulting in a general lack of 
planning. In future, a programme approach must be followed to ensure that 
general consensus is reached on the principles of labour-intensive construction. 
The lack of consensus in the Strategic Oil Fund programme is evident by the 
fact that <50 % of the funds were spent on projects with a substantial increase in 
employment per unit of expenditure. Only 8 % of the funds were spent on truly 
labour-intensive projects. 
The short-term nature of the programme did not allow for the necessary 
dissemination of improved methods of labour-intensive construction or 
organisation. Adequate research and development were also not possible. The 
duration of the programme was simply insufficient to allow the methods of 
construction used to become more efficient. The low level of labour 
productivity in general, throughout the programme, is evidence of this. Periods 
of up to three (3) years have been necessary in other countries with little 
experience in labour-intensive construction. 
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The Strategic Oil Fund programme did not achieve its objectives because, when 
compared with successful programmes such as KRARP in which labour-intensive 
construction alone accounted for 56 % of the total budget, only a paltry 8 % was 
achieved on this programme. The Strategic Oil Fund programme failed to start with 
pilot projects. 
3.2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
From the literature studied, it is clear that the Strategic Oil Fund failed to achieve its 
stated objectives, but there are lessons to be learnt from this programme. The lessons 
should be to do the opposite of all the shortcomings documented by Greyling (1994). 
Instead, the Kenya and Botswana experiences as documented by McCutcheon (1993, 
1992) demonstrate that, for a programme of this nature to be successful, proper and 
adequate training is necessary, while a pilot project (technical research and 
development) is essential. 
Despite all the negative and disturbing factors that arose during the Strategic Oil 
Fund programme, the Government of National Unity also embarked on job-creation 
programmes after taking over in 1994 and the next section focuses on the programme 
between 1994 and 1996. 
3.3 THE COMMUNITY-BASED PUBLIC WORKS 
PROGRAMME (1994 TO 1996) 
3.3.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROGRAMME 
In 1994 South Africa held its first democratic general election and a new 
Government (the Government of National Unity) was elected to lead South Africa. 
However, the Government of National Unity inherited from its predecessors a high 
level of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, infrastructure backlogs and political 
problems. In an attempt to address these problems, the Government of National 
Unity introduced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (Mthombeni, 
1996:143). This primary programme consisted of several secondary programmes that 
served as a delivery mechanism of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
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These primary programmes included, amongst others, the Independent Relief and 
Development Programme, the Employment Creation Programme and the National 
Public Works Programme. The National Department of Public Works was conceived 
as one of the most important role players and stakeholders in the delivery mechanism 
of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The primary implementation of 
the National Public Works Programme was carried out through the Community-
Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP). The objectives of the CBPWP were to 
use highly labour-intensive, capacity building for communities, and a high level of 
job creation through the construction of infrastructural assets. 
Initially the CBPWP was to be a short-term programme with a focus on quick 
delivery and the piloting of approaches for the longer-term National Public Works 
Programme. With this programme the National Department of Public Works also 
wanted to demonstrate to government and the Private Sector how sustainable 
infrastructure backlog could be addressed with active involvement of communities 
without large-scale use of machinery and without lowering the standard of the end 
product (Mthombeni 1996:46). 
As a delivery mechanism the CBPWP was to meet the expressed needs of the poorest 
communities for infrastructure and services. It was also recognised that, during the 
first year, the CBPWP could be used as a mechanism to capacitate provinces to 
implement development projects. It should also be noted that the Government of 
National Unity sub-divided South Africa into nine (9) provinces after the 1994 
general elections. 
The CBPWP consists of a governmental component through the Provincial 
Departments of Works in each of South Africa‟s nine (9) provinces, and a non-
governmental component administered through NGOs that have a commendable 
record of management of projects and adherence to the principles of the CBPWP. 
Mthombeni (1996:6;47) states that the Government of National Unity allocated 
ZAR250 million to the National Department of Public Works for the fiscal year 1994 
to 1995. ZAR150 million was to be shared amongst the provinces in accordance with 
four (4) indices including levels of unemployment, poverty, need for skills and need 
for infrastructure. The remaining ZAR100 million was allocated to the four 
(4) NGOs chosen as they had a proven capacity to distribute funds. 
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Initially the CBPWP was a community-managed programme that was implemented 
by a CBPWP unit within each of the Provincial Departments of Works. Funds were 
allocated to the Provincial Departments of Works who were responsible for 
identifying projects from applications received from communities. The projects were 
chosen using the following CBPWP criteria: highly labour-intensive; community 
involvement in identifying needs and priorities; management and maintenance plans 
of assets created; usefulness of facilities and assets for improvement of community 
welfare; incorporation of training and capacity building in the programmes, and their 
design and implementation ability. 
Funds were then transferred from the Provincial Departments of Works into 
community bank accounts for the planning and implementation of the projects. 
Communities were, in turn, responsible for appointing designers and trainers in order 
for these projects to be designed and then implemented by the community workforce. 
Mthombeni (1996:6;47) notes that for the NGO component the following four 
(4) NGOs were included: the Independent Development Trust‟s Community 
Employment Programme (ZAR70.25 million), the Siyakha Sugar Community 
Development Programme (ZAR12.0 million), Youth Supported Projects (formerly 
the National Youth Service Initiative) (ZAR8.9 million) and the Transkei 
Community School Building Trust (ZAR4.0 million). 
The CBPWP had numerous organisational problems that developed from 
inappropriate administrative and institutional arrangements. Wage levels and other 
benefits were not clearly defined and CBPWP workers were contracted outside of 
formal employment conditions. Policies were often made without the flexibility to 
adapt to different circumstances and project types, for example, the Community 
Employment Programme recommended a very low blanket wage level as a vital 
“self-selection mechanism” that would make sure that only the poorest people were 
employed. However, this policy did not take into consideration the differences in 
economic development and unemployment levels across the country. 
The communities involved had insufficient technical capacity and there was little 
technical support and training. Technical assistance was often missing at the 
planning stage, which led to inappropriate project choices. Issues like affordability 
and sustainability were sometimes neglected. Important aspects – such as 
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maintenance plans – were omitted, despite the fact that they were required by the 
project syntax selection criteria. Women, making up the largest proportion of the 
rural poor and the key target of the CBPWP, were not involved in the planning stages 
of projects and were usually involved only during implementation. 
3.3.2 SUMMARY OF SHORTCOMINGS 
In summary, the following shortcomings were noted: 
 Despite the fact that CBPWP was a pilot programme, there was no 
effective monitoring and evaluation programme that led to a 
realignment of the National Public Works Programme based on the 
lessons learnt. 
 It is clear that the National Department of Public Works did not fully 
take into consideration some of the lessons learnt from the other 
employment creation and infrastructure provision experiences. 
 Important aspects were neglected, such as involvement of women at an 
early stage; maintenances plans; technical assistance at the planning 
stages, and training and technical development. 
 The State budgetary processes did not allow for sufficient planning time 
at a provincial level. 
3.3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
From Mthombeni (1996) it is clear that the CBPWP failed in that: 
 One (1) of the key indicators of the progress of the provincial aspect of 
the CBPWP up until 1996 was that only a very small proportion (14 %) 
of the allocated budget was spent. 
 There was a lack of appropriate labour standards and regulations and no 
suitable wage policy for community-based projects aimed at the poorest 
of the poor. 
 Since delivery was a key focus area, CBPWP did not place sufficient 
importance on a preparation and learning period for South African 
public institutions. 
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3.4 THE EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME 
PHASE 1 (APRIL 2004 TO MARCH 2009) 
3.4.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROGRAMME 
On Friday, 26 August 2011, McCutcheon presented a paper prepared by 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011) entitled “The Expanded Public Works 
Programme: policy, rhetoric, reality and opportunities foregone during the 
expenditure of over R40 billion on infrastructure.” The researcher was part of the 
audience. 
According to McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:1-2) salient points from the 
presentation are: 
 South Africa has high levels of unemployment and poverty. The 
problems of unemployment (approximately 40 % unemployed 
according to the “broad” definition and close to 25 % using the 
“narrow” definition) and poverty alleviation are of national strategic 
importance. 
 The Expanded Public Works Programme initiated in 2004 is one of 
Government‟s strategic components for generating employment and 
alleviating poverty. 
 The goal of the Expanded Public Works Programme was to alleviate 
unemployment for least one (1) million people between 2004 and 2009. 
This goal was to be achieved by generating work opportunities in four 
(4) sectors of the economy: Infrastructure, Environment, Social and 
Economic. 
 Labour-intensive methods were to be used in the provision of public 
goods and services. The budget for the infrastructure component was 
ZAR15 billion. 
 The first five (5) years of the EPWP started in April 2004 and ended in 
March 2009. At the start of the Programme, the EPWP Public Sector 
Budget totalled ZAR21 billion; ZAR15 billion for infrastructure and 
the balance for the Environmental and Social Sector (the budget for the 
Economic Sector had not yet been determined). 
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 In May 2008 the Minister of Public Works announced that the goal of 
creating temporary work opportunities for a minimum of one 
(1) million people had been achieved a year ahead of schedule. 
 It was intended that the findings of the study should guide approaches 
and strategies across all spheres of government in order to inform 
policy reviews of the programme. At the same time focus group 
discussions were held with communities in which the EPWP had been 
implemented and assets created. 
 The paper goes beyond the conclusions reached in the studies. In 
particular it focuses on one (1) sector: Infrastructure. The paper begins 
with a brief outline of the objective of the EPWP and proceeds to 
outline the conditions which were originally set, particularly for 
implementation in the Infrastructure Sector, which accounted for 84 % 
of national expenditure and provided the greatest opportunity for the 
generation of a significant increase in employment per unit of 
expenditure. 
 McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:7) note that the EPWP has 
generated a considerable amount of data, about 20 quarterly reports that 
contain over 3 949 pages of information. However, these reports say 
nothing about the amount and value of physical assets produced. 
 From about halfway through the EPWP increasing attention was paid to 
one (1) item: the number of temporary work opportunities. To a lesser 
extent the amount of training was mentioned (McCutcheon and Taylor 
Parkins 2011:8). 
 McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:8) opine that it is extremely 
disturbing that no attempt has been made to obtain the total amount of 
the different types of assets produced during the expenditure of 
>ZAR40 billion; especially given the amount of time and effort focused 
on the recording of details relating to the number of work opportunities 
generated. In itself this indicates that the intention of the EPWP 
regarding infrastructure was relief rather than development. 
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3.4.2 SHORTCOMINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXPANDED PUBLIC 
WORKS PROGRAMME PHASE 1 
From McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins‟ (2011) paper, the shortcomings of Phase 1 of 
the EPWP are summarised below: 
Scope of work   
Total infrastructure Planned:  
(In the Infrastructure Sector 
37 000 km of road, 31 000 km 
of pipelines, 1 500 km of 
stormwater drains, and 150 km 
of sidewalks were to be 
constructed) over five (5) 
years 
Achieved:  
Not mentioned in the quarterly 
reports 
Gravelled roads Planned:  
Not clear 
Achieved:  
Not mentioned in the quarterly 
reports 
 
Employment created 
Number employed at peak Planned: 
1 000 000 casual labourers 
 
Achieved: 
1 069 819 of which 750 000 
were to be casual labourers in 
infrastructure projects 
 
Years of employment created 
Casual labourers Planned:  
The goal of the EPWP was: to 
alleviate unemployment for a 
minimum of 1 million people 
in South Africa: at least 40 % 
women, 30 % youth and 
2 % disabled 
Achieved:  
Employment created not 
clearly categorised in terms of 
the goal in the quarterly 
reports  
 
Training   
Labourers trained Planned: 
(It was planned that 2 % of the 
programme budget must be 
allocated for training) from 
2004 to 2009 
Achieved: 
not mentioned in the quarterly 
reports. 
Breakdown of labourers trained Planned: 
Training will form part of the 
programme. 
Achieved: 
Not mentioned in the quarterly 
reports 
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Training facilities Planned: 
It was planned that a Training 
College on labour-intensive 
construction methods would 
be built 
Achieved: 
Not in place (as at February 
2012) 
 
Financial 
Overall expenditure Planned:  
ZAR15 billion (in 2004)  
for infrastructure 
Achieved:  
ZAR42 billion (in 2009),  
amounting to 280 % of the 
2004 planned expenditure 
Wages ZAR4.5 billion or 10.8 % of expenditure 
EPWP labour intensity decreased from 27.2 % in 2004 to 9.4 % 
in 2009, averaging 10.8 % over five (5) years 
 
Quality of workmanship In December 2008 McIntosh Xaba and Associates were 
appointed by the Ministry of Public Works to carry out a meta-
analysis of over 100 documents relating to the national EPWP 
since its inception in April 2004. McCutcheon and Taylor 
Parkins were members of the team that performed the studies. 
From this study the number of assets constructed over five (5) 
years were not part of the report as the focus was on the number 
of jobs created.   
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:5) assert that in 2004 the Division of 
Revenue Act, Act No. 5 of 2004 (RSA 2004) made it mandatory to use labour-
intensive methods for specific categories of infrastructure funded through the formal 
channels through which public infrastructure is funded: the Provincial Infrastructure 
Grants and the Municipal Infrastructure Grants. 
Funding allocated for the Expanded Public Works Programme formed part of normal 
government expenditure and, therefore, had to follow normal procedures as specified 
by National Treasury under the Division of Revenue Act, Act No. 5 of 2004 (RSA 
2004). These procedures included an annual audit. However, the National Treasury 
failed to undertake monitoring and penalise those Implementing Agents who did not 
comply, thus contributing towards the failure of Phase 1 of the EPWP. 
Project costs were badly estimated. Indeed, in some cases, the actual costs amounted 
to twice or sometimes even quadruple the amount of the budget, indicating failure by 
implementing agents to monitor and contain project expenditure. 
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The Consolidated Overview – a paper by McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:6) – 
stated that “a National Training College for labour-intensive construction would be 
established.” However, as at February 2012, the EPWP is in its 8th year of 
implementation but this college has not yet been established. When compared with 
the Kenya and Botswana programmes where Training Centres were established and 
training of supervisors, labourers and engineers took place and was successful, it 
indicates South Africa has failed to replicate them. 
The specific categories for which it was mandatory for public bodies to use labour-
intensive construction methods were: low-volume roads, stormwater drainage, 
sidewalks and trenches. However, the fact that little labour-intensive construction has 
taken place in South Africa‟s seven (7) predominantly rural provinces, where low-
volume roads were possible to build, has contributed towards the failure. 
Additional conditions were enumerated in the Guidelines. McCutcheon and Taylor 
Parkins (2011:5-6) note that these included: 
 Consultants responsible for labour-intensive projects must have 
completed accredited training; the consultants who design 
infrastructure and prepare contracts should have accredited training 
– specific to the person and not to the firm. The intention was that 
when it came to designing projects the consultants would be 
equipped to optimise the use of labour. 
 The EPWP guidelines contained “copy and paste” clauses for 
integration into standard contract documentation. 
 Standard clauses would be included in the contracts, which would 
compel/ensure the use of labour-intensive methods. 
 In particular, the contract would identify those items which could 
be constructed labour intensively and would compel their 
subsequent use by stating that if labour-intensive methods were not 
used for the specified items, the contractor would not be paid. 
 Company owners, managers and supervisors of labour-intensive 
sites would also have to have accredited training. The contractors 
would receive accredited training in the following ways: the 
contractor would be trained to run a company; each contractor 
would have two (2) site supervisors who would be fully conversant 
with the organisation of teams of labour-intensive workers. 
Implementation would be audited to see whether the specific categories of work 
had been constructed labour intensively. Site operations would be audited, as 
would provincial and municipal expenditure to see whether the institution had 
complied with EPWP regulations. 
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Furthermore, future allocations of funding were to be dependent upon the extent 
to which an authority had complied with these conditions. For example, if the 
institution had not constructed the specific types of infrastructure labour 
intensively, then they would not be given funding in future. Treasury took on 
the role of monitoring the work in terms of compliance with the legislated 
“conditionalities”. This allowed for public accountability, again in contrast with 
previous programmes that had attempted to promote the use of labour-intensive 
methods. 
It was also stated that, in the Infrastructure Sector, because labour-intensive 
methods would be used, the 750 000 work opportunities would be in addition to 
the opportunities that would have been provided through conventional machine-
intensive construction. Additionally, the expenditure on infrastructure would be 
without detriment to the fiscus. (By contrast, expenditure on the social 
component of the EPWP required additional funding.) 
The above elements provide the legislative and regulatory framework required 
for labour-intensive construction. 
The factors mentioned above, combined with the objectives, comprise part of 
the frame of reference to evaluate the results of the EPWP. 
3.4.3 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FROM NATIONAL STUDIES ON THE 
EPWP 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:7) reached a number of conclusions from a 
review of over 100 documents and categorised these conclusions into three (3) 
levels: 
 Policy and Programme 
 Issues requiring attention above the level of Programme Management 
 Programme and Project management. 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:7) mention four (4) related to Policy and 
Programme: 
 The direct and indirect beneficiaries of the EPWP clearly (and 
desperately) welcomed the short-term work opportunities, and those 
that had worked on the EPWP were eager to get further work 
opportunities. They wanted more, much more. 
 In relation to infrastructure, the EPWP is currently not a 
development programme but rather an ad hoc collection of existing 
and new projects. 
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 There was little compliance with the requirements as set out in the 
Division of Revenue Act No. 5 of 2004 (RSA 2004). These authors 
note there has been little or no enforcement to date (2011) with 
respect to labour intensity, type of project or component of project, 
related contractual documentation and training. 
 Another major conclusion, which resulted in part from the lack of 
adherence to the Division of Revenue Act No. 5 of 2004 (RSA 
2004) requirements, is that insufficient work opportunities have 
been generated given the amount of expenditure. In relation to the 
Infrastructure Sector for instance, just over 1 million work 
opportunities were generated at a cost ZAR42 billion, instead of a 
projected 750 000 for the ZAR15 billion budgeted in 2004. 
According McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:7) the first conclusion is of critical 
importance: 
“Beneficiaries wanted more work opportunities– because so many decision 
makers and theorists with comfortable, well-paid jobs, state with confidence 
that, in South Africa, the poor are not prepared to do this type of work or, if 
they do, it will be done badly.” 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:8) briefly record and comment upon the main 
findings with respect to four (4) sets of data namely: 
 EPWP budget versus actual expenditure by sector 
 EPWP budget versus actual expenditure by province 
 Labour intensity in the EPWP 
 Labour intensity versus average project cost. 
3.4.3.1 EPWP BUDGET VERSUS ACTUAL EXPENDITURE BY 
SECTOR 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:8) note: 
The 2004 budget for the whole EPWP was ZAR21 billion; by 2009 almost 
ZAR50 billion had been spent. In itself this indicates a difference between the 
South African economy and most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa: the 
additional expenditure was generated internally without reliance upon donor 
funding. Furthermore the actual 2004 to 2009 budget allocations amounted to 
more than four (4) times the original budget, or twice the actual expenditure. 
Although this indicates a severe inability to spend the allocated budget, it again 
indicates the scale of internal resources available to South Africa. 
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The Infrastructure Sector had by far the greatest share, R42 billion or 84 % of 
total expenditure between 2004 and 2009. Actual expenditure on infrastructure 
amounted to 280 % of the 2004 budget estimate of ZAR15 billion. 
Comparison between allocated budget and actual expenditure shows that for the 
period 2004 to 2009 the trend was for the EPWP to spend a lower proportion of 
the allocation. The Economic Sector was the worst affected of the four (4) 
sectors. This is more than interesting, given the amount of attention and 
emphasis placed upon the role of small, medium and micro-entrepreneurial 
development in general and the EPWP in particular. 
When comparing South Africa with other developing countries implementing labour-
intensive construction programmes, a major concern is the budget overrun of 280 % 
that was committed on the infrastructure sector of the EPWP first phase. This was a 
sector with great potential, where more job opportunities should have been created 
but this was not the case. Because South Africa could afford to fund a programme of 
this magnitude without external funding this worked to the country‟s disadvantage as 
external funds would probably have come with certain conditions which would have 
had to be adhered to and monitored. 
3.4.3.2 EPWP BUDGET VERSUS ACTUAL EXPENDITURE BY 
PROVINCE 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:9) state: 
Gauteng Province and the Eastern Cape accounted for nearly half of the actual 
expenditure, while the remaining seven (7) provinces shared the other half. Five 
(5) provinces (namely, Free State, Limpopo, Northwest, Mpumalanga and the 
Northern Cape) combined made up less than one quarter of total expenditure. 
All five (5) of these provinces have significant rural populations, parts of which 
have been termed “deep rural”. With the notable exception of the extremely 
poor Eastern Cape, the above distribution of funding shows insufficient focus 
on the rural areas within the EPWP, as does the fact that over 25 % of 
expenditure took place in Gauteng Province, which is the most urbanised 
province in South Africa. 
These authors note (p9) that in 2008 Mitchell also concluded that “there was a lack 
of emphasis upon the rural” which was a severe shortcoming in programme design. 
The EPWP‟s goal of generating work opportunities in the infrastructure sector stated 
clearly that it would be spent on four (4) categories of construction, of which low-
cost, low-volume roads was one of them and this should have taken place in the five 
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(5) provinces which are predominantly rural as these roads are mostly found in rural 
areas. Instead, however, about 25 % was spent in the most urbanised province in 
South Africa, Gauteng, which indicates failure to achieve the programme‟s goals. 
3.4.3.3 LABOUR INTENSITY IN THE EPWP 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:9) observe: 
There was a steady decline in labour intensity from 26 % at the start of 2004 to 
nearly 11.3 % at the end of the fourth quarter of the 2008/2009 financial year. 
Even the Social Sector fell from 85 % to 43 %. 
When considering the decline in the infrastructure sector with regard to employment 
generation, while the EPWP is still claiming to be labour-intensive, South Africans 
should be worried about the next phase of this programme: the major reasons for its 
failure are neglecting basics (such as training supervisors, allocating time towards 
development, research and the training stage (pilot projects)), which played a major 
role in the achievements of other developing countries‟ programmes. 
3.4.3.4 LABOUR INTENSITY VERSUS AVERAGE PROJECT 
COST 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:9) state: 
The average project cost was derived from the division of the actual expenditure 
by the total number of projects. Labour intensity dropped significantly over 
time as the value of the projects increased. As project values doubled, labour 
intensity decreased by two-thirds. Fast tracking the nominal incorporation of 
large and more sophisticated projects into the programme, thus increasing 
expenditure and numbers, intensified the “business as usual” attitude. 
One of the factors to measure the success of any project is project expenditure. 
Therefore, if projects were stipulated to be implemented labour-intensively and the 
project costs doubled, then even the amount of money that goes to labour should also 
double but, in Phase 1 of the EPWP, this was not the case, which indicates a 
shortcoming. 
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3.4.4 INFRASTRUCTURE AND LABOUR INTENSITY 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:9-10) concentrated upon the Infrastructure 
Sector not only because it is the largest but, more importantly, it is the main sector in 
which it was originally planned that a significant increase in productive employment 
would be generated per unit of expenditure. 
In the Consolidated Programme Overview of June 2004 it had been estimated 
that ZAR45 billion would be spent over five (5) years in the formally planned 
provision and municipal infrastructure throughout South Africa (EPWP, 2004). 
However, it was estimated that ZAR15 billion of this ZAR45 billion would be 
spent on four (4) categories of construction: 
 Low-cost, low-volume roads 
 Stormwater drainage 
 Trenches and 
 Pedestrian and cycle paths. 
These four (4) categories of infrastructure are eminently amenable to being 
constructed using highly labour-intensive methods. Using techniques and 
procedures that have been well tried and tested elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa 
and in South Africa, it could reasonably be expected that at least 40 % of direct 
construction costs would be earned by the labourers. 
Furthermore, as McCutcheon (1992) and McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:10) 
note: 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the rural areas. Their interpretation of this 
is that less money was spent in those areas on the types of infrastructure which 
are particularly amenable to being constructed using labour-intensive methods. 
Little attention has been paid to projects where successful models from 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa could be replicated. For example, the Kenya 
Rural Access Road Programme and its immediate successor, the Minor Roads 
Programme, constructed and maintained over 12 000 km of low-cost, low-
volume gravel road. At its peak the programme employed, at the same time, 
over 10 000 people on construction and 5 000 on maintenance. Similar 
programmes existed in Botswana, Lesotho and Malaŵi (Quainoo 2010 and 
Quainoo and McCutcheon 2009). 
Furthermore, McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:11) note: 
Gauteng Province accounted for 25 % of expenditure on infrastructure...Very 
little of the expenditure on infrastructure in Gauteng was devoted to the four (4) 
categories that were supposed to be the main foci of the EPWP Infrastructure 
Sector. The majority of expenditure in Gauteng was on a much higher standard 
of road. That standard of road could have been constructed using labour-
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intensive methods. Prior to the EPWP over 400 km of the standard of road 
(residential and urban bus routes) had been constructed in various parts of 
South Africa [citing Hattingh et al 2007 and McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins, 
2003]. But the effective use of labour-intensive methods necessitates a re-
engineering of the whole design, contract and construction process [citing 
McCutcheon et al 2007]. This has not taken place. The extent of the re-
engineering required for low-cost roads is extensive but not to the extent 
required for higher standards of roads. 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:11) discuss several anomalies that 
occurred, such as: 
 Projects were simply labelled “labour intensive”, but conventional 
methods were used. 
 Consultants did not re-engineer the projects: new designs were not 
prepared; the greater use of productive labour was not the “design 
driver”; appropriate specifications were not included in supposedly 
labour-intensive contracts. 
 Some of the contracts included clauses that indicated that labour-
intensive methods would be used, but the clauses were ignored. 
 Contracts were awarded to small contractors who were not able to 
use labour-intensive methods. 
 Not only were contracts implemented using conventional capital-
intensive methods: in some cases extra people were hired to sit 
under a tree alongside the site where the equipment was working in 
order to raise the number of employees. Often even this tokenism 
was not considered necessary. 
 The essentially machine-intensive, conventional methods resulted 
in the cost per kilometre varying from two (2) to four (4) times the 
cost which would have been achieved during the same period using 
machine-intensive methods had the projects been implemented 
outside the umbrella of the EPWP. 
 Given that these contracts generally use the same amount of labour 
as conventional projects, the extremely high total costs meant that 
the proportion of expenditure going to labour was even less than 
under conventional construction/normal conditions. 
 Contractual clauses were not enforced. 
Part of the reason for this sorry state of affairs is that there is very little in-house 
capacity or competence within most public bodies to assess technical matters. 
This is outsourced to consultants. Unless the consultants have been thoroughly 
trained, they cannot design labour-intensive projects, or prepare appropriate 
contract documentation, or assess the effectiveness of implementation. 
Added to these factors is the prevailing prejudice in the civil construction 
industry against labour-intensive construction. 
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Infrastructure is one sector that has great potential to generate more job 
opportunities, when considering Table 2.1 (a comparison of successful completed 
programmes in Africa). Table 2.1 shows that the money that went to labour as wages 
ranges between 38 % and 65 %. In the case of South Africa‟s EPWP, looking at the 
worst case scenario (38 %) the amount of money that could have gone to labour in 
the form of wages on Phase 1 should have been ZAR15.96 billion, ZAR11.46 billion 
more than what was actually achieved. This aspect alone indicates the magnitude of 
the failure of Phase 1 of the EPWP. 
3.4.5 CRITIQUING THE METHODOLOGY 
Phase 2 of the EPWP started in April 2009 and was supposed to come to an end in 
2014. As at February 2012 the programme has not yielded the expected (planned) 
results. Of major concern is the picture painted to the public at large, even as recently 
as October 2011 (EPWP 2011:9), in which it is claimed that the programme has been 
successful thus far, while it has not. 
 Although the EPWP had no pilot programme, the fact that it is now on 
Phase 2 presents an opportunity for improvement but, since experts 
have not been consulted, the degree of failure is still high. 
 In Phase 1 of the EPWP, there was no effective monitoring and 
evaluation.  The same contention holds for Phase 2 which is currently 
in progress and, if no serious intervention is made, the whole 
programme will fail. 
 It is clear that Phase 1 of the EPWP did not fully take into consideration 
some of the lessons learnt from the other employment creation and 
infrastructure provision experiences elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 During Phase 1 of the EPWP several important aspects were neglected 
(such as creating employment in rural areas; technical assistance at the 
planning stages, and training and technical development). 
 More emphasis was put on the number of jobs created but nothing was 
said about the infrastructure constructed and its quality. 
 Non-compliance with the Division of Revenue Act No. 5 of 2004 (RSA 
2004) to enforce labour-intensive projects indicates failure from all 
48 
 
spheres of Government: Municipal, Provincial and National 
Departments and Treasury to fulfil their roles. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
From the paper by McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011) it is clear that Phase 1 of 
the EPWP has failed in that: 
 Its objective was to create temporary work opportunities and income for 
at least 1 million unemployed people. Even though 1 069 819 jobs were 
achieved (which was 7 % greater than the target), it was achieved at 
nearly double the anticipated cost. 
 The percentage of project cost that went to labour as wages was below 
11 %, and this indicates failure when compared with other successful 
programmes, where more than 50 % was achieved. 
 The fact that there was a decline in labour intensity from 26 % at the 
start of 2004 to nearly 11.3 % at the end of the fourth quarter of the 
2008/09 financial year indicates failure of this programme to achieve 
its objectives. 
 Another objective was to provide needed public goods and services, 
labour intensively to required standards. The fact that there is no record 
of assets constructed in the quarterly reports indicates a major failure. 
 An objective was to increase the potential of participants to earn a 
future income by providing work experience, training and information 
related to local work opportunities, further education and training, and 
small-, medium- and micro-enterprise (SMME) development but, in the 
view of McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:13), little was achieved 
in this regard. 
 It was also stated that there was going to be a National Training Centre 
for training of foremen, supervisors, contractors and engineers on 
labour-intensive construction (EPWP 2004:26), which, to date, 
(February 2012) has still not been established. This also indicates the 
programme‟s failure, when compared with the Kenya and Botswana 
programmes, where their successes were a direct result of the Training 
Centres they have established. 
49 
 
 Despite there being long-term political support and Government‟s 
commitment to the programme, the fact that there was a lack of in-
house (municipal and provincial departments) capacity and/or skills on 
labour-intensive projects where the implementation was taking place 
and failure to consult experts with extensive experience on labour-
intensive projects contributed to the programme‟s failure. 
 The fact that in the Infrastructure Sector it was anticipated that the 
average duration of employment would be 80 days, whereas an average 
of about 66 days was achieved over the full five (5) year period, also 
indicates failure of Phase 1 of the EPWP. 
 McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:13) opine “wages in the 
infrastructure components of the EPWP amounted to only 
ZAR4.5 billion or 10.8 % of expenditure.” However, had proper 
labour-intensive methods been used for specific categories of 
infrastructure, a labour intensity of at least 40 % (p13) of direct 
construction costs would have been achieved. “This would have 
amounted to some R16.7 billion. Thus, an additional amount of 
>R12 billion should have reached the poor” (p13)... but this was not the 
case with Phase 1 of the EPWP. 
 The fact that during the EPWP labour intensity decreased from 27.2 % 
in 2004 to 9.4 % in 2009, averaging 10.8 % over five (5) years, 
indicates how badly Phase 1 has failed as compared to the other 
successful programmes discussed in Chapter 2 of this research report. 
In conclusion, Phase 1 of the EPWP has failed and currently (February 2012) Phase 2 
of the EPWP is more than 50 % into its implementation but the basics are still not 
right and it is almost certain that it will also fail unless drastic intervention takes 
place. McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011:14) opine 
if a proper programme is not established, the second phase [Phase 2] of the 
EPWP will be just as inefficient in generating a significant increase in effective 
work opportunities amongst the poor, particularly the rural poor, during the 
provision of public infrastructure. 
Thorough research into Phase 1 of the EPWP is required in order to establish the 
number of assets created and the quality of these assets. 
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In summary, this chapter focused on experiences from labour-intensive programmes 
implemented in South Africa. Even though there were few successes, there were 
experiences and lessons that may be taken from the programmes studied with regard 
to employment creation. 
The Strategic Oil Fund and CBPWP claimed that they were based on the principles 
of labour-intensive projects. Equally, they claimed to have incorporated lessons from 
international experiences. However, during implementation, there was little evidence 
of either of these claims. Firstly, a few of the projects were carried out labour 
intensively. Secondly, the so-called programmes did not follow the programme 
format adopted in Kenya and Botswana: planning a series of related projects, 
commencing with pilot projects to adopt labour-intensive methods through local 
authorities, training at first on a small scale then expanding gradually to provide 
human resources to implement the programme, all combined within a small 
framework guided by the principle of programme management. 
Table 3.1 compares the three (3) programmes discussed in this chapter, indicating 
their shortcomings with regard to the amount of money that went to labour and 
employment created. By comparing this table with Table 2.1 on the regional African 
experiences it clearly indicates that South Africa has failed to replicate the Kenya 
and Botswana programmes. When looking at South Africa‟s programmes they claim 
to be labour intensive, yet – in some of the programmes – the amount of expenditure 
paid to labourers as wages cannot be accounted for or is not even mentioned. The 
same situation holds for the number of assets and the quality of the end product 
created. 
The major failing in the projects implemented in South Africa has been that the 
research and development phase or pilot project phase and training were neglected. 
Little was done with regard to small contractor development, for which McCutcheon 
and Taylor Parkins (2011:13) note: 
considerably less start-up and operation capital is required and it was one of the 
prime considerations for the promotion of labour-intensive small contractors in 
the East and West Africa. 
The negative and cautionary lessons learned from this chapter form a very good base 
for Chapter 4 which focuses on the Modimolle Local Municipality labour-intensive 
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pilot project. From the shortcomings identified in Chapter 3, Modimolle‟s aims and 
objectives were to benchmark on the regional experiences and do the opposite of the 
South African experiences outlined in this chapter. 
The next chapter, Chapter 4, introduces Modimolle Local Municipality and their 
labour-intensive pilot project, which formed a base for the Modimolle Council to 
resolve to implement all their infrastructure projects using labour-intensive methods 
of construction as far as practicable. The problems encountered during the pilot 
project, together with the successes, are documented in Chapter 4. 
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Table 3.1: South African perspective: comparison of three major programmes implemented in South Africa 
 
Programme name 
 
Was there 
a pilot 
project 
(yes/no) 
Pilot 
project  
duration 
(years) 
Programme  
planned 
duration 
(years) 
Programme  
achieved duration 
(years) 
Number  
of  
casual 
labourers 
employed  
 Quality of end product 
Money that went 
to labour as 
wages  
(ZAR) 
Money that 
went to 
labour as 
wages  
(%) 
Strategic Oil Fund* No 0 3 4 Not clear poor 20 million*
+  8 % 
Community-Based 
Public Works 
Programme** 
No 0 2 
After 2 years 
only 14 % of 
the budget was 
spent 
Not clear poor Not clear Not clear 
Expanded Public Works 
Programme: 
Phase 1*** 
No 0 5 5 1 069 819 
Not clear as the assets 
constructed do not form part of 
the quarterly reports 
4.5 billion 10.8 % 
Source: *Greyling (1994), *+Greyling (1994:223),  **Mthombeni (1996), ***McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2011) 
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CHAPTER 4:  
MODIMOLLE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY AND THE 
PILOT PROJECT 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
Post the 1994 general election, South Africa was demarcated into nine (9) provinces 
(Figure 4.1). The municipalities in these provinces were divided into three (3) 
categories (GCIS 2009): 
 Category A are the metropolitan municipalities and, in June 2007 
(when this research was conducted), South Africa had 6 (six) 
metropolitan municipalities, of which three (3) were in Gauteng 
Province, one (1) in KwaZulu-Natal, one (1) in the Eastern Cape and 
one (1) in the Western Cape. Limpopo, Free State Mpumalanga, 
North West and Northern Cape had no metropolitan (Category A) 
municipalities. 
 Category B are the local municipalities. In June 2007 there were 227 
local municipalities, of which 25 local municipalities were in Limpopo 
Province. 
 Category C are the district municipalities, and as at June 2007, there 
were 45 district municipalities in South Africa. Limpopo had five (5) 
district municipalities.  
Limpopo Province (Figure 4.1) is predominantly rural, with vast areas of land being 
utilised for farming. In September 2001 and September 2002, Limpopo Province was 
the poorest province in South Africa with a published unemployment rate of 33.1 % 
and 32.6 %, respectively (SSA 2009: Labour Force Survey Historical Revision: 
September Series, 2000 to 2007). All 25 local municipalities in Limpopo Province 
also battled with unemployment and backlog problems with regard basic services  
54 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of South Africa, showing Limpopo Province and Modimolle Local Municipality (the study area) (not to 
scale) 
Source: Ms W Phillips, Department of Geography 
University of the Witwatersrand 
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such as water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal, road and storm water 
construction, and maintenance. In this respect, Modimolle Local Municipality was no 
different, nor was it better off when coming to issues of unemployment: the level of 
unemployment was estimated to be at 50 % in 2002 (Modimolle 2003). Apart from 
the unemployment problem, Modimolle also had basic service backlog problems. 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION TO MODIMOLLE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 
Modimolle Local Municipality is a Category B municipality situated within the 
Waterberg District Municipality. It is 6 228 km
2
 in size with a total population of 
52 599 (Modimolle 2009). The Municipality is a water service authority and provides 
water and electricity to its community. Modimolle is situated ~130 km to the north of 
Pretoria along the N1 road and ~155 km to the south-west of Polokwane (the 
provincial capital of Limpopo Province). 
Modimolle has hot summers and mild winters. Modimolle is renowned for its export-
quality grapes and other fruit (such as melons and peaches). Modimolle is the 
administrative capital of the Waterberg region, which means that all government 
district offices are situated in Modimolle town including the Waterberg District 
Municipality. 
The Modimolle Local Municipality is divided into the following areas: 
 Modimolle town and Phagameng 
 Mabatlane town and Leseding 
 Mabaleng, while  
 the remainder of the area is predominantly a farming area. 
The eviction of farm dwellers by farmers around Modimolle following the 
promulgation of the Extension of Security Tenure Act, Act No. 62 of 1997 (RSA 
1997) did not do justice to the Modimolle Local Municipality as many farm workers 
were fired from their jobs and had to leave the farms on which they resided, which 
created more unemployment and further increased the infrastructure backlog (with 
regard to the need for more serviced stands and housing). In 2007 the illiteracy level 
in Modimolle was high – 39 % of the population did not have Grade 12 (previously 
known as Standard 10) (Modimolle 2009). 
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Another Act promulgated by the Government of National Unity was the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act, Act No. 32 of 2000 (RSA 2000). This Act 
required all municipalities in South Africa to develop an Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP). The IDP is a five (5) year strategic plan for a municipality and is the 
process through which municipalities prepare a strategic development plan through 
an intense consultation process with its stakeholders. It informs all planning, 
budgeting, management and decision-making processes of a municipality. 
The Act required that this five (5) year plan be reviewed annually. Other than the 
IDP, Modimolle Local Municipality also has the following Sector Plans which 
inform the IDP: the Water Service Development Plan, the Roads and Stormwater 
Master Plan and the Electricity Master Plan. 
In addition to these Sector Plans, Modimolle Local Municipality, through its IDP 
processes which necessitate the involvement of all stakeholders, has managed to: 
 Identify most needs and challenges, and key development priorities. 
 Formulate a clear vision and mission. 
 Align resources with the development priorities. 
During the 2002/2003 municipal financial year, Modimolle Local Municipality 
identified unemployment as one of their major concerns and a problem to be given 
high priority. In their 2002/2003 IDP they also mentioned labour-intensive methods 
of construction as a possible solution to their problem of high unemployment. 
This solution of labour-intensive methods of construction was well documented in 
the Modimolle Local Municipality‟s previous IDPs before the 2002/2003 financial 
year. In November 2002 the Council of Modimolle took a resolution to appoint the 
researcher as their Technical Director to head their Department of Technical 
Services. 
This department consisted of the following divisions or sections: 
 Water and Sewer Section 
 Town Planning and Housing Section 
 Electricity and Mechanical Section, and 
 Public Works section (Roads and Stormwater Section). 
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In 2007 the Department of Technical Services was the biggest department in the 
Municipality. This was the service delivery department of the Municipality and, for 
the Municipality to realise their mission and vision, the initiative to start 
implementing projects labour intensively was supposed to originate from this 
department. 
4.1.2 EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE 
4.1.2.1 ROADS 
The existing road infrastructure and backlog is given in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Road infrastructure and backlog as at May 2009 
Area  
description 
Total length of all roads  
(m) 
Length of surfaced roads  
(m) 
Backlog 
% 
Modimolle town 74 014 66 414 10.26 
Phagameng 65 478 8 208 87.46 
Mabatlane 43 793 8 740 80.11 
Mabaleng 3 095 0 100      
Total 186 380 83 362 55.29 
Source: Modimolle (2009:17) 
 
The existing local municipal road network comprises a total of 186.4 km of roads of 
which 83.4 km are surfaced roads (that is, only 44.7 % of the total local road network 
is surfaced) and 103.0 km are gravel roads (representing 55.3 % of the total local 
road network). Of the surfaced road network, 85 % of the roads are in a relatively 
good to fair condition (Modimolle 2009:17). 
The fact that Modimolle has a Roads and Stormwater Master Plan made it easy for 
their Public Works Section to maintain the existing road infrastructure. 
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4.1.2.2 WATER 
Water for the townships surrounding Modimolle is obtained from the following 
sources (Modimolle 2009:21): 
 Modimolle town/Phagameng has a storage capacity of 24 ML, which is 
sufficient to cater for the population in this area, and obtains potable 
water from: 
a. Donkerpoort water purification plant (the water is purified from 
Donkerpoort Dam situated within the Municipality); 
b. Boreholes within the Municipality; and, 
c. From Klipdrift purification plant near Hammanskraal. 
 Mabatlane town/Leseding has a storage capacity of only 3 ML, and 
obtains their water supply from boreholes (their only source of water 
supply). 
 Mabaleng has a storage capacity of only 3 ML and obtains their water 
supply from boreholes (their only source of water supply). 
Table 4.2: Water infrastructure and backlog as at May 2009 
Area  
description 
Number of households  
with water  
connection on stands 
Number of households 
without water 
connection on stands 
Backlog 
% 
Modimolle town 3 227 180 5.58 
Phagameng 6 195 2 115 34.14 
Mabatlane 3 998 720 18.01 
Mabaleng 297 297 100 
Total 13 717 3 312 24.14 
Source: Modimolle (2009:21) 
 
The bulk water infrastructure in Modimolle town and internal reticulation is 
predominantly asbestos-cement pipes which were laid >50 years ago and ageing is 
creating problems in this network as there are many burst pipes encountered on a 
monthly basis. 
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4.1.2.3 SANITATION 
The sanitation situation for the townships within Modimolle Local Municipality is 
(Modimolle 2009:22): 
 Modimolle town/Phagameng is currently serviced by a waste-water 
purification plant which has a capacity of 3 ML/day, while the required 
capacity due to growth is 4 ML/day. The community in this area are 
supplied with waterborne sewerage. 
 Mabatlane also has waterborne sewerage through oxidation ponds, with 
720 stands having pit latrines. 
 Mabaleng does not have any formal sanitation system in place. Some 
pit latrines did not meet the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme standard of service. 
Table 4.3: Sewer infrastructure and backlog as at May 2009 
Area  
description 
Number of households  
with a 
sewer connection 
Number of households  
without a 
sewer connection 
Backlog  
% 
Modimolle town 3 227 180 5.58 
Phagameng  6 195 3 118 50.33 
Mabatlane 3 998 720 18.01 
Mabaleng 297 297 100      
Total 13 717 4 315 31.46 
Source: Modimolle (2009:22) 
 
4.1.2.4 ELECTRICITY 
Modimolle Local Municipality has a licence to supply electricity to its community. 
The municipality purchases electricity in bulk from Eskom and distributes it through 
its infrastructure to the community. Council owns and maintains the entire 
infrastructure. 
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Details of the electricity infrastructure and backlog are provided in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Electricity infrastructure and backlog as at May 2009 
Area  
description 
Number of households  
with an 
electricity connections 
Number of households 
without an 
electricity connection 
Backlog  
% 
Modimolle town 3 227 180 5.58 
Phagameng  6 195 2 403 38.79 
Mabatlane 3 998 520 16.77 
Mabaleng 297 0 0 
Total 13 717 3 153 22.99 
Source: Modimolle (2009:22) 
 
For the purpose of this research report, other infrastructure (such as housing, refuse 
removal and social services) will not be discussed. Electricity and roads have been 
mentioned to emphasise the overall backlog of the municipality. 
4.1.3 ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
The backlog in Modimolle‟s infrastructure is detailed in the sections that follow. 
4.1.3.1 INTERNAL ROADS 
The current backlog on the internal roads in the municipality is that 103.1 km of 
186.4 km are gravelled, which amounts 55 % which still need to be surfaced. This 
can be quantified in ZAR by considering the recently completed projects and 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant guidelines which “estimate that to complete a section 
of 1 km of low-cost road needs ZAR1.9 million.” This means that Modimolle will 
require ZAR195.8 million just to address the roads backlog to date (as at February 
2012). Other than the local road network, the following provincial roads have also 
been prioritised (Modimolle 2009:17-19). 
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4.1.3.2 ROADS FOR TOURISM 
 R33 from Modimolle to Mabatlane to Lephalale: 120 km needs to be 
rehabilitated at a cost of ZAR240 million. 
 R33 from Modimolle to Marble Hall: 83 km needs to be rehabilitated at 
a cost of ZAR166 million. 
4.1.3.3 ROADS FOR AGRICULTURE 
 Mokgopong to Mabaleng to Thabazimbi: 138 km requires surfacing at a 
cost of ZAR552 million. 
 Bela-Bela to Mabaleng: 47 km requires surfacing at a cost of 
ZAR188 million. 
 Marekele National Park to Leeupoort: 47 km requires surfacing at a 
cost of ZAR188 million. 
4.1.4 WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
In Modimolle town/Phagameng, in 2009 the water supply backlogs in this area were:  
 150 households in Modimolle Extension 2 
 30 households in Modimolle Extension 11 
 300 households in Phagameng Extension 8 and  
 1 100 households in Phagameng Extension 10. 
In 2009 in Mabatlane town/Leseding the water supply backlogs in this area were: 
 500 households in Mabatlane Extension 4 and  
 70 households for Mabatlane Extension 3. 
There is also the need to find a reliable source of water – other than from boreholes – 
which are currently the only source of bulk water supply within this area. 
In 2009 there were no water supply backlogs in Mabaleng although the water supply 
is from boreholes. Sufficient water was yielded from this source and the current 
storage capacity was also adequate. 
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4.1.5 SANITATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
In 2009, for Modimolle town/Phagameng, the sewer backlog was: 3 298 households 
without proper sanitation, and at Mabaleng: 720 households were without proper 
sanitation at Reconstruction and Development Programme standard. 
4.1.6 ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
For this service, in 2009, other than bulk infrastructure that needs an upgrade from 
20 MVA to 40 MVA, there was only a backlog for: 
 Modimolle town/Phagameng: 2 583 households without an electricity 
connection. 
 Mabatlane: 570 households without an electricity connection. 
With the above-mentioned backlogs and the high level of unemployment and 
illiteracy, there was indeed a need for Council to come-up with innovative ideas as to 
how to address these challenges, and it was found that labour-intensive methods of 
construction could be an appropriate solution. After the use of this method was 
included in their previous IDP documents, the Council of Modimolle embarked on an 
ambitious mission to implement all their capital projects labour intensively with 
effect from November 2002. 
4.2 THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING, BUDGETING FOR 
AND IMPLEMENTING PROJECTS 
Modimolle Local Municipality through its IDP and Sector Plans such as the Water 
Service Development Plan, Roads and Stormwater Master Plan and Electricity 
Master Plan has very good documented systems in place to guide the process of 
implementing projects annually. 
Briefly the seven (7) phases of the IDP process are: 
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4.2.1 ANALYSIS PHASE 
The purpose of this phase is to provide the Municipal status quo and its compilation 
is through a desk-top study. Owing to the availability of Sector Plans in Modimolle, 
it was easy to provide the Municipal status quo from these plans. 
4.2.2 STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
This focuses on the development of strategies that illustrate how the municipality 
intends to address challenges and needs identified as a challenge at analysis stage. 
Labour-intensive methods might be identified as a strategy to address unemployment 
problems. 
4.2.3 SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK PHASE 
This phase guides development within a municipality. It provides a clear character or 
identity of a municipality and its potential for growth. It is developed within a 
framework which enables and directs development in an appropriate and desired 
manner. 
4.2.4 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
This phase ensures that all plans and programmes that are implemented within the 
jurisdiction of the municipality are integrated and aligned. Project development 
includes project costing, setting time targets, identifying beneficiaries and the 
source(s) of funding. All funded and non-funded projects are included in the IDP for 
the purpose of potential funders to assist as and when they are able to. 
4.2.5 FINANCIAL PLANNING PHASE 
This indicates the total municipal budget, including both the operational and capital 
budget. It is a three (3) year plan that indicates municipal budget, planned 
expenditure and planned income. 
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4.2.6 ORGANISATION STRUCTURE PHASE 
This phase indicates municipal human resource capacity per department and factors 
hampering service delivery on day-to-day operation activities. 
4.2.7 REVIEW PHASE 
In this stage the process starts again from analysis by looking back and checking 
what was achieved and providing the municipal status quo again, and the other 
phases follow in the same sequence as discussed above. 
If every phase is done in consultation with all stakeholders as required by the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000), and also if all available Sector 
Plans are taken into consideration, this should guarantee a well-documented IDP and, 
in Modimolle, this was the case. 
The Modimolle Local Municipality was one of the municipalities with the best IDP 
document, which enjoyed the support of almost all stakeholders. Through these 
processes local communities, provincial departments, NGOs, Councillors, and other 
important stakeholders are involved early in the selection of projects, and their 
prioritisation and implementation, ensuring transparency and their support 
throughout. 
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4.3 MODIMOLLE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY PILOT PROJECT 
(NOVEMBER 2002 TO JUNE 2003) 
4.3.1 BACKGROUND AND BRIEF ABOUT THE PROJECT 
Below follows the background and a brief précis of the project. 
4.3.1.1 PHAGAMENG EXTENSIONS 5 AND 6 LETŠEMA PILOT 
PROJECT 
Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 is a township which is situated 7 km from Modimolle 
town. The total number of households in Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 is 800. 
During the 2002/2003 IDP and municipal budget, the Council of Modimolle 
approved an amount of ZAR1 million to provide water to individual stands 
(Erfs/Erven) to this extension. By then 280 stands had a water connection in the yard, 
while 520 households were provided with water via stand pipes which were within a 
200 m radius from their yards. The approved budget of ZAR1 million was to 
reticulate these 520 stands. 
4.3.2 APPROVAL OF IDP AND MUNICIPAL BUDGET 
The municipal financial year starts on 1 July and ends on 30 June the following year. 
Chapter 5 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, Act No. 32 of 2000 
(RSA 2000), requires all municipalities to adopt IDPs and approve budgets at least 
30 days before the start of the new financial year. 
In 2002 the Modimolle Local Municipality complied with this Act, and both their 
IDP and municipal budget were approved before the 31 May 2002. During the 
development of Modimolle‟s 2002/2003 IDP and municipal budget, unemployment 
was identified as one of the highest priorities to be addressed. 
In their IDP, labour-intensive construction methods were adopted to implement all 
their capital and maintenance projects. The IDPs prior to 2002/2003 also suggested 
labour-intensive methods of construction as an appropriate solution to address their 
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infrastructure backlogs in order to reduce the high percentage of unemployment 
within the Modimolle Local Municipality. 
In their IDP, Council also recommended the development and support of SMMEs to 
address unemployment, but neither the labour-intensive projects nor the SMMEs 
were properly measured to check if indeed they were achieved. By November 2002 
the municipality was already five (5) months into the financial year and, as in the 
previous years, nothing had been done to implement Council‟s resolution to 
implement capital and maintenance projects using labour-intensive construction 
methods, so this remained a paper exercise. 
4.3.3 PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE FIRST-EVER, LABOUR-
INTENSIVE PROJECT (PILOT PROJECT) IN MODIMOLLE 
As mentioned above during November 2002 the researcher was appointed by the 
Council of Modimolle Local Municipality as their Technical Director. In 2002 the 
researcher attended a course at the University of the Witwatersrand (given by 
Prof. R.T McCutcheon) (McCutcheon 2002) on Employment Creation which 
changed his perception about labour-intensive methods of construction not being 
economical as compared with conventional methods of construction. 
When the researcher resumed his duties in November 2002, during the first 
Management meeting, he suggested the implementation of this project in Phagameng 
Extensions 5 and 6 using labour-intensive methods of construction as a pilot project. 
After the Management Committee supported the suggestion, the proposal was 
presented to a Modimolle Local Municipality Executive Committee meeting in mid-
November 2002. 
The Executive Committee‟s support of this proposal, together with their 
recommendation for executing this water project in Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 
using labour-intensive methods of construction, was then tabulated at a Council 
meeting which was held on 29 November 2002. Council approved this pilot project 
and the Council resolution to implement this project further had a condition that 
following successful implementation of this pilot project, all other projects must 
follow the same methods of construction (labour-intensive). 
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The resolution was taken by Council that an excavation task, Table K3 of the Kenya 
Rural Access Road Programme (de Veen 1980,1983) would be used as a guideline to 
set the scope of each task on the Modimolle projects. The resolution was based on a 
complete task of 3.5 m³ but it did not limit labourers regarding the number of tasks 
one could undertake in a day... “the sky was the limit”. The principle of “no work, no 
pay” was also adopted by Council. The conditions of employment were adopted from 
Ministerial Determination No. 3: Special Public Works Programme (RSA 2002). 
4.3.4 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PHASES 
The project was implemented in three (3) phases: 
4.3.4.1 PHASE 1: PLANNING 
The planning details for Phase 1 were: 
 The planning phase started in mid-November 2002 after the 
Management Committee‟s recommendation was adopted by the 
Executive Committee of Council. During this phase, which took two 
(2) months from mid-November 2002 to January 2003, all the 
necessary approvals were obtained and followed by procurement of 
material. 
 Detailed design was completed long before the approval of the 
2002/2003 municipal budget, as the 280 stands were reticulated 
already. During the reticulation of these 280 stands a detailed design 
for the entire extension was drawn up. 
 Procurement of equipment and other small plant was also done at this 
phase. The recruitment of local labourers also took place in early 
January 2003 through a process which was agreed upon with the 
community. Anyone who was interested in being employed as a local 
labourer was invited to attend an open, public meeting. At this meeting, 
a box was used for all interested in working on the project to put their 
identity documents into and a minor – a child age ~6 years – was 
required to pick an identity document out of the box and the name of 
the person whose identity document was picked was read out and 
invited to be recruited. The process continued in this way until the 
required number of potential employees was reached. 
68 
 
 Twenty (20) casual men were appointed for excavation, while 
10 women were appointed for bedding preparation and backfill duties. 
Two (2) men were also appointed from the community as Supervisors 
based on the previous experience they had acquired while working with 
the other contractors within the municipality and their duties were: 
setting tasks, checking completed tasks, booking labours working on 
the daily duties, supervising bedding preparation and backfilling of 
pipes in layers and pipe laying. Wages were kept low, with unskilled 
labours being paid R35 per task while supervisors were paid R50 per 
day. The minimum wage for Limpopo Province during November 2002 
was R46.89 for unskilled labourers as per the South African Federation 
of Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC 2003). The municipality 
made one (1) Technician from its Water and Sewer Section available as 
a Project Manager and his duties were to assist with the transportation 
of materials and equipment and also to monitor pipe testing, while the 
researcher was the Programme Manager. 
4.3.4.2 PHASE 2: PRE-IMPLEMENTATION 
The planning details for Phase 2 were: 
 This phase took place in mid-January 2003, immediately after the 
appointment of local labourers. During this phase contracts were signed 
with all local labourers, conditions of employment were explained to 
them in the language that they understood. On-the-job training and 
orientation of local labourers took place. The on-the-job training that 
took place was focused on safety with regard to the trenches to be 
excavated and the safety of the local communities. 
 During this phase it was checked to establish whether the 3.5 m³/day 
was an achievable daily task. After it was found that some workers 
could achieve 3.5 m³ of excavation even before lunch (while others 
took an entire day to complete a task), it was decided that 3.5 m³ would 
be the daily task for the labourers on this site. The 3.5 m³ daily task for 
20 labourers digging the trenches was calculated at a daily production 
rate of 100 m of pipes to be laid and at least a 300 mm blanket layer to 
be completed daily. 
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4.3.4.3 PHASE 3: IMPLEMENTATION 
The planning details for Phase 3 were: 
 This phase started in the fourth week of January 2003. The following 
were already on site when construction started: 
 50 % of all material purchased. The remaining 50 % had been  
 ordered and the material suppliers were awaiting instructions  
 as to when to deliver the balance; 
 All the personal protection equipment, and 
 Small equipment (such as shovels, picks, a Wacker and hand-
 held compactors). 
 During the planning phase it was agreed that the minimum length of 
pipe the team should lay on a daily basis should be 100 m. The 100 m 
was based on the following assumptions: There was a team of 
20 labourers on site each digging 3.5 m³/day. This equated to 100 m 
minimum, with a trench width of 700 mm at a total length of 5 m by 
1 m depth. The 10 remaining workers (daily rate workers), who were 
women, were supposed to do the following daily duties: 
 Prepare bedding. 
 Load and off-load the pipes from the municipal bakkie 
 allocated to the site. 
 Assist the two local Supervisors to bring the pipes close to  
 the trenches and to lay the pipes. 
 Backfill the first 300 mm and compact. 
 On day two (2), the team for digging continued with the 
 trenching, while some female workers backfilled the remain 
 der of the trench and others delivered the pipes to site from 
 the municipal storeroom. 
 At the planning stage it was agreed that all pipes and fittings 
 for this pilot project should be kept at the municipal storeroom  
 for control purposes. The municipal Storeman issued the  
 materials but different, project-specific requisition and  
 approval forms were used. 
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 On classifying the Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 soil type as  
 per Table A3-2 (Detailed task rates for excavation), according  
 to de Veen (1980, 1983) the type of soil falls under “loose, not  
 sticky soil” (with a throwing distance of 0 to 4 m). Thus the  
 minimum of 5 m³/day, with a maximum of 6 m³/day, should  
 have been achievable. But, during the pilot project, this rate of  
 manual excavation was not thoroughly tried and tested and  
 there was a profound fear of failure so the daily task was set  
 on the low side at 3.5 m
3
/day (even though some labourers  
 could achieve it before lunchtime. 
 During implementation it was found that the labourers were doing on 
average three (3) tasks each per day. In bench-marking this against 
Table A3-2 it was clear that a task of 6 m³ at a throwing distance of 4 m 
was achievable in these soil conditions. But, since the Programme 
Manager feared failure and he was relatively inexperienced on labour-
intensive methods of construction (except for the theory gained at an 
Employment Creation course), he kept the daily task set at a low level 
during the pilot-testing stage irrespective of what research overseas has 
proved (de Veen 1980, 1983). 
4.3.5 SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT MILESTONES 
The project details were: 
Project name Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 Letšema pilot project 
Approved budget ZAR1 million only VAT exclusive 
Project sponsor Modimolle Local Municipality 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant N/A 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
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4.3.6 OUTLINING AND DETAILING OF DUTIES FOR THE PILOT 
PROJECT 
A total of 520 stands were to be reticulated, with 520 house connections and 
12 500 m of pipes to be installed. The trench width was 700 mm, with a depth of 1 m 
across a total distance of 5 m to make a complete task (0.7 m x 1 m x 5 m) = 3.5 m³. 
Thus, the number of tasks to complete the project = 12 500/5/20 = 125 tasks. It was 
assumed that each labourer would complete one (1) task daily. This meant that in one 
(1) day at least 100 m of pipe would be laid. To complete 12 500 m, assuming no 
work is done over weekends and also that no labourer is able to complete more than 
one (1) task in a day, would take the team 125 days. 
The implementation of the pilot project started on 27 January 2003. The project was 
required to be completed within 22 weeks, including Easter, weekends and public 
holidays. Thus, in effect, there were only 111 days to complete a project that required 
125 days, without considering any other delays that might be encountered as a result 
of rain (implementation started during the raining season). So the project team had to 
provide initiatives as to how to overcome these problems. The options that were 
available were: 
 To encourage the team to do at least two (2) tasks per day. 
 To allow the team to work for two (2) fortnights and assess the situation 
and, if necessary, increase the number of labourers in the team. 
 To encourage the team to work some weekends to make up the 14-day 
periods and also any delays due to unforeseen conditions or inclement 
weather. 
4.3.7 TEAM OUTPUT DURING IMPLEMENTATION 
On average each labourer was able to complete three (3) tasks per day, which meant 
300 m of pipe trench could be excavated in one (1) day. At this rate of production, 
bedding preparation due to the soil type was easy. The problem became backfilling 
and compaction, which necessitated that the team needed to be increased by an 
additional 10 women, which brought the total number of people in the team to 
42 (namely, two (2) Supervisors, 20 pipe trench diggers and 20 women for bedding 
preparation, pipe laying, backfilling and testing). With this new rate of production it 
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meant that only 42 days were required to complete the pilot project. This team 
worked very well until the end of the fortnight (7 February 2003), when the labourers 
were due to be paid. It was at this point that a gap was identified:  it was necessary to 
appoint a salary clerk and this was done immediately. 
4.3.8 CHALLENGES THAT FACED THE PILOT PROJECT 
Many challenges faced the pilot project. The main ones were: 
 Proper team balancing was not performed before implementation and 
when setting out tasks. 
 Although international experience (de Veen 1980, 1983) was taken into 
account in setting the daily task, fear of failure played a major role in 
reducing the task. 
 Even though on-the-job training was provided to Supervisors and/or 
Overseers, the duration of the pilot project was too short to evaluate its 
effectiveness. McCutcheon (1991, 1992, 1993) suggests that a 
minimum of one (1) year for a municipal project is required to 
adequately assess effectiveness. 
 Task determination, which took place during the pre-implementation 
stage by conducting trial excavations on site, was not supposed to have 
been performed by the same labourers who would be working on this 
pilot project, because it was misleading as, during the trial, it took some 
of the labourers almost an entire day to complete one 3.5 m³ task. 
However, during implementation, the same labourers could complete 
up to three (3) tasks in a day. 
 The involvement of permanent Council personnel to perform duties, 
such as the Storeman (to assist with issuing of material) and Salary 
Clerk (to issue payments), put more strain on the officials involved, 
even though they were paid extra for carrying out these additional 
duties. 
 Resistance from what McCutcheon (1992) calls “business as usual” in 
Modimolle was also a big challenge. Amongst these people were the 
Divisional Manager for Water and Sewer, and the Divisional Manager 
Public Works – both are engineers by profession and were from the 
Technical Department – while, from the Finance Department, both the 
Salary Clerk and Divisional Manager Expenditure were not in support 
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of the use of labour-intensive methods of construction, claiming they 
are time consuming (inefficient), would require more administration 
and that the end product (quality) would be inferior. 
 Lack of skilled and semi-skilled personnel locally with knowledge and 
experience of labour-intensive construction methods also put pressure 
on the Programme Manager as there were times when he was required 
to work overtime to train Supervisors. 
4.3.9 GAPS IDENTIFIED DURING THE PILOT PROJECT 
A number of shortcomings were identified during the pilot project. They are: 
 Although it was found that the task determined was too low, the fact 
that the wage was kept below the minimum in the province cancelled 
out this shortcoming. 
 The fact that on-the-job training was provided only with regard to 
technical skills identified a need for formal training. 
 Sourcing of more skilled and semi-skilled personnel was also identified 
as a gap, in particular people with labour-intensive expertise. 
 A need for the project to have its own personnel and not to depend on a 
Council official was also identified as a shortcoming. Specifically the 
project needed its own Technicians, Salary Clerks, Project 
Administrators, Project Manager and Artisans. 
 Even though a team-balancing exercise was performed prior to 
implementation of the pilot project, it was not handled properly because 
the task determined was not revised prior to commencement of the 
main projects. 
 There was a communication gap between the Finance Department and 
Technical Department with regard to the recording of completed tasks 
on the time sheets. 
 The time allocated for planning, due to time constraints, and the fact 
that municipalities were not allowed to do multi-year budgeting or to 
roll over funds into the next financial year were also found to hamper 
labour-intensive projects. 
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4.3.10 EVALUATION OF PILOT PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
When Council adopted the pilot project, the following were the project objectives: 
 The use of labour-intensive construction methods. 
 Training of local labour and transfer of skills. 
 Creation of maximum employment for the local residents. 
 Involvement of the local community on the project from initiation to 
close-out stage. 
 Support of local businesses by procuring first locally in Modimolle, 
secondly in the Waterberg district if not available locally, thirdly 
provincially (Limpopo) if not available locally or in the district and, 
lastly, from elsewhere in South Africa. 
 No compromise in the quality of the end product. 
In order to evaluate the success of this project each objective will be looked at 
separately to establish whether it was achieved. 
Training provided to the site Supervisors included: 
 Setting out the works; 
 Checking of levels and supervising trench excavation; 
 Supervising bedding preparation; 
 Pipe laying; 
 Supervising blanketing; 
 Supervising backfilling; 
 Supervising compaction; 
 Site supervision; 
 Site administration duties; 
 Health and safety courses, HIV and Aids awareness courses and 
 Supervising concrete handling. 
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4.3.10.1 UTILISATION OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
The concept of labour-intensive construction was promoted adequately prior to the 
implementation of the project; the Ward Councillors went through their various 
wards to explain Modimolle‟s approached after Council passed the resolution. 
During implementation, consensus was reached by all parties involved, and/or all 
stakeholders with regard to conditions of employment and remuneration. 
4.3.10.2 TRAINING OF LABOURERS AND TRANSFER OF SKILLS 
Even though no formal training of the labourers was done on this project, on-the-job 
training took place and all those who were involved acquired technical skills with 
regard to site clearance, excavation, bedding, pipe laying, blanketing, backfilling and 
compaction. Other than these technical skills the labourers were also trained with 
regard to health and safety issues. 
4.3.10.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
Modimolle‟s approach in itself allowed maximum use of local community members, 
because no contractor was involved. If contractors are involved, often they make 
excuses that their unskilled labourers must also be involved. In the case of 
employment creation within the local community, this objective was achieved. 
 None of the activities on this project was done using conventional 
methods, every task was performed labour intensively. For example, 
compacting the sides of the pipes was done using man-made, hand-held 
steel compactors. This was very effective as the hand-held compactors 
were manufactured locally (Figure 4.2) while, for the rest of the 
backfill, a hand-held Wacker and hand-held compactors were used. 
 To check compaction, a dynamic cone penetrometer test was used. 
Testing pipes in itself is labour-intensive and this was also carried out. 
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Figure 4.2: Hand-held, locally made steel compactor 
4.3.10.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
The local community was involved because: 
 The IDP processes forced the municipality to consult with their local 
community, from planning to completion, on all their planned projects. 
 In Modimolle the consultation stage was taken seriously and hence 
Modimolle‟s IDP was regarded as one of the best in Limpopo Province. 
 Prior to implementation, the Ward Councillor where the project was to 
be implemented called public meeting to brief people within his/her 
ward about the details of the project. 
 Municipal officials were invited to these meetings to assist Ward 
Councillors, in case communities asked technical questions. 
 This objective was also achieved, as the local community was involved 
from the initial stage of this project until close-out. 
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4.3.10.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
The procurement policy of Modimolle, with regard to Local Economic Development, 
stipulates that on procuring goods first preference must be locally, then from within 
the district, then provincially and lastly from anywhere within South Africa. 
During the implementation of this pilot project this was achieved as all material 
which could be sourced locally was purchased from local businesses and the money 
was rotated locally. The reasoning behind this was that these businesses are paying 
rates and taxes and, by supporting them in this manner, it keeps the Municipality‟s 
economy strong. 
4.3.10.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
A high-quality end product was achieved because: 
 The people responsible for the maintenance after project completion 
were also involved on this project as they undertook quality checks and 
quality assurance. 
 The Technician who was seconded to work on this project was also the 
leader of the Maintenance team at the Water and Sewer Section of the 
Technical Department. 
 From the interviews which were conducted with Municipal officials 
involved with regard to quality, the personnel indicated that this 
project‟s quality was one of the best ever, since they were more 
involved on the project than when projects were outsourced to 
contractors. 
4.2.10.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Phagameng Extension 5 and 6 project output is summarised in Table 4.5. The 
cost breakdown for this project is given in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.5: Phagameng Extension 5 and 6 project output as at 
31 March 2003 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 8 months 
(November 2002 to June 2003) 
5 months 
(November 2002 to March 2003) 
Cost ZAR1 million ZAR0.56 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water 
520 standpipes with a water meter in 
each yard 
520 standpipes with a water meter in 
each yard 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
60 % of the budget due to water  
meters not being available locally 
80 % of the budget due to water  
meters not being available locally  
Employment 
created 
2 200 man-days 1 848 man-days 
 
Table 4.6: Phagameng Extension 5 and 6 project cost breakdown 
as at 31 March 2003 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 0 As the design was already done during the 
reticulation of the first 280 stands 
Training cost 0 Only-on-the-job training was performed 
Overhead cost 60 000 10.71 % of the project cost 
Total indirect cost 60 000 10.71 % of the project cost 
Total construction cost 
excluding  
indirect cost  
500 000 89.29 % of the project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as 
wages 
68 200 13.64 % of the project cost 
Amount retained as saving 
(profit) 
440 000 44 % of the approved project budget 
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The proportion of funding (13.64 %) that went to labour (in terms of wages) on this 
project was ZAR68 200, being the amount that was invested in local labourers. 
Council saved ZAR440 000 on this project by implementing it internally. Had the 
project been outsourced, that saving would have become the Contractor‟s profit. 
4.3.11 IDENTIFYING INDICATORS OF SUCCESS 
The following identifying indicators of success were noted from the pilot project: 
 The fact that the local community was involved from the initial stage of 
the project to close-out indicates success. 
 The long-term political support by Council to approve the 
implementation of all their capital projects using labour-intensive 
construction methods indicates Council‟s commitment to use labour-
intensive methods of construction. 
 The appointment of all unskilled labourers from the local community 
indicates the success in reducing unemployment. 
 The fact that 80 % of the project cost was retained in Modimolle also 
indicates how well the objectives were achieved. 
 The three (3) month saving on the total project duration indicates the 
potential effectiveness of labour-intensive construction methods. 
 The huge cost saving which was realised at the end of the project 
indicates how cost effective a labour-intensive project can be when 
compared with conventional methods. 
 The quality of the end product was of a high standard and highly 
competitive when compared with conventional methods and this 
indicates the extent of how this project achieved its original goals, with 
regard to quality control. 
 International experience and local expertise was consulted prior to the 
implementation of this project, showing how committed the Modimolle 
Local Municipality was to achieving their goals. 
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From the lessons learnt in this chapter, together with the gaps or indicators of failure 
identified, it was the Modimolle Local Municipality‟s main objective to close those 
gaps through identifying, improving and working on them. This pilot project may be 
taken as the base for future projects and, if the lessons learnt are properly applied, it 
can improve the outcome of future labour-intensive projects even further. 
Chapter 5 introduces the next projects which were implemented labour intensively in 
Modimolle Local Municipality after completion of the pilot project. The problems 
encountered and successes are documented. Chapter 5 concludes by referring back to 
those gaps identified during the pilot project and the extent to which they were 
addressed to avoid repeating the same mistakes. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
MODIMOLLE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY  
LABOUR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS 
This chapter focuses on the eight (8) labour-intensive projects that were implemented 
in Modimolle Local Municipality after the successful implementation and 
completion of the pilot project. It evaluates the five (5) water and the three (3) sewer 
projects and concludes by making recommendations from the lessons learnt and the 
pilot project for future projects and programmes. 
5.1 PHAGAMENG EXTENSION 7 LETŠEMA WATER AND 
SEWER PROJECT (APRIL 2003 TO MARCH 2004) 
Phagameng Extension 7 is a township within Modimolle Local Municipality, which 
is about 5 km from the centre of town. 
This township consists of 755 low-income stands and covers 90 ha. The successful 
completion of the Phagameng Extensions 5 and 6 pilot project encouraged the 
Council to implement the Phagameng Extension 7 project using the same principles 
of labour-intensive construction methods. 
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5.1.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Phagameng Extension 7 Letšema water and sewer project 
Approved budget ZAR6.84 million 
Project sponsor Department of Local Government and Housing Limpopo 
Province, under the Human Settlements Programme 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant Dombo, du Plessis & Partners (Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
5.1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
During the period April 2002 to March 2003, Dombo, du Plessis & Partners (Africa) 
(Pty) Ltd approached the Council of Modimolle to request permission to submit a 
business plan on their behalf (at risk) to apply for funding to provide full services at 
Reconstruction and Development Programme standard (water, sewers, roads and 
stormwater) to Phagameng Extension 7. During this period, Phagameng Extension 7 
township was fully established and proclaimed in terms of the town-planning 
processes. Before Council was approached by the consultant to source funding for 
them, this area had been earmarked for development in the 2004/2005 municipal 
financial year. Following the approach, Council saw this as an opportunity and a way 
to relieve the budget constraints that they had. 
Council gave the consultant the necessary permission and funds were approved under 
the Human Settlements Programme. The Human Settlements Programme was a 
programme within the Department of Housing aimed at fast-tracking housing 
delivery, where municipalities made land available. Township establishment, and 
provision of full services at Reconstruction and Development Programme standard, 
were done under the Human Settlements Programme, so that when houses are 
allocated in the area, all basic township services are already in place. When the funds 
were approved, the following conditions were attached: 
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1) The Memorandum of Understanding was to be signed between the 
provincial department (Department of Local Government and Housing) 
and the municipality regarding these conditions before the project could 
start. 
2) The procurement of services was to be done in line with Council‟s 
policy and the provincial department need only be notified. 
3) No money would be transferred to the municipality for payment of any 
services: all service providers were to be paid directly by the 
Department of Housing‟s provincial Department of Local Government 
and Housing. 
4) All invoices were to be made out to the provincial department, and 
municipalities were responsible only for certifying that the works had 
been completed. 
5) The project was to be completed on or before the end of March 2004, as 
no roll-over of funds would be permitted. 
As this was a conditional grant, Council complied with all the stipulated conditions, 
and Dombo, du Plessis & Partners (Africa) (Pty) Ltd were given permission to 
undertake detailed design and project specifications and construction supervision. By 
the end of April 2003 the design was complete and had been presented to the 
Municipality and approved. 
This project was divided into three (3) main components: 
1) Sewer reticulation to 755 stands in Phagameng Extension 7, which 
included the construction of 160 mmØ sewer pipes. 
2) Main outfall sewer. The brief scope included 284 m of 450 mmØ class 
100D reinforced concrete pipes and 376 m of 600 mmØ class 100D 
reinforced concrete pipes which were to be jacked beneath the Spoornet 
main passenger and goods railway line. 
3) Water reticulation to 755 stands in Phagameng Extension 7, which 
included the construction of 75 mmØ UPVC pipes, including Erf 
connections and meters. 
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5.1.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES AND THE PROJECT SPONSOR 
An analysis of the project in line with Council‟s objectives is presented below: 
5.1.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
The concept of labour-intensive construction was adequately promoted when a 
resolution of Council was passed to the effect that, should the pilot project be 
successful, all other projects would adopt this method of construction. The word 
“Letšema” was used to describe labour-intensive construction in Modimolle. It is a 
Northern Sotho word which describes a “team” of men and women who work to 
achieve a certain goal. For example, in years gone by a King would have his farm 
cultivated by his people and, when the crops were growing, the weeds would also 
grow, so the team of men and women who were doing the farming and weeding at 
the King‟s farm used to be called “Letšema”. The labour-intensive projects in 
Modimolle had the word “Letšema” as an extension to them to indicate how serious 
Council was about promoting the labour-intensive concept. 
5.1.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS  
For labour-intensive training, it was agreed that a certain amount of budget – 2 % – 
be set aside on this project for accredited training, and this was achieved in that the 
actual figure was 2.42 % of the project cost. 
The accredited trainer with the Construction Seta was also appointed, and fortunately 
the appointed Consultant on this project – Dombo, du Plessis & Partners (Africa) 
(Pty) Ltd – was accredited as service providers by the Construction Seta. 
 The following formal training was covered: 
1) Setting out the works (Supervisors); 
2) Trench excavation (Labourers and Supervisors); 
3) Bedding preparation (Supervisors); 
4) Pipe laying (Supervisors); 
5) Blanketing (Labourers and Supervisors); 
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6) Backfilling (Labourers and Supervisors); 
7) Compaction (Labourers and Supervisors); 
8) Site Supervision (Supervisors); 
9) Site administration duties (Supervisors); 
10) Health and safety courses, HIV and Aids courses (Labourers 
and Supervisors),  and 
11) Concrete handling (Labourers and Supervisors). 
 The training was structured in a manner that allowed, or gave, workers 
an opportunity to attend formal classes and thereafter to do practical 
work on site. 
 Training was compulsory and, since labourers were paid a daily task 
wage even when they were attending classes, this encouraged them to 
participate in the training. 
 Over and above the training budget of ZAR136 800 (2.42 % of the 
project cost) which was made available on this project, Council 
approached the Department of Labour to train and capacitate local 
labourers. 
 The Department of Labour‟s commitment to training was long-term and 
more intensive than Council‟s because they had enough budget for 
training but most government departments were not using this 
opportunity. 
 Annually the Department of Labour was rolling-over funds for training 
so, when Modimolle approached them, this was also a relief to them. 
 The Department of Labour had on their database a list of accredited 
service providers who they could appoint and introduce to Council to 
perform training. 
 Apart from this formal training Modimolle took a decision to retain all 
the labourers who worked on the pilot project (Phagameng 
Extensions 5 and 6 Letšema Water Project), in order to ensure 
continuity. 
 On-the-job training also continued and was intensified. 
 As part of training, Modimolle Local Municipality took advantage of 
the fact that students from the Universities of Technology needed 
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in-service training to complete their Diplomas. This project had three 
(3) students who were taken on as trainees. 
 To strengthen the team and the on-the-job training, a Project Manager, 
Ms Mpho Lekoloane (see Section 2.2.2.2), who worked on the Gundo 
Lashu
9
 programme was head-hunted to be part of this project and she 
added much value to this project. A brief curriculum vitae for 
Ms Lekoloane is provided in Annexure A. 
5.1.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
Maximum employment was created for the local community: 
 The employment created for the local community on this project was 
three (3) times the number of labourers who had been employed on the 
pilot project. 
 A total of 120 labourers was appointed for the 12 months duration of 
this project. This number excluded in-service training students and the 
project manager. 
 31 680 man-days were achieved on this project for local labourers. 
5.1.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
The Modimolle Local Municipality made a specific effort to involve the local 
community: 
 Modimolle Local Municipality‟s record with regard to community 
participation was very good: it starts from the IDP stages when the 
project is identified and extends to project close-out. 
 On this project the consultation process, where Ward Councillors invite 
the entire local community and other affected role players, was 
followed diligently. 
                                                 
9
 “Gundo Lashu” was the first long-term labour-intensive public works road sector programme in South Africa, 
where emerging contractors were given extensive formal training and a series of practical on-site training 
projects in labour-intensive road works over a period of 21 months (Ngebulana 2007, Annexure A). 
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 The community‟s support played a crucial role and was not neglected. 
 The community was included throughout all the project stages. 
5.1.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
Local business was supported by this contract as the materials were purchased 
locally through Council‟s procurement policy, which emphasised the support of local 
businesses. 
5.1.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
The Modimolle Local Municipality took particular care to ensure an acceptable 
quality of the end product as: 
 Modimolle adopted a client-based approach and the project consultant 
was given supervisory duties. 
 Quality monitoring and assurance were undertaken from both the 
consultant‟s side and from the Client‟s perspective. 
 According to the project consultant, the quality of this project was one 
of the best amongst similar projects they had implemented previously. 
 The Project Sponsor (the Department of Local Government and 
Housing) was happy with the method statement, quality control 
measures or plan, and the commitment not to compromise quality by 
project team members. 
 While quality was given a priority, issues of health and hygiene also 
received appropriate attention to ensure compliance with safety 
standards. 
5.1.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Phagameng Extension 7 project output is summarised in Table 5.1. The cost 
breakdown for this project is given in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.1: Phagameng Extension 7 project output as at 
31 March 2004 
 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 12 months 
April 2003 to March 2004 
12 months 
April 2003 to March 2004 
Cost ZAR6.84 million ZAR5.64 million 
Quality of end 
product 
High standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water and 
sewers 
755 Stands 732 Stands 
(Water and sewer services could not 
be provided to the remaining 
23 stands because they were in a 
waterlogged area) 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
80 % 85 % 
Employment 
created 
30 000 man-days 33 000 man-days 
 
Table 5.2: Phagameng Extension 7 project cost breakdown as at 
31 March 2004 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 957 600 16.98 % of the project cost 
Training cost 136 800   2.42 % of the project cost 
Overhead cost 342 000   6.1 % of the project cost 
Total indirect cost 1 436 400 25.47 % of the project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
4 203 600 74.53 % of the project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 1 201 200 28.58 % of the project cost 
Amount retained as saving (profit) 1 200 000 17.54 % of the approved project budget 
 
The proportion of funding that went to labour (in terms of wages) on this project was 
ZAR1.201 million (28.58 %), plus ZAR136 800 paid for training which totals 
ZAR1.34 million, being the amount that was invested in local labourers. 
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Of the total project cost, 31.00 % was spent on labour (excluding overheads, 
professional fees and other indirect costs), which was a great achievement when 
considering that a saving of ZAR1.2 million was achieved. 
The direct construction cost on this project was ZAR4.20 million, while the cost of 
fully servicing a stand with both water and sewer, including basic road and storm-
water drains, was ZAR7 705, which was within the Human Settlements guidelines of 
ZAR9 000 per stand. 
5.1.3.7 ANALYSING THE PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The project objectives were analysed using the “SMART” principle, where 
“S” represents “Specific”, “M” represents “Measurable”, “A” represents 
“Attainable”, “R” represents “Realistic” and “T” represents “Time”. The individual 
objectives are discussed below. 
5.1.3.7.1 SPECIFICITY 
The project objectives were specific in that they clearly spelled out the methods of 
construction, documents were drafted, documented and amended in a manner that 
accommodated the use of labour-intensive construction methods. 
5.1.3.7.2 MEASURABILITY 
 The project objectives were measurable as, at the beginning of the 
project, targets were set with milestones, and one of the targets was to 
create 30 000 man-days of employment for local labourers. 
 The consultation with the local community was also measurable in the 
sense that they had buy-in to the implementation of this: at no stage 
was the project stopped by the community. 
 With regard to training it was also measurable, because targets were 
specified relating to the training to be covered, and indeed this was 
exceeded. 
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5.1.3.7.3 ATTAINABILITY 
 The fact that all the targets were reached on this project, some even 
exceeded, indicates that the project objectives were attainable. 
 Table 5.1 indicates what was planned, against what was achieved, from 
which it is clear that most of what was targeted for was exceeded. 
5.1.3.7.4 RELEVANCE 
 The project objectives were relevant to Council‟s goal of reducing the 
high level of unemployment and also building capacity with regard to 
training local unemployed residents. 
 Training identified on this project was also relevant to the method of 
construction adopted by Council. 
5.1.3.7.5 TIME CONSTRAINTS 
 The project had a strict time frame as it was required to be completed 
within 12 months. 
 The project was implemented within this time frame, without 
compromising quality, safety and with project saving. 
 The project was done without the use (or assistance) of large 
construction equipment, but it was completed within the time frame, 
and without working on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. 
5.1.4. THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
Lessons learnt from previous projects contributed to the success of the project as 
follows: 
5.1.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
 The excavation task was set at 3.5 m³/task at a rate of R35 per task. 
This amount was not changed as all labourers who worked on the pilot 
project continued to work on this project. 
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 Payment per task ensured that stronger, more energetic labourers were 
rewarded for their efforts as they could complete several tasks per day 
although the task completion rate depended on the geotechnical 
conditions of the area in which they were working. 
 Lessons learnt at the research and development stage were that, for 
future projects at the pilot-project stage, different people should be used 
to determine the task to those who will be involved at the programme‟s 
implementation to ensure that the scope of the task is correctly 
assessed. 
 Even though the scope of the task was too small, considering the 
geotechnical conditions of Phagameng, the fact that the wage rate was 
also low (below the provincial rate) resulted in a saving and the project 
being cost-effective. 
5.1.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
 The success of the team-balancing exercise that took place at the 
beginning of the pilot project played an important role in the efficiency 
of this project. 
 The reason the labour force was increased by multiplying the number of 
labourers in a team by three (3) was that the pilot project worked well 
with a team consisting of 40 labourers. Thus, to increase the task 
completion output, one simply multiplied the number of labourers in a 
team by a predetermined multiplier. For this project, three (3) was 
chosen as the multiplier because a team of 120 labourers could be 
supervised effectively by two (2) supervisors. 
5.1.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
 The pilot project was successful because the knowledge acquired in the 
pilot stage could be, and was, taken forward to project implementation. 
 It was found during the implementation of this project that those who 
worked on the pilot project were more skilled than the newly recruited 
labourers, even when it came to interpreting the drawings and the 
specifications. 
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 The introduction of a project manager with extensive experience on 
labour-intensive construction methods also played a big role, with 
regard to skills transfer. 
5.1.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
 During the implementation of the pilot project, all the labourers were 
paid in cash at the Municipal Stores. Payment was made fortnightly. 
 With the team having increased threefold from the pilot project, 
fortnightly cash payments were no longer feasible so payment was 
made electronically into the bank accounts of the labourers. The 
labourers were still paid fortnightly. 
 The Finance Department was also familiar with the task-based 
timesheets that were used. Council temporary workers‟ timesheets were 
adjusted from a daily-paid basis to paid-per-task basis, which was also 
introduced at the project pilot phase. 
5.1.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
 Council had a long-term goal of making this programme work. They 
adopted a policy to recruit from Letšema water and sewer projects 
whenever vacant posts were to be filled in their Water and Sewer 
Section. 
 Council also adopted the principle of “training the trainer” so the 
retention of these skilled labourers also played a major role in training 
new technicians from the Universities of Technology. 
 This strategy worked well, because the Project Manager, who was 
head-hunted from Gundo Lashu (Sections 5.1.3.2 and 5.1.3.4) ended up 
heading the Housing Section in the Technical Department, while the 
three students from the Universities of Technology (who were also 
recruited for in-service training) were appointed permanently as 
technicians in the Water and Sewer Section of the municipality. 
5.1.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
 With the current Government emphasis on safety at the workplace and 
compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act, Act No. 85 of 
1993 (RSA 1993) and its amendments, Council showed their intention 
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of not compromising safety by prioritising training on occupational 
health and safety. 
 In addition to training, the involvement of a professional service 
provider of Dombo, du Plessis & Partners (Africa) (Pty) Ltd‟s calibre 
as a safety consultant indicated that Council was serious about 
implementing projects using labour-intensive methods. 
 This project was completed without any injuries or near-miss incidents. 
5.1.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
 Hand-held compactors were manufactured locally by a steel company, 
and were used to compact the soil to each side of the pipes that had 
been laid. 
 Compaction on top of the blanket layer and up to the top was also done 
using a small hand-held steel compactor and/or a Wacker, which was 
labour intensive. 
 To obtain the correct moisture content of the soil for compaction a 
small water trailer, hooked to and pulled by a light delivery vehicle (a 
“bakkie” in South African terminology) was used to dampen the soil. 
The same vehicle was used when pressure testing the water lines. 
 A dynamic cone penetrometer test was used to check the compaction. 
 For pressure testing the water lines, a water pump was used which was 
not labour-intensive but it was the only way the water lines could be 
pressure tested. 
 For rock excavation, jack hammers with compressors were used to 
break rocks, which was also labour-intensive. 
 The only plant that was used on this project was a Tractor-
Loader/Backhoe (TLB), which was necessary to lift the concrete pipes 
on the main outfall sewer line. 
 Dumpy levels were used for marking levels and placement of profiles 
for excavations. After levels were set on the profiles, fishing line 
attached to rods was used to control and check the levels. 
 All small tools and equipment were sourced from local suppliers, 
including the TLB. 
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5.1.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
 Because the Client adopted a client-based method of construction, the 
use of SMMEs was not successfully implemented in line with 
Council‟s IDP. Thus, although the IDP recommends the use of 
SMMEs, it was decided that the use of labour-intensive construction 
methods was so innovative that it needed to be demonstrated first using 
in-house capacity (“force account” system). 
 No sub-contracting of local sub-contractors took place on this project as 
labourers were sourced locally from the community and the Client 
retained the administration of the entire project. 
 Although there were opportunities for sub-contracting other parts of the 
work (such as the construction of Erf connections, for example) to local 
and emerging contractors, this was omitted or overlooked as more 
emphasis was placed on direct employment. 
5.1.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
A number of challenges or problems were encountered during the project: 
 A high percentage of unskilled labourers due to the “earn as you learn” 
system that was adopted at the pilot project. 
 Collapsing of the side walls of sewer trenches due to overloading of 
trench banks. 
 A shortage of semi-skilled and skilled personnel with labour-intensive 
construction knowledge and experience to carry out engineering-related 
duties (such as site supervision, site administration, project 
management and other duties). 
 Lack of support from provincial departments and some departments 
within the municipality. This took the form of what McCutcheon 
(1992) terms “business as usual”, as those who did not want change and 
believed labour-intensive construction methods would not work, tried 
to convince the decision makers that the conventional methods of 
operation were the most economic and preferred option. 
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5.1.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
Because the municipality was so determined and focused to implement their projects 
labour intensively, every challenge was seen as an opportunity. Thus, in order to 
address the abovementioned challenges the following interventions were made: 
5.1.6.1 UNSKILLED LABOURERS 
 Council introduced formal accredited classroom training with the 
assistance of Department of Labour funding, where emphasis was put 
on supervisory courses and technical courses (such as pipe laying, 
bedding preparation, blanketing, backfilling, pipe testing, plumbing, 
brick laying, concrete laying and manhole construction). 
 On-the-job training was also effective where local labourers were 
trained how to use a dumpy level, how to prepare bedding, fill 
blanketing, pipe laying, backfilling in layers, testing of pipes, 
construction of manholes and site administration. 
 The “earn as you learn” method worked well for the municipality and it 
was effective and successful. 
5.1.6.2 COLLAPSING OF TRENCHES 
The project team introduced effective team balancing on site, where two (2) 
labourers dug trenches, with one (1) labourer on the bank above the trench throwing 
the excavated soil away from the trench to reduce trench-bank overloading. 
5.1.6.3 DEEP EXCAVATION ON THE SEWER LINE 
 The project team introduced the method to excavate the trenches in a 
step form as indicated in Figure 5.1. 
 This method was most effective because it also helped with the problem 
of trench-bank overloading since a 2 m deep trench was excavated to 
two (2) different, stepped depths. 
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Source: Researcher‟s own diagram, based on site observation. 
 
Figure 5.1: A cross-section of a sewer trench excavated in steps to 
prevent trench-bank overloading and the trench 
collapsing 
5.1.6.4 SHORTAGE OF SKILLED PERSONNEL WITH LABOUR-
INTENSIVE EXPERTISE 
 The recruitment of a project manager from the Gundo Lashu 
programme (Sections 5.1.3.2, 5.1.3.4 and Annexure A) played a major 
role in addressing this challenge. 
 The three (3) in-service training students recruited from the Universities 
of Technology (then known as Technikons), were of great assistance 
owing to the post-matriculation education they had received. 
 Professor McCutcheon (2002) used to say, during his lectures at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, that “Post matriculation is crucial, 
even one (1) year post matric plays a very important role in a person‟s 
reasoning, ability and understanding.” In Modimolle this was indeed 
evident in that all the in-service training students understood concepts 
faster than either the unskilled labourers or labourers with only a 
Grade 12 (previously known as Standard 10) certificate. 
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5.1.6.5 LACK OF SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT AND 
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS 
Before indicating what intervention was made in relation to this challenge, it is 
important to elaborate what exactly was a “challenge” with regard to lack of support. 
Prior to the start of the project it was indicated that a service-level agreement had to 
be signed with the Department of Local Government and Housing regarding the 
method of construction and also that no funds would be paid into a municipal bank 
account but, instead, service providers would be paid directly by the Department. All 
the invoices from the project consultant – including training service providers – were 
paid in full by the Department of Local Government and Housing, including invoices 
from material suppliers, and invoices for the purchase of tools and equipment. 
The challenge arose when the Modimolle Local Municipality wanted to be 
reimbursed for the amount they had paid to the labourers as wages and as salaries to 
the municipal officials who were seconded to this project (the “force account” 
system) and also when they wanted to claim the ZAR1.2 million which was realised 
as a saving on this project. The Department of Local Government and Housing‟s 
Financial Department and Legal Department, interpreted the matter differently and 
said this would be in breach of the service level agreement signed between the two 
parties. 
But, with the support from the Mayor and Councillor responsible for infrastructure at 
Modimolle Local Municipality, after they had a meeting with the Member of 
Executive Council for the Department of Local Government and Housing, the 
service level agreement was amended in order to resolve this challenge. Since there 
was political support, this project was never stopped due to lack of funds or labourers 
not being paid. Instead, Council money was used to address the funding until the 
challenge was resolved and all outstanding money was paid to Modimolle by the 
Department of Local Government and Housing. 
98 
 
5.1.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
By March 2004, the Extension 7 Letšema Water and Sewer Project had achieved: 
 Creation of 33 000 man-days of temporary employment. 
 Water reticulation to the entrances of 732 stands in Phagameng 
Extension 7 and 732 sewer connection points were also provided. 
 Roads and stormwater drainage were also provided at a Reconstruction 
and Development Programme level of services (opening of roads, 
gravelling and stormwater provision). 
 The training that took place ensured that, by the end of this project, 
sufficient skilled and semi-skilled personnel were developed from both 
formal and informal (on-the-job) training. 
 This project was successful and Modimolle won first prize in the 
2003/2004 Vuna Awards because of it and the pilot project 
(Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: From left: the Corporate Director, Chief Financial 
Officer, Social Director, Municipal Manager and 
Technical Director of the Modimolle Management 
Team holding the Modimolle Vuna Award cheque 
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5.2 PHAGAMENG EXTENSION 8 LETŠEMA WATER AND 
SEWER PROJECT (APRIL 2004 TO JUNE 2005) 
Phagameng Extension 8 is a township within the Modimolle Local Municipality 
directly opposite Phagameng Extension 7. The two (2) extensions are separated by a 
street (Joe Slovo Street), which is the main street from Modimolle town into 
Phagameng Township. This township consists of 1 592 low-income stands and 300 
middle-income stands covering 113 ha but, for the purpose of this research report, 
the 300 middle-income stands were not covered as Council decided during 
implementation to out-source this contract for the purpose of developing emerging 
contractors and SMMEs. 
5.2.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Phagameng Extension 8 
Letšema Water and Sewer Project 
Approved budget: 
Initial 
ZAR3.74 million 
Approved budget: 
Additional 
ZAR1 million 
Approved budget: 
Total 
ZAR4.74 million 
Project sponsor Department of Local Government and Housing  
under the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant Phala Consulting Engineers 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
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5.2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
The introduction of the EPWP saw the South African national government 
introducing a financial plan to provide infrastructure funding to this programme: the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant. Prior to the introduction of the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant, the national government used to provide funding for 
infrastructure to municipalities through the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme (which focused more on water, sewers, roads, storm water and other 
infrastructure), while the Department of Minerals and Energy funded only electricity 
projects. The then (in 2002) Department of Water Affairs and Forestry funded water 
and sewer projects relating to their schemes. The Human Settlements Programme 
funded housing-related developments. The Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
consolidated most of these sources of funding into one national fund for provision of 
basic infrastructure to municipalities. This was a conditional grant aimed at 
supporting the municipality to fast-track service delivery and, unlike other grants 
(such as the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme), the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant allowed for multi-year budgeting, where projects could be 
implemented over a period of three (3) years or more, while, with other grants, funds 
were required to be used in that year, or a municipality had to apply for roll-over 
(which was a long-process) if a project could not be completed in the same year. 
 Phagameng Extension 8 Letšema water and sewer project‟s first budget 
was an amount of ZAR3.74 million that was approved under the 
Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme. 
 Initially when Council applied for funding to the Consolidated 
Municipal Infrastructure Programme, the aim was to provide water at a 
Reconstruction and Development Programme level of service only, to 
the informal settlement, as the township was not properly formalised. 
Most of the people who were staying at this extension were former 
farm workers who had been evicted from various farms within the 
Municipality. 
 When Extension 7 stands were serviced, it was Council‟s intention to 
relocate people who had informally allocated themselves stands in 
Extension 8, where there were twice as many people staying as in 
Extension 7. 
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 With the approved budget of ZAR3.74 million, Council decided to 
formalise the Extension 8 township and peg it in situ and not to relocate 
anyone. However, with the available budget being insufficient (it was 
supposed to cover pegging, formalising the township and providing 
basic infrastructure services), additional funding had to be applied for 
under new funding, the Municipal Infrastructure Grant. 
 The only challenge become the fact that the conditions for the two (2) 
fundings were substantially different: the Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant focused on basic infrastructure at Reconstruction and 
Development Programme level, while the Consolidated Municipal 
Infrastructure Programme used a formula to allocate funding to the 
municipalities, and it was then up to the municipality concerned as to 
how they allocated available funding to their infrastructure. So the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant regarded waterborne sewers as a high 
level of service (above Reconstruction and Development Programme 
level) and they needed the municipality to come up with counter 
funding. Fortunately with the saving that was realised at Extension 7, 
Council had no challenge in providing the additional funding required. 
5.2.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES AND THE PROJECT SPONSOR 
Several aspects – in line with the Council‟s objectives for the project – are analysed 
below: 
5.2.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
 Council took a resolution to replicate the Phagameng 7 labour-intensive 
project, and, therefore, a decision was made to keep the same personnel  
who worked at Extension 7, as most of them were well trained, and also 
to use the same construction methods, that saw Council making a 
saving of ZAR1.2 million. 
 The concept of labour-intensive construction was therefore adequately 
promoted, considering that the local community was well informed 
about the methods to be used. 
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5.2.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
 The Council‟s decision to retain all the labourers that worked at 
Extension 7, as all the labourers had received compulsory training, 
ensured that additional training was added to the skills which were 
already there. 
 Formal training in the form of accredited training was sponsored by the 
Department of Labour, which was further followed by practical training 
on site. 
 There was effective training for Technical, Supervisors and 
administration duties, due to sufficient funds having been budgeted and 
made available by the Department of Labour. 
 The training that took place at Modimolle drew national attention: the 
Minister of Labour, Mr Membethisi Mphumzi Shepherd Mdladlana, 
visited the Extension 8 Letšema water and sewer project on 10 May 
2005 (Figure 5.3). 
 The Minister‟s visit took place because, at that stage, Modimolle was 
leading with regard to spending the Department of Labour‟s budget 
allocated nationally, and was also as a result of Modimolle continually 
benefiting from his Department‟s budget in terms of formal training. 
Therefore everybody wanted to see whether the training that was taking 
place was value for money. 
 Over and above formal training, which was funded by the Department 
of Labour, on-the-job training continued on this project. 
 To improve capacity of the Supervisory personnel or Overseers, three 
(3) more students were recruited from the Universities of Technology. 
 Training was effective: this was confirmed by the fact that one (1) Head 
of Department from each of the Pretoria University of Technology, the 
Vaal University of Technology and the Durban Institute of Technology 
visited their students on this project and they were impressed about the 
standard of training that their students were receiving. 
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Figure 5.3: From left: the Modimolle Mayor, Technical Director, 
Project Manager and the Minister of Labour during 
their visit to Modimolle on 10 May 2005 
5.2.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
This objective was achieved in that a total of 120 local labourers was retained from 
Phagameng Extension 7 and they worked for a period of 15 months – which was 
three (3) months more than the Extension 7 employment created for locals – the 
equivalent of 42 570 man-days. 
5.2.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
 The process for the implementation of projects in Modimolle was 
formal and well documented in the IDP processes. On this project, the 
Project Steering Committee was established in accordance with formal 
Council processes. 
 The fact that pegging of stands, formalising of townships, and provision 
of infrastructure were taking place in an area where people were 
illegally occupying stands, made it very difficult to implement this 
project. Hence, consultation with the local community was well 
structured and intensified, in order to move some people permanently 
from their current stands and relocate them to a new site nearby. 
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Services were supplied to the new residential site to Reconstruction and 
Development Programme level. 
 Indeed, through the Project Steering Committee, Ward Councillor and 
Ward Committee members, Council managed to obtain “buy-in” from 
the local community and the project ran smoothly, with few delays. 
5.2.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
On this project Council‟s procurement policy was adhered to, which ensured the 
development and promotion of local business, as all the goods, materials, tools and 
equipment that were available locally were purchased locally. 
5.2.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
On this project the project consultant, Phala Consulting Engineers, was allocated the 
responsibility to supervise and monitor the project to ensure quality control. 
The quality on this project was of a higher standard than that of Phagameng 
Extension 7 because the labourers on this project were more skilled than those who 
worked on Extension 7 and more supervisory personnel were available due to the 
effective training that took place. 
5.2.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Phagameng Extension 8 project output is summarised in Table 5.3. The cost 
breakdown for this project is given in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.3: Phagameng Extension 8 project output as at 
30 June 2005 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 12 months 
(April 2004 to March 2005) 
15 months 
(April 2004 to June 2005) 
Cost ZAR3.74 million ZAR4.74 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water and 
sewers 
1 592 stands 1 592 stands 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
85 % 80 % 
Employment 
created 
31 680 man-days 42 570 man-days 
 
As mentioned above the original approved budget was ZAR3.74 million, which was 
for water provision to 1 592 individual stands. However, during implementation it 
was decided that sewer must be included. Hence, there was a need to top-up the 
originally approved funds. 
Roads and storm water and township establishment were catered for within the 
capital budget of the municipality and their cost does not form part of this report. 
When compared with the previous project (Phagameng Extension 7) that had a 
saving of ZAR1.2 million – though the total number of stands serviced was 117 % 
fewer than in this extension – it was concluded that the Phagameng Extension 8 
project was more successful and better implemented than the Extension 7 project. 
Thus, an additional ZAR1 million – approved under the Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant funding – was necessary and cannot be regarded as a budget over-run, because 
the cost of fully servicing a stand with both water and a sewer as per the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant guideline was ZAR2 200 and ZAR3 300, respectively, all costs 
included. On this project it cost Council only ZAR2 977 for servicing the stand with 
106 
 
both water and sewer, which was a saving of 54.13 % when compared with the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant guidelines. 
Table 5.4: Phagameng Extension 8 project cost breakdown as at 
30 June 2005 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 523 600 11.05 % of the project cost 
Training cost 0 Was provided by Department of Labour 
Overhead cost 187 000   3.94 % of the project cost 
Total in direct cost 710 600 14.99 % of the project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
4 029 400 85.01 % of the project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 1 716 750 42.61 % of the project cost 
Amount retained as saving (profit) 0 No saving was realised 
 
The proportion of funding (excluding overheads, professional fees and all other 
indirect costs) that was invested in local labourers in the form of wages on this 
project was 42.61 % of the project cost (amounting to ZAR1.717 million), which was 
a good achievement when compared with the >50 % achieved by Botswana and 
Kenya. 
5.2.4 THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
5.2.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
The task that was determined at pilot stage and the Phagameng Extension 7 Letšema 
water and sewer project was kept unchanged at 3.5 m³/task for ZAR35. The reason 
for the task remaining unchanged was that, when the Programme Manager went to 
the Management Committee to request that the task and the rate be amended to be in 
line with research and the development stage (pilot project) and the recently 
completed project, his suggestion was rejected because: 
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 According to Council standing rules, once a decision has been taken by 
Council, for it to be rescinded it needs to go the same route of first 
being presented to the Executive Committee of Council and then to the 
Council at which meeting the majority of Councillors must be present. 
 Any item that had a cost implication, which in this case was the rate, 
would require a budget adjustment, which process required that the 
whole IDP processes need to be followed, and all the stakeholders 
mentioned above under the IDP processes must participate to make any 
amendments and approve the rate and management was not prepared to 
follow these processes again. 
 Section 28 (1) and (2) of the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act, Act No. 56 of 2003 (RSA 2003) deals with reasons 
for municipal budget adjustments, and rate adjustments do not form 
part of those reasons. 
 The concern raised concerning the rate adjustment was, however, noted 
and an agreement was reached by management that, during the next 
financial year‟s IDP and budget processes, this must be presented for 
approval. 
 The only adjustment that was made was the rate per day for the seven 
(7) categories of Supervisor, who were produced by both formal and 
on-the-job training in the Phagameng Extension 7 project. 
5.2.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
As Council decided to keep the unskilled labour force on this project unchanged at 
120 local labourers, the same team-balancing exercise that was used on Extension 7 
and the pilot projects was adopted. 
5.2.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
 At the beginning of this programme, Modimolle Local Municipality 
adopted the policy of “training a trainer” and, to some extent, this 
worked. 
 The Project Manager who was recruited from Gundo Lashu, together 
with the three (3) University of Technology students, who were 
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permanently employed by the Municipality, made themselves available 
to transfer skills to others. 
 The skills transfer to the newly recruited University of Technology 
students was easy due to the availability of these trainers. 
 Apart from receiving practical training, the students from the 
Universities of Technology were also given an opportunity to attend 
formal training (such as supervisory and health and safety courses). 
5.2.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
 Even though there was a shortfall on the project budget, all local 
labourers were always paid on time from Council funding. 
 The Project Steering Committee and Ward Committee members were 
given only a transport allowance of ZAR100 per meeting attended. 
5.2.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
Some of the workforce who worked on the previous project were not available (due 
to being recruited and joining the Municipality as permanent employees), while 
others had permanent employment elsewhere within Government departments or 
became employed in the Private Sector. However, about 90 % of the workforce was 
retained from the previous project. 
5.2.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
 This service was outsourced to the project consultant, Phala Consulting 
Engineers, who ensured compliance with safety regulations. 
 There were no major incidents or “near misses” that occurred on this 
project due to the commitment of all participants to health and safety 
issues. 
5.2.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
 All the labour-intensive tools, which were specifically manufactured for 
Phagameng Extension 7, were used again on this project (including the 
Tractor/Loader/Backhoe (TLB)). Although there were no concrete 
pipes involved on this project, deep excavation and manhole 
construction necessitated the use of a TLB. 
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 The only other tools and equipment used on this project were hand-held 
compactors, dynamic cone penetrometers, Wackers, dumpy levels, jack 
hammers, breakers and compressors. 
5.2.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
 The availability of 300 middle-income stands in this extension made it 
possible for Council to advertise and appoint emerging contractors to 
service them. 
 After servicing the stands the appointed contractor was allowed to sell 
the fully serviced stands at a market-related price to cover their costs 
and some mark-up (profit). 
 Council policy was followed to service the stands in this area, while the 
TLB was also sourced locally from an emerging enterprise. 
 This research report does not cover these 300 middle-income stands, as 
that project lies outside the scope of the current research. 
5.2.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
There is a saying that “in engineering no two projects are ever the same”. This is true 
and it was witnessed in Modimolle. 
On this project the team members were more skilled than the Extension 7 team. With 
the team balancing being in place, it was assumed that no major challenges would be 
encountered but, unfortunately, the following challenges were found: 
 There were existing structures on the pipe route in the form of shacks 
and informal pit latrines. 
 The high water table in this area necessitated deep excavation (with the 
assistance of the TLB) of the sewer pipe line varying between 1.5 m to 
4 m deep (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). 
 Insufficient funds for the project and the project being funded from two 
different sources. 
 Loss of key personnel (semi-skilled and skilled). 
 Non-compliance with certain clauses of the Code of Good Practice 
(RSA 2002:4) for employment. 
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Figure 5.4: The TLB assisting with manhole construction 
 
Figure 5.5: Deep excavation at Phagameng Extension 8 using the 
TLB 
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5.2.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
With the assistance of the Project Steering Committee, Ward Councillors, Ward 
Committee members and the co-operation of the local community, it was easy to 
relocate people quickly without delaying the project. 
Even though the pipe route had to pass through an area where there were temporary 
pit latrines which posed some health risks because the labourers were required to 
work with human waste, this problem was overcome through teamwork. 
5.2.6.1 HIGH WATER TABLE 
In relation to the high water-table problem, the labourers were provided with the 
right personal protection equipment to work in these types of conditions. 
The design of the water and sewer reticulation had to be changed slightly to 
accommodate a sub-surface drainage system, which was also done labour 
intensively. 
5.2.6.2 INSUFFICIENT FUNDING 
Despite the fact that additional funding was later approved on this project, the 
problem remained of funding a project from two different sources that each had its 
own, slightly different conditions. However, the project team had to adjust to the 
conditions and all the grant‟s conditions were adhered to. 
5.2.6.3 LOSS OF KEY PERSONNEL 
Even though most of the personnel who played a major role in the successful 
implementation of the Phagameng Extension 7 project were lost to the Municipality, 
the fact that they now (in 2005) worked for the Council helped a lot in that they 
remained available to share their expertise. 
5.2.6.4 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE 
There were contraventions of the clause for the duration of participation and the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund clauses (RSA 2002:4). 
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1) On duration of participation, the guideline states: “Special Public 
Works Programmes seek to provide as many people as possible with 
the opportunity to participate in the programme” (RSA 2002:3). 
 It further says: “No person may be employed for more than 24 months 
within a 5-year cycle, except in circumstances where no other local 
labour is available” (RSA 2002:4). 
2) Regarding the Unemployment Insurance Fund, despite the fact that the 
guidelines are clear that: “No Unemployment Insurance Fund 
contributions will be paid on behalf of or by workers in Special Public 
Works Programmes” (RSA 2002:4), the Council decided to deduct this 
contribution and register the local labourers for the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund. Even though this was not in line with the guidelines, it 
benefited the local labourers who participated on this programme as 
labourers whose services were terminated afterwards received money 
from the Unemployment Insurance Fund. 
5.2.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
The overall outputs of this project were: 
 42 570 man-days of temporary employment were created. 
 1 592 stands in Phagameng Extension 8 had water and sewer 
connections in their yard (Erf). 
 Training was effective and it drew the attention of the National 
Ministry of Labour. 
 Due to the success of this project and the previous two projects, 
Modimolle was nominated the winner of the prestigious 2003/2004 
Vuna Award. 
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5.3 MABATLANE (LESEDING EXTENSION 2) LETŠEMA 
SEWER RETICULATION PROJECT (MARCH 2005 TO 
FEBRUARY 2006) 
The town of Mabatlane (previously known as “Vaalwater”) is situated in the 
Modimolle Local Municipality area about 65 km north of Modimolle town. In 2005 
the Council received funds approved through Municipal Infrastructure Grant funding 
to provide waterborne sewers to this township as, at that time, informal pit latrines 
were used which did not meet Reconstruction and Development Programme 
standards. 
5.3.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Leseding Extension 2 Letšema Sewer Project 
Approved budget ZAR6.679 million 
Project sponsor Department of Local Government and Housing under 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant funding 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant SSA Consulting Engineers 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
 
5.3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
Leseding Extension 2 is a small township situated 2 km from Mabatlane town. It has 
a total of 1 316 low-income stands. Water reticulation had already been provided to 
all the stands, while sewers had been installed only to the first 250 stands with 
Reconstruction and Development Programme houses. The remaining 1 066 stands 
were to benefit from this project. Indications from the previous sewer installation 
contract were that rock could be expected at depths of 500 mm to 1 000 mm which 
made excavation by hand very difficult. Blasting was also problematic close to 
existing houses. The excavation was, therefore, expected to be relatively expensive, 
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hence there had to be sufficient budget to cover this contingency. Despite these 
challenges, Council maintained its decision of implementing the project labour 
intensively. 
5.3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES 
The project is analysed under the following headings: 
5.3.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
Even though the geotechnical conditions of Mabatlane, were not amenable to the use 
of labour-intensive methods (due to excessive rock within the area), the concept of 
labour-intensive work was adequately promoted. 
A total of 30 local labourers (of whom 20 were male and 10 were female) was 
appointed. 
5.3.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
Training was effective as, during the implementation of this project, the working 
relationship between the Department of Labour and Modimolle was very good, so 
both formal and informal training took place. Some of the key personnel, who 
worked on the Phagameng projects, were seconded to this project as Supervisors in 
order to transfer skills to Leseding personnel. 
5.3.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
This objective was achieved in that 100 % of the labourers who worked on this 
project were local residents. Even though it was difficult to excavate trenches by 
hand, the following activities were done labour intensively: 
 Removal and reinstatement of fences before and after construction. 
 Pipe laying, manhole construction and house connections. 
 Setting-up for construction and controlling levels. 
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 Bedding preparation and subsurface drainage installation. 
 Backfilling of trenches. 
 Fixing of driveways. 
 Site cleaning on completion of the works. 
On this project the specifications and documentation took careful consideration of 
the ground conditions of Leseding. The tender bid was amended to cater for labour-
intensive construction and all seven (7) activities mentioned above were strictly 
labour-intensive. A combination of labour-intensive and capital-intensive operations 
was used and, by the end of this project, a total of 8 976 man-days of employment 
were achieved (against the initially planned 6 732 man-days) despite the fact that all 
excavation on this project was done conventionally due to hard rock. 
5.3.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
There was great involvement of the local community because most of the temporary 
pit latrines were on the pipe route – so, in addition to the normal consultation 
meetings, there were extra meetings to establish the Project Steering Committee in 
line with Council‟s policy. Ward Committee members and Ward Councillors 
participated and were also involved in consultations between the residents and the 
Council. 
5.3.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
On this project, the project team members complied with the Council‟s procurement 
policy by procuring locally: only those items that could not be found locally were 
sourced from outside (such as the 30 t excavator and the blasting sub-contractor). 
5.3.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
The end product was of a very high standard of workmanship as the appointed 
project consultant, SSA Consulting Engineers, was also responsible for quality 
control, site monitoring and supervision. 
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5.3.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Leseding project output is summarised in Table 5.5. The cost breakdown for this 
project is given in Table 5.6 
Table 5.5: Leseding project output as at 
28 February 2006 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 9 months 
(March  2005 to November 2005) 
12 months 
(March 2005 to February 2006) 
Cost ZAR6.676 million ZAR6.84 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scopeof work: 
Erfs connected 
with sewers 
1 066 stands with waterborne sewers 1 000 stands with waterborne sewers 
66 stands were not connected as they 
were too low for the sewerage to 
gravitate to the sewer connection 
point 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
70 % 75 % 
Employment 
created 
6 732 man-days 8 976 man-days 
Table 5.6: Leseding project cost breakdown as at 
28 February 2006 
 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 934 642 13.66 % of the project cost 
Training cost 0 Was provided by Department of Labour 
Overhead cost 333 801   4.88 % of the total project cost 
Total indirect cost 1 268 443 18.54 % of the total project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
5 571 556 81.46 % of the total project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 659 280 11.83 % of the direct cost 
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On this project the proportion of budget that went to labour was only 11.83 % due to 
the excessive rock in the pipe route. Despite this challenge, the lesson learnt was that 
it is possible to implement a labour-intensive project under any conditions and 
circumstances. 
There was a budget over-run of 2.46 %, which was as a result of the hard rock 
encountered. However, because the project was implemented internally, no variation 
order was required even though the amount of hard rock encountered exceeded the 
anticipated quantity by more than 200 %. 
The cost to service a stand in this area was R6 840, which was more than double the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant guidelines but, in cases of unforeseen conditions (as 
in the case of the hard rock encountered on this project), the Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant required a motivation as the site conditions necessitated this extra cost. 
5.3.4 THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
Experience gained from previous projects was applied and contributed to the success 
of the project in the following areas: 
5.3.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
As excavation did not form part of the labour-intensive scope, new tasks were 
determined based on the completed projects and international experience, while the 
task rate was also revised from R35 to R55 per complete task during the 2005/2006 
municipal budget. 
5.3.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
Since this project involved the use of machine- and labour-intensive methods, a 
team-balancing exercise for this project is provided in Table 5.7. 
The size of the task was determined by using Table A3-1 (Average task output 
values according to McCutcheon (1983) and Simpson (1980)), which indicate a 
spreading rate of 12 m³/day, while the throwing-distance task rates were taken from 
Table A3-2 (Detailed task rates for excavation (De Veen 1980,1983)). 
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Table 5.7: Leseding project team balancing as at March 2005 
Activity 
Work 
type Unit Quantity 
Work 
rate/day 
Number 
of  
days 
Number  
of  
workers 
Actual 
number  
of  
days 
Balancing 
days 
Actual 
number  
of 
workers 
Rate/day 
ZAR 
Cost 
ZAR 
1. Site clearance LIC* m² 12 870 65 198 5 40 50 4 17.85 3 534.30 
2. Fence removal LIC m 12 400 100 124 6 21 30 4 17.85 2 213.40 
3. Excavation            
3a. Soft Machine (TLB) m³ 25 483 150 170 4 42 60 3 1 620.00 275 216.40 
3b. Hard Machine (TLB) m³ 15 290 100 153 2 76 90 2 2 520.00 385 308.00 
4. Bedding LIC m³ 1 632 12 136 8 17 20 7 17.85 2 427.60 
5. Pipe laying 
(160 mm diameter) 
LIC m 12 870 100 129 6 21 30 4 23.50 3 024.45 
6. Blanket LIC m³ 3 587 12 299 15 20 30 10 17.85 5 335.66 
7. Backfill LIC m³ 19 113 12 1 593 20 80 90 18 17.85 18 445.00 
8. Fence  
reinstatement 
LIC m 12 400 12 1 033 18 57 80 13 17.85 18 445.00 
9. Fixing driveways LIC number 8 12 7 4 2 3 2 17.85 119.00 
10. Site clearance LIC m³ 12 400 12 1 033 12 86 100 10 17.85 18 445.00 
TOTAL     4 874 100 462 583 77  742 499.40 
*LIC = Labour-intensive construction. 
Source: information accumulated by the researcher whilst working on the project. 
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5.3.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
Skills transfer was ensured because: 
 Four (4) labourers from the Phagameng projects were seconded to this 
project to capacitate the labourers in Mabatlane as supervisors. 
 The Project Manager was one of the four (4) University of Technology 
students who had also worked on the Phagameng Extension 8 Project. 
 Skills transfer took place and it was effective. 
5.3.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
The same method of paying labourers on a fortnightly basis was adopted, and money 
was transferred into their bank accounts by electronic funds transfer. 
5.3.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
Even though the skills retention was not 100 %, most of the labourers were retained 
on this project. 
5.3.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
SSA Consulting Engineers was engaged to oversee safety and ensure that safety 
regulations were complied with on site at all times. Although there was a 
combination of machinery and labour on this site, the project was completed without 
any near-miss incident or accident. 
5.3.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
Due to hard rock excavation on this project the following equipment was used: 
 1 x 30 t excavator for trench excavation. 
 1 x TLB 4 x 4 for loading of soft material for bedding and blanketing. 
 3 x 10 m3 tipper trucks for transporting of material and loading of rocks 
from site. 
For compaction, hand-held compactors and/or Wackers were used, in a similar way 
to the previous projects. 
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5.3.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
Local SMMEs were involved as follows: 
 The TLB and tipper trucks were hired from local emerging contractors 
within Mabatlane. 
 The 19 mm stone aggregate necessary for sub-soil drainage was 
purchased from a local quarry, the owner of which is also an emerging 
contractor. 
 The blasting sub-contractor was an emerging contractor even though he 
was not local to Modimolle, but he was from Limpopo Province. 
5.3.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
Three challenges were encountered on this project: 
 Excessive hard-rock. 
 High water table. 
 Most of the pipe route passed through existing pit latrines. 
5.3.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
The Council endeavoured to assist the team to mitigate challenges faced wherever 
possible. 
5.3.6.1 EXCESSIVE HARD-ROCK 
When hard rock was encountered, the Council dealt with the problem by using the 
services of a blasting sub-contractor and a 30 t excavator to carry out excavation as it 
was not possible to excavate by hand but, because Council wanted this project 
implemented labour intensively, some activities were set aside specifically for 
labour-intensive construction methods. 
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5.3.6.2 HIGH WATER TABLE 
The high water table was addressed by adopting sub-soil drains during the contract to 
mitigate the problem. 
5.3.6.3 PIT LATRINES 
The pipe route passed through old pit latrines but this was easy to address as there 
was a 30 t excavator on site, so all the human waste was removed and the pit latrines 
were closed immediately. 
5.3.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
Notable project outputs were: 
 The overall employment created on this project was 8 976 man-days as 
opposed to the planned 6 732 man-days. 
 Even though the project exceeded the budget and the planned time 
frame by 3 (three) months, it produced a good product with regard to 
quality. 
 Due to the success of this project, considering the ground conditions, 
Council decided to implement the other projects in the Mabatlane area 
using the same methods of labour-intensive construction. 
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5.4 MABATLANE EXTENSION 4 LETŠEMA WATER 
PROJECT (OCTOBER 2005 TO JUNE 2006) 
5.4.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Mabatlane Extension 4 Letšema Water Project 
Approved budget ZAR2.25 million 
Project sponsor Premier‟s office under the Premier‟s Emergency 
Infrastructure Grant 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant CES Consulting Engineers 
Contractor Mayishe Business Enterprises 
5.4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
During October 2005 the Province of Limpopo made available a sum of 
ZAR200 million for the upgrading of water and electricity infrastructure in the 
Province. The funds were allocated as follows: ZAR100 million was for electricity 
and the other ZAR100 million was for water projects. These funds were from the 
Premier‟s office but were managed by the Department of Local Government and 
Housing in Limpopo Province together with the Provincial Treasury Department. 
The funds were once off and all the Local Municipalities in Limpopo Province were 
encouraged to apply by submitting their business plans. Due to the high level of 
unemployment in the province at that time, a labour-intensive method of construction 
was decided on as being the preferred option. The funds were available for a period 
of six (6) months with an additional period of a further three (3) months for a worst-
case scenario. Modimolle Local Municipality also submitted their business plan and 
it was approved for three (3) water projects, namely: 
 Mabatlane Extension 4 Letšema Water Project 
 Phagameng Extension 9 Letšema Water Project and 
 Leseding Extension 2 Reservoir Project. 
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The total amount approved for Modimolle Local Municipality under this programme 
was ZAR8.1 million. On this project Council saw an opportunity to develop SMMEs. 
The Engineer was appointed to produce the Design and Contract documentation, 
while construction monitoring and supervision was kept in-house by the Client. A 
local contractor was appointed to implement this project with the assistance of the 
Technical Department. Labour-intensive methods of construction were adopted from 
the design phase and items were properly and clearly marked in the bill of quantities 
that they should be done labour intensively. Council assisted the appointed 
Contractor to procure material (for them) and to hire equipment on their behalf on a 
cession (particularly those items that needed or required large amounts of capital). 
The previous contract indicated that in Mabatlane hard rock could be encountered at 
a depth of ~500 mm, while the water table was also high within this area (at 
~1000 mm below ground level). Owing to Council‟s commitment to creating jobs 
and developing local SMMEs, the decision was taken at Council to implement this 
project labour intensively. 
5.4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES AND THE PROJECT SPONSOR 
5.4.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
The concept of labour-intensive construction methods was adequately promoted, 
considering the fact that the Project Sponsor, Design Engineer and the Client were 
committed to this method of construction and non-compliance was not permitted. 
The appointed contractor also signed the contract, in which Design, Specification, 
Drawings and Contract Documentation were all done to accommodate labour-
intensive methods of construction. 
5.4.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
Even though a local SMME contractor was appointed to implement this project, it 
was clearly specified that the appointment of unskilled labourers should be 100 % 
from the local community. The contractor was not allowed to bring any unskilled 
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labourers from outside Mabatlane. Accredited training such as technical training 
(trenching, bedding, blanketing, backfill, pipe laying and pipe testing) was provided 
through the Department of Labour. Other training (such as financial training) was 
also provided. On-the-job training was provided by keeping the construction 
monitoring and supervision in-house, because the personnel from Council (officials) 
were already capacitated to manage labour-intensive projects. 
On this project, with regard to training, Council, reached its objective considering the 
fact that both formal (accredited) and informal (on-the-job) training took place and 
was well co-ordinated and managed. 
5.4.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
Even though the construction part of this project was outsourced (contracted out), the 
contractor was compelled by the contract to hire all unskilled labourers from the 
local community of Mabatlane. Indeed, the contractor complied with the contract and 
30 local labourers were appointed (of whom 10 were women). The amount of 
employment created for locals on this project equated to 6 732 man-days, despite the 
fact that some excavations were done by the TLB due to the ground conditions. 
5.4.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
The process for the implementation of projects in Modimolle was outlined in 
Chapter 4. It is well documented in the IDP processes and compels the involvement 
of the community from the project initiation stage through to project completion and 
hand-over, which was the case on this project. 
5.4.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
Local business was supported by this contract: 
 The appointed contractor was local, while the TLB was hired locally. 
 The material was purchased locally through the Council‟s procurement 
policy, which emphasised the support of local businesses. 
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5.4.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
The quality of the end product was of a very high standard, considering the fact that 
site supervision and construction monitoring were done in-house by the Department 
of Technical Services which had to maintain the project after completion and hand-
over. 
5.4.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Mabatlane Extension 4 project output is summarised in Table 5.8. The cost 
breakdown for this project is given in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.8: Mabatlane Extension 4 project output as at 
30 June 2006 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 6 months 
(October 2005 to March 2006) 
9 months 
(October 2005 to June 2006) 
Cost ZAR2.25 million ZAR2.2 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water 
503 stands 503 stands 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
80 % 80 % 
Employment 
created 
4 488 man-days 6 732 man-days 
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Table 5.9: Mabatlane Extension 4 project cost breakdown as at 
30 June 2006 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 315 000 14 % of the project cost 
Training cost 0 Was provided by Department of Labour 
Overhead cost 188 500 Project was outsourced but Contractor‟s 
Preliminary and General cost was 12 % 
Total indirect cost 503 500 22.89 % of the total project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
1 696 500 77.11 % of the total project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 394 020 23.22 % of the direct construction cost 
Amount accumulated as loss/profit Not 
applicable 
This project was implemented by locally 
based SMMEs 
 
The proportion of funding (23.22 %) that went to labour (in terms of wages) on this 
project was ZAR394 020, being the amount that was invested in local labourers. 
By implementing this project using locally based SMMEs, and labour-intensive 
methods of construction, Council achieved its goal of developing SMMEs as well as 
providing temporary employment to local labourers. 
5.4.4 THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
Experience gained from previous projects was almost three (3) full years of 
Modimolle implementing projects labour intensively. This experience contributed to 
the success of the project in the following areas: 
5.4.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
As the bulk of the excavation was done by the TLB due to site conditions, tasks were 
determined for bedding preparation, pipe laying, blanketing, backfill, pipe testing 
and clearing of site on completion. 
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As the Client retained the responsibility for monitoring the construction, the tasks 
determined on the previous project were adopted. Labourers were paid for a 
completed task and they were paid on a fortnightly basis by electronic funds transfer. 
5.4.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
A team-balancing exercise (similar to that shown in Table 5.7) was performed on 
behalf of the contractor, to train her and give her support as to how tasks are 
balanced in a labour-intensive project, and it was a success. 
5.4.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
The four (4) Supervisors, together with the University of Technology student, were 
seconded from the Phagameng projects, for implementation of this project. The four 
(4) Supervisors were paid by the contractor, while the Technician was paid by the 
Client (Council) as she performed the duties of a full-time Resident Engineer. Skills 
transfer also took place, considering the training that formed part of this project 
through the Department of Labour. 
5.4.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
Labourers were paid on a fortnightly basis, through electronic funds transfer, while 
the Resident Engineer was paid on a monthly basis. 
5.4.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
The skills retained were those of the Resident Engineer because she was later 
appointed in the Technical Department as a Project Manager. 
5.4.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
Council was responsible for health and safety issues on this project, hence formal 
and informal training formed part of this project. The Resident Engineer was 
responsible for the oversight of all safety issues on this project, while the Contractor 
also had a safety officer on site. 
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5.4.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
Due to site conditions, the following equipment was hired locally: 
 1 x TLB to excavate and to load trucks. 
 2 x 10 m3 tipper trucks for transporting the soft material and removing 
the hard rocks from site. 
 For backfill, compaction and testing density, Wackers, hand-held steel 
compactors and dynamic cone penetrometers were used. 
 1 x bulldozer for opening the pipe route and streets as the area of 
Mabatlane Extension 4 was undeveloped before the implementation of 
this project. 
5.4.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
Local SMMEs were involved as follows: 
 The TLB and tipper trucks were hired from local emerging contractors 
within Mabatlane. 
 A bulldozer for opening the pipe route and streets was also hired 
locally, the owner of which is also an emerging contractor. 
 On this project a local emerging contractor was appointed to implement 
the project on behalf of Council labour intensively. 
5.4.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
Two main challenges were encountered: 
 Excessive hard rock. 
 The contractor appointed was not conversant with labour-intensive 
construction methods but, owing to on-the-job training and her 
willingness to learn, she was trained and she gained skills to implement 
the project labour intensively. 
129 
 
5.4.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
Where challenges were encountered on the project, the Municipality was most 
accommodating: 
 With regard to the hard rock, a TLB was used for most of the 
excavation where the hard rock was encountered. To a depth of 1 m, 
there was soft rock which was easy to break with the TLB. 
 With regard to the appointed contractor not being familiar with labour-
intensive construction, there was skills transfer to the appointed 
contractor and, after nine (9) months with her on site, she was trained 
with regard to labour-intensive construction methods. 
5.4.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
The overall project output was: 
 A total of 6 732 man-days was achieved on this project, while 503 
stands were reticulated with water and had a tap on each Erf. 
 The project was completed three (3) months later than was originally 
planned but it was within budget. 
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5.5 PHAGAMENG EXTENSION 9 LETŠEMA WATER 
PROJECT (OCTOBER 2005 TO JUNE 2006) 
5.5.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Phagameng Extension 9 Letšema Water Project 
Approved budget R3.9 million 
Project sponsor Premier Emergency Infrastructure Grant 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant CES Consulting Engineers 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
5.5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
Phagameng Extension 9 consists of low-income stands covering 90 ha. This 
extension came about as a result of pressure on the need for low-income housing as a 
consequence of the eviction of farm dwellers. Council decided to establish a new 
extension next to Phagameng Extension 8. There was total of 1 003 low-income 
stands in this extension. After the township was established, while Council was 
planning to budget funds to put infrastructure (water) into this extension, the 
Premier‟s Emergency Infrastructure Grant was introduced and it came to Council‟s 
rescue. Phagameng soil conditions, as previously mentioned, permit the use of 
labour-intensive construction methods to the fullest. After funds were approved, all 
the labourers (other than some who were appointed permanently by Council, some 
by other departments, some by the Private Sector, and a few who had moved) who 
worked on the Phagameng Extension 8 Project were appointed on this project to 
implement it. 
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5.5.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES AND THE PROJECT SPONSOR 
5.5.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
Three (3) main benefits resulted from this project: 
 The concept of labour-intensive construction was adequately promoted, 
Council‟s resolution was very clear that the successful implementation 
of the pilot project would ensure that all other projects would follow 
the same route. 
 The team was increased to 150 labourers. All 150 labourers appointed 
on this project were from Phagameng Township. 
 The direct employment approach was still adopted on this project, 
where the managerial support and financial control were handled in-
house by the Municipality. 
5.5.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
The following points should be noted regarding the training of local labourers: 
 All the labourers who worked on this project benefited from training 
provided by the Department of Labour. 
 The working relationship between the Department of Labour and the 
Modimolle Local Municipality was very sound at that time, resulting in 
a visit by the National Department of Labour Minister. The Waterberg 
District Department of Labour relied a lot on the Modimolle Local 
Municipality to ensure that they spent their budget wisely, as most 
municipalities were not using this opportunity to provide training 
through the Department of Labour‟s budget. 
 Both formal and informal training took place. 
 The major focus with regard to training was on supervisory, financial, 
technical and soft-skill training. 
 All local labourers who worked on this project benefited from the 
training provided. 
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5.5.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
This project created and achieved: 
 A total of 24 948 man-days (against a planned 15 840 man-days) of 
employment created. 
 As this project ran concurrently with the Mabatlane Extension 2 
project, this means that across both projects, a total of 33 924 man-days 
of employment was created between the period October 2005 to June 
2006 which was an excellent achievement. 
5.5.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
There was substantial involvement of the local community because: 
 The local community was greatly involved on this project through the 
Municipality IDP processes and the on-going community meetings 
during project implementation. 
 There was a democratically elected Project Steering Committee in place 
which ensured that there was community buy-in on this project. 
 The community buy-in played a major role on this project towards its 
success, as there was never a time where the community had a problem 
or a complaint about this project. 
5.5.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
Local business was supported because: 
 All materials and small tools and equipment that were available locally 
were purchased locally in line with Council‟s procurement policy. 
 This principle of procuring locally ensured that local business was 
developed and capacitated. 
5.5.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
The quality of the end product at hand-over was high because: 
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 On this project there was continuity with regard to personnel who had 
worked on the previous projects in Phagameng, ensuring that the 
quality was not compromised. 
 The same labourers, who started with the pilot project in 2003, were 
still part of this project. 
 The fact that the maintainer of the completed project was also the 
implementing agent added an advantage with regard to the standard of 
the end product produced and delivered by the project team. 
 On this project, construction, construction monitoring and supervision 
were kept in-house by the Client, as the consultant‟s mandate was to do 
only the design. 
5.5.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Phagameng Extension 9 project output is summarised in Table 5.10. The cost 
breakdown for this project is given in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.10: Phagameng Extension 9 project output as at 
30 June 2006 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 6 months 
(October 2005 to March 2006) 
9 months 
(October 2005 to June 2006) 
Cost ZAR3.9 million ZAR2.9 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water 
1 003 stands 1 003 stands 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
80 % 85 % 
Employment 
created 
15 840 man-days 24 948 man-days 
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Table 5.11: Phagameng Extension 9 cost breakdown as at 
30 June 2006 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 546 000 14 % of the total project cost 
Training cost 0 Was provided by Department of Labour 
Overhead cost 195 000   5 % of the total project cost 
Total indirect cost 741 000 22.89 % of the project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
2 159 000 74.45 % of the total project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 1 422 450 65.88 % of the direct construction cost 
Amount accumulated as profit 1 000 000 25.64 % of the approved budget 
 
The amount of funding that went to labour in the form of wages – excluding 
overheads, professional fees and all other indirect costs on this project – was 
ZAR1.422 million. The total percentage of money that went to labour equates to 
65.88 %, which was the best achievement of all projects implemented in Modimolle. 
(This achievement still stands as at February 2012.) 
5.5.4 THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
5.5.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
The task determined during the pilot project was adopted: the only slight change was 
the rate per task which was reviewed to R55/task from R35/task. 
5.5.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
The team-balancing exercise performed on the previous project was replicated as it 
proved to be successful and it also worked well on this project. 
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5.5.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
Substantial skills transfer took place: 
 Most of the 150 labourers who worked on this project formed part of 
the previous projects and therefore skills transfer took place. 
 There were two (2) University of Technology students who did their in-
service training on this project. 
 The other University of Technology students who worked on the 
previous labour-intensive projects also played a major role with regard 
to skills transfer as they were seconded to this project as Resident 
Engineer, Project Managers, Site Agent and Contract Managers. 
5.5.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
The system of paying labourers on a fortnightly basis was again adopted and 
labourers were paid directly into their bank accounts through electronic funds 
transfer. 
5.5.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
Skills retention is essential to maintain a consistent, motivated labour force. 
The retention of skills on this project with regard to local labourers was almost 90 % 
because those who left the programme were either appointed permanently in the 
Municipality or within the District, with the remainder still being on the programme. 
With regard to the University of Technology students who benefited on this 
programme, in total 12 students received in-service training from the Municipality 
between January 2003 and December 2006. At least 10 of the 12 students were 
appointed permanently by Modimolle Local Municipality as Technicians in various 
departments in Technical Services. These employees left the Municipality only after 
being appointed elsewhere to a better post or to a promotion post. 
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5.5.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
The appointment of a Resident Engineer and Site Agent from in-house personnel, 
who were part of the training offered by the Department of Labour, also ensured that 
compliance with Health and Safety regulations was not compromised. 
5.5.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
The only tools used on this project were hand-held compactors, Wackers, dynamic 
cone penetrometers, jack hammers, breakers and two (2) compressors to assist in 
areas where hard rock was encountered on the project. 
5.5.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
On this project no emerging contractors were involved as the Client kept all the 
administration of this project in-house and local labourers were appointed as casual 
labourers to implement the project. 
5.5.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
Several challenges were encountered on this project: 
 Non-compliance with the Special Public Works Programme Code of 
Good Practice (RSA 2002:4) with regard to South Africa‟s 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and 
 Non-compliance with the duration of participation on the programme. 
5.5.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
The Modimolle Local Municipality implemented two (2) interventions to mitigate 
the challenges encountered: 
 Even though Council took a decision to register all the employees who 
worked on the Letšema projects with the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund, their argument was that the guidelines were there for guidance 
purposes only. Regarding the basic conditions of employment, the 
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Council‟s view was that if one does more than the basic or guideline 
level of implementation then the employer was still complying with the 
principles of the guidelines. 
 The guidelines clearly specified that “No person may be employed for 
more than two (2) years within a five (5) year cycle except in 
circumstances where no other Local is available” (RSA 2002:4) 
Despite the fact that 50 % of Modimolle‟s township residents were 
unemployed, the same people worked and benefited for a period of 
more than four (4) years on this programme. However, the Council‟s 
practice of employing the same labourers for extended periods 
benefited the Technical Department because, with more experienced 
personnel or labourers on site, productivity and progress were very 
good. 
5.5.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
At the end of the municipal financial year 2005/2006, the overall project‟s output 
was: 
 About 150 local labourers and four (4) local Supervisors who had 
benefited from the project, bringing the total amount of employment 
created within a period of nine (9) months to 24 948 man-days. 
 1 003 stands in Phagameng Extension 9 were provided with water in 
their yards. 
 1 003 beneficiaries received serviced stands with regard to water and 
roads and storm water at a Reconstruction and Development 
Programme level of service. 
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5.6 MODIMOLLE TOWN LETŠEMA WATER PROJECT: 
REPLACEMENT OF ASBESTOS-CEMENT PIPES WITH 
UPVC PIPES (JULY 2005 TO MARCH 2007) 
5.6.1 PROJECT DETAILS 
The project details were: 
Project name Modimolle town Letšema Water Project, Replacement of 
asbestos-cement pipe with UPVC 
Approved budget ZAR3 million over 3 years at ZAR1 million per annum 
Project sponsor Modimolle Local Municipality 
Client Modimolle Local Municipality 
Consultant N/A (As-built drawings were used to replace existing pipes) 
Contractor Modimolle Local Municipality 
 
On this project local labourers were appointed or transferred from successfully 
completed Letšema projects. 
This project was structured in a way that allowed any surplus labourers from existing 
Letšema projects to be transferred to this project. At peak this project had appointed 
154 local labourers (including local supervisors), with each team having a total of 
30 local labourers and one (1) supervisor. 
5.6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 
The introduction of EPWP, its funding (the Municipal Infrastructure Grant) and its 
budgeting processes worked to the Council‟s advantage. This EPWP introduced the 
Medium-Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework. The Medium-Term Revenue 
and Expenditure Framework allows municipalities to undertake medium-term 
budgeting for three (3) years, which was not the case with the old municipal 
budgeting system, which allowed for only one (1) year budgeting and, if projects 
were not completed, application was required for funds to be “rolled-over” (the term 
used to move funding from one financial year to the other). Therefore, with the 
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Medium-Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework, a project could be budgeted 
for a minimum of three (3) to a maximum of five (5) years, without having to request 
roll-over, as long as there are funds allocated to it every financial year. 
Through the Modimolle Local Municipality Water Service Development Plan there 
was a project that was identified for the replacement of existing old asbestos-cement 
pipes with UPVC pipes. This project came about as a result of asbestos-cement pipes 
that formed 100 % of water reticulation in and around Modimolle town, having 
problems due to ageing. These asbestos-cement pipes were laid more than 60 years 
ago during the time of Nylstroom Town Council. 
Frequent pipe bursts that occurred mainly during winter were causing maintenance 
problems, inconvenience and water interruptions to the people living in and around 
Modimolle town. Therefore, with the Medium-Term Revenue and Expenditure 
Framework, Council budgeted for replacement of these old asbestos-cement pipes 
over a three (3) year period. This project was funded mostly from the savings 
realised on the other projects (such as Phagameng Extensions 7 and 9 Letšema 
Projects). Council realised a huge saving on these two (2) projects by implementing 
them in-house (using a direct employment approach) and using labour-intensive 
methods of construction. Since they were funded from conditional grants, Council 
was not allowed to make profit. Therefore, all the savings were required to be 
declared and to be used on other projects of a similar nature. So this project was 
implemented with funds from savings and other internal funding from Council. 
5.6.3 ANALYSIS OF THIS PROJECT IN LINE WITH COUNCIL’S 
OBJECTIVES 
This project is analysed in accordance with Council objectives under the headings 
below. 
5.6.3.1 USE OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
METHODS 
The concept of labour-intensive construction methods was adequately promoted. The 
fact that asbestos-cement pipes were to be replaced in a developed area where there 
were other underground services (such as telecommunication cables, electricity 
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cables, sewer pipes and existing water pipes, for example), mitigated in favour of 
labour-intensive methods of construction being more favourable than conventional 
methods in order to minimise damage to existing infrastructure. Although this project 
started in July 2005, during the period July 2006 to March 2007, a total of 154 local 
labourers benefited on this project as additional labourers were seconded to this 
project as and when other labour-intensive construction projects that were running 
concurrently ended. 
Annexure B contains an example of a timesheet for a fortnight in March 2005 before 
the daily or task rate was revised. From this timesheet it can be seen that Modimolle 
Local Municipality was committed to implementing projects using labour-intensive 
methods. 
The timesheets were very simple and straight forward, with the first column 
indicating the name of the employee and the second column containing the identity 
document number (it was compulsory for everyone working on this programme to 
have a South African identity document). The third column showed the number of 
tasks the employee completed within that period;  the fourth column indicated the 
number of tasks completed or days the employee had worked;  the fifth column was 
the pay rate of that employee;  the sixth column was the total nett pay for the 
employee,  while the seventh column showed the money deducted (for the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund) for the work period. The last column contained the 
vote number (the cost centre number from where the money was paid for wages 
during the period). The reason it was important to record the number of days worked 
was for control purposes, because even though workers were paid for tasks 
completed and the principle of “no work, no pay” was applied, those people who 
were often absent without a valid reason were disciplined and replaced with more 
committed employees. All the employees indicated on the time sheet that they came 
from the local community. 
5.6.3.2 TRAINING OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
From the example of a timesheet in Annexure C (July/August 2006), it can be noted 
that the rate for labourers is not consistent. The reason for this was the continual 
training that was offered through the Department of Labour. Employees or labourers 
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who did well at training were promoted to: Gang Leaders, Pipe Layers or Artisans, 
Project Administrators and Salary Clerks. The salaries of the Project Managers, Site 
Agents and Resident Engineers are not reflected on these timesheets but are included 
in the proportion of costs that went to labour. The fact that people were promoted 
from one project to the next indicates how effective training was on this project. 
5.6.3.3 CREATION OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT FOR LOCAL 
RESIDENTS 
This project alone created a total of 37 268 man-days of employment, focusing only 
on local labourers from the community. All (100 %) the unskilled labourers 
appointed came from local communities around Modimolle. 
5.6.3.4 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
This project was in an existing developed area and a business node so it was 
anticipated that disruption of the water supply might negatively affect the community 
and the business community. To minimise this impact Council took extra measures 
to involve the community through public meetings and discussion forums. During 
this project the community was affected throughout the project‟s life cycle as the 
project interfered with their daily activities and some of their walkways and 
driveways were also affected. 
5.6.3.5 SUPPORT OF LOCAL BUSINESS 
Local business was supported because material was purchased locally wherever 
possible as per Council policy. 
5.6.3.6 QUALITY OF THE END PRODUCT 
With about four (4) years of using the “force account” system, the quality of 
workmanship on this project was rated as excellent. Quality assessment was done by 
Local Government project managers. 
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5.6.3.7 PROJECT OUTPUT 
The Modimolle Town Letšema Water project output is summarised in Table 5.12. 
The cost breakdown for this project is given in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.12: Modimolle Town Letšema water project output as at 
31 March 2007 
Activity Planned Achieved 
Duration 36 months 
(July 2005 to June 2008) 
21 months 
(July 2005 to March 2007) 
Cost ZAR3 million ZAR3 million 
Quality of end 
product 
Very high standard of workmanship Very high standard of workmanship 
Scope of work: 
Erfs connected 
with water 
3 227 stands 3 227 stands 
Money to be 
retained in 
Modimolle 
80 % 85 % 
Employment 
created 
35 840 man-days 37 268 man-days 
Table 5.13: Modimolle Town Letšema water project cost 
breakdown as at 31 March 2007 
Activity description 
Amount 
ZAR 
Amount as a 
% 
Professional fees 0 As-built drawings were used   
Training cost 0 Was provided by Department of Labour 
Overhead cost 150 000   5 % of the total project cost 
Total indirect cost 150 000 22.89 % of the project cost 
Total construction cost excluding  
indirect cost 
2 850 000 95% of the total project cost 
Direct cost to labour paid as wages 2 049 740 71.92 % of the direct construction cost 
Amount accumulated as profit 0 0% of the approved budget 
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The proportion of funding (71.92 %) that went to labour on this project was 
ZAR2.049 million, which is the amount invested in local labourers in the form of 
wages. It should be noted, however, that the 71.92 % is not a true reflection of the 
direct construction cost as the actual cost was considerably reduced as it was not 
necessary to purchase the full amount of material required as surplus pipes and 
materials from previous projects were transferred to, and used on, this project. 
5.6.4 THE EXTENT TO WHICH PREVIOUS PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT 
5.6.4.1 TASK DETERMINATION 
The task determined at the pilot stage was adopted throughout all the projects and, on 
this project, there was no difference except that the rate for labourers was revised 
from R35/per task to R55/task with effect from 1 July 2005. 
5.6.4.2 TEAM BALANCING 
The previous projects‟ team-balancing exercise, which proved to be effective and 
efficient, was adopted and implemented on this project. 
5.6.4.3 SKILLS TRANSFER 
From the timesheets in Annexures B and C, differences in daily rates indicate the 
different roles each labourer was undertaking. Those with daily rates slightly higher 
than others were promoted from the local labourers after they had undergone training 
and shown an improvement and competence. The skills transfer was done 
successfully both through on-the-job training and thorough formal training that was 
offered through the Department of Labour. 
5.6.4.4 PAYMENT OF LOCAL LABOURERS 
Labourers were paid on a fortnightly basis, and each labourer was given his/her task 
completed, number of days worked and the nett pay. The deductions made from their 
wages were also shown. This information was printed and made available on 
Tuesday prior to being paid on Friday. Even though the labourers were paid on a 
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fortnightly basis, their fortnight was structured such that they worked one (1) week in 
advance (meaning that when the project commenced, they worked three (3) weeks 
before being paid for the first fortnight period. Thus, in effect there was a one 
(1) week retention held for each worker. At the end of the contract the retention 
money was paid to the workers). 
5.6.4.5 RETENTION OF SKILLS 
The allowance that was made on this project (anent promotion and training from 
within) played a major role with regard to retention of personnel. More than 90 % of 
labourers were retained on this project. 
5.6.4.6 HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
Training played a major role in ensuring that none of the project labourers was 
injured on duty. This project was also completed injury-free. 
5.6.4.7 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
No sophisticated tools were used on this project other than a walking roller, a 
Wacker, hand-held steel compactors and dynamic cone penetrometers. 
5.6.4.8 INVOLVEMENT AND CAPACITATION OF EMERGING 
CONTRACTORS 
On this project the involvement of emerging local contractors was minimal as they 
were involved only with detecting underground services (electricity cables and 
telecommunication cables) before hand excavation for pipe trenches could take 
place, where “as-built” drawings do not exist. 
5.6.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED ON THE PROJECT 
The challenges encountered on this project were minor and more of an irritation than 
a major inconvenience. There were: 
 Minor water interruptions which were encountered when switching to 
the new water lines. 
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 Minor damage to existing infrastructure, especially electricity cables. 
 Damage to residence walkways and driveways, which were later fixed. 
5.6.6 INTERVENTIONS BY THE MUNICIPALITY TO MITIGATE THE 
CHALLENGES 
The municipality assisted as far as possible to minimise disruptions as follows: 
5.6.6.1 WATER INTERRUPTIONS 
When switching to the new pipeline, notice was given seven (7) days in advance 
before the switch over to the new pipeline to minimise major interruptions. Switch 
overs were done over the weekend when most of the businesses were closed. 
5.6.6.2 DAMAGE TO ELECTRICITY RETICULATION 
In Modimolle the Electricity Section and Water and Sewer Section were within one 
(1) department, making it easy for the community to reach the correct section 
responsible when problems were encountered. These two (2) sections also worked 
together so that if damage was caused by a work team from one (1) section to 
another section‟s property, that damage was reported and attended to immediately. 
5.6.6.3 DAMAGE TO RESIDENCE WALKWAYS AND 
DRIVEWAYS 
Through training that was provided on the programme, fixing of driveways and 
walkways was done internally by the labourers that worked on this project. This was 
evidence that the skills they had acquired were adequate because they never received 
any comebacks or complaints after fixing and maintaining the damaged 
infrastructure. 
5.6.7 OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT 
The overall output from the project was: 
 By the end of the of March 2007, about 150 local labourers and four 
(4) local Supervisors benefited on the project, bringing the total amount 
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of employment created within a period of 21 months to 37 268 man-
days. 
 A total of 3 227 stands in Modimolle town were provided with 
uninterrupted water in their yards. 
 The proportion of funding that went to labour on this project was in the 
form of wages, totalling ZAR2.049 million. 
 The 71.92 % direct cost on the project that was paid to wages (even if it 
was not a true reflection of the direct construction cost because it was 
not necessary to purchase all the materials as surplus pipes, fittings and 
other materials from previous projects were transferred to this project) 
was most encouraging for future labour-intensive projects or 
programmes using a “force account” system. 
 The success of this project was a result of proper consultation with the 
local and affected community members and the long-term “force 
account” system that Modimolle adopted. 
 
The next chapter contains a discussion of the shortcomings and the factors that 
contributed to the success of the Modimolle Local Municipality labour-intensive 
projects. 
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Table 5.14: Compliance with Council objectives: indicators of success 
Project name 
Use  
of  
labour- 
intensive  
construction  
methods 
Training  
of  
local  
labourers 
Creation  
of  
employment 
for  
local  
residents 
Local  
community  
involvement 
Support  
of  
local  
business 
Task  
determin- 
ation 
Skills  
transfer 
Payment  
of  
local  
labourers 
Retention  
of  
skills 
Tools  
and  
equipment 
Phagameng Extension 5 
& 6 water project 
*Met Met Met *Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 
Phagameng Extension 7 
water & sewer project 
Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 
Phagameng Extension 8 
water & sewer project 
Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met 
Phagameng Extension 9 
water project 
Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 
Mabatlane Extension 4 
water project 
Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 
Leseding sewer project Met Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met 
Modimolle Town 
Letšema Water Project 
Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Met Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 
*Exceeded = 75 to 100 %       Met = 50 to 74 %      Not met = 0 to 49 % 
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CHAPTER 6:  
ANALYSIS OF THE MODIMOLLE PROJECTS 
Chapter 4 documented, evaluated and analysed the pilot project that took place in 
Modimolle prior to the implementation of the labour-intensive construction projects. 
Chapter 5 documented, evaluated and analysed the eight (8) Modimolle labour-
intensive projects based on international and national best practices. This chapter 
details the successes and shortcomings from both the Modimolle pilot project and the 
eight (8) labour-intensive projects. 
6.1 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF 
THE MODIMOLLE LABOUR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS 
Many factors contributed to the success of the Modimolle labour-intensive projects: 
 Training played a major role towards the success of the Modimolle 
labour-intensive projects. 
 Long-term political support and political will also played a substantial 
role towards the success of the projects. 
 The introduction of EPWP and its funding (the Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant) also contributed towards the projects‟ successes. 
 The concept of labour-intensive construction was adequately promoted 
prior to, and during, the implementation of the projects. 
 All parties involved were properly consulted about, and supported, the 
method of construction. 
 Experts, with extensive national and international experience in labour-
intensive construction, were consulted. 
 Documented literature – international and local (South African context) 
– on labour-intensive construction was studied thoroughly and the 
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information gleaned was applied to the Modimolle labour-intensive 
projects. 
 Supervision was adequate, which was due to effective training for 
Supervisors through both formal and informal (on-the-job) training. 
 The training budget allocated by the Department of Labour to technical 
training and Supervision training was sufficient as there was not a time 
that labourers could not be trained due to budgetary constraints. 
 There was long-term support from the Department of Labour, the 
Department of Local Government and Housing and the Department of 
Public Works (provincial office). 
 There was long-term financial commitment and support by the Council 
of Modimolle. 
 The effort and commitment the Modimolle Town Council made to 
achieve community participation and acceptance of a labour-intensive 
method of construction through its IDP processes and other Sector 
Plans (Water Service Development Plan, Storm Water, Road Master 
Plan, and Electricity Master Plan) was enormous and contributed 
positively to the outcome of the projects. The annual budget 
discussions also contributed to the projects‟ successes. 
 The availability and willingness of unskilled labour to work as 
labourers on the programme. 
 Quality control was adequate and those responsible to monitor quality 
were committed as all tests required by the South African Bureau of 
Standards‟ codes or the South African National Standards were 
complied with. 
 The fact that the daily task and task rate were kept low ensured that 
more labourers benefited from the project and projects were completed 
within the available budget constraints. 
 Productivity improved drastically over time, as the longer the labourers 
were involved on these projects and attended training, the more 
productive they became. 
 The organisational structure adopted and used by the Modimolle Local 
Municipality to co-ordinate the programme was effective because there 
was commitment and support from the Technical Department 
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directorate, which was the responsible department tasked with ensuring 
the success of the projects. 
 The overall productivity of labour was generally higher than that 
achieved in international programmes, considering the number of tasks 
that were completed daily on these projects. This increased output was 
in itself an incentive to work efficiently and reliably as the labourers 
benefited from the additional wages earned. 
 Health and safety issues were not neglected and this is attributed to the 
effective on-going training that was provided through the Department 
of Labour. 
 The awards that were received by the Modimolle Local Municipality 
also contributed positively towards their long-term commitment to this 
programme. 
 Between November 2002 and December 2006, Modimolle Local 
Municipality received the following awards: the 2003/2004 Vuna 
Award for the best Municipality in Limpopo (with a prize of 
R750 000). In 2005/2006 they were the provincial winners of the 
Govan Mbeki Award and, at national level, they achieved third position 
out of 262 local municipalities. 
The Govan Mbeki Award, was the award introduced by the then Minister of 
Housing, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu, during the 2005/2006 financial year. For this award the 
Municipality competed in the following areas: 
 Best innovations in implementation of projects. 
 Best in project implementation and management, budget spending in 
line with the Integrated Development Plans submitted to provincial and 
national government. 
 Best in infrastructure development with regard to provision of basic 
services (water, sewer, roads and storm water at Reconstruction and 
Development Programme level of service). 
 Best in employment creation, training and skills transfer for local 
residents. 
 Best with regard to readiness to provide serviced stands for 
Reconstruction and Development Programme houses. 
 Best in Local Economic Development and Financial Viability. 
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6.2 ACHIEVEMENTS OF MODIMOLLE LABOUR-
INTENSIVE PROJECTS AS AT MARCH 2007 
Table 6.1 depicts the man-days of employment generated during the 
programme between 2002 to 2007. The following were achieved: 
 Modimolle was successful in replicating the Botswana programme. The 
greatest achievement was that a total of 65.88 % went to labour as 
wages and salaries, which is slightly higher than Botswana‟s 65 %. 
 A total of 4 330 stands received water in their yard (Erf connections), 
while a total of 19 485 households benefited by receiving water. 
 A total of 33 % of stands received a waterborne sewer connection in 
their individual stands, while a total of 15 255 households benefited by 
receiving decent and proper sanitation. 
 A total of 12 students (Technicians) from the Universities of 
Technology, benefited from the programme, graduated and received 
their qualifications. 
 At peak operation, water and sewer projects managed to employ a total 
of 154 local labourers at a time. 
 A total of 154 022 man-days of employment was generated during the 
programme between 2002 and 2007 on only water and sewer projects. 
Considering that even trenching on electricity projects and roads and 
stormwater projects was implemented labour intensively, this figure 
would be enormous if labour-intensive methods of construction were 
implemented nationally. 
 Over a period of four (4) years an amount of ZAR7.5 million went to 
local labourers as wages, which represents 29.25 % of the total project 
cost. The figure would have been higher had hard rock conditions not 
been encountered on two (2) of the projects which necessitated the use 
of machinery to overcome the problems. 
 A total of 8 577 households received access to basic water and 
sanitation in their yards. 
 The quality of the end product achieved using a “force account” system 
in Modimolle was high when compared to similar equipment-intensive 
projects carried out before. 
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 Training at different levels played a major role in the success of the 
Modimolle projects. 
 Council received three (3) awards: two (2) at provincial level and 
one (1) at national level. 
6.2.1 POSITIVE INTERVIEWS FROM VARIOUS ROLE PLAYERS 
Below are positive comments made to the researcher by 13 individuals in the 
construction industry to whom he spoke: 
 Interviewee 1 (a former – now deceased – Municipal Manager of 
Modimolle) at the Govan Mbeki Award: 
“Modimolle Letšema Projects is one of the success programmes [sic] this 
municipality ever had in its history, which is why we have been winning 
awards year in year out.” 
 Interviewee 2 (a former Mayor of Modimolle during the Vuna 
Award Presentation): 
“With the Letšema Water and Sewer Projects, our Municipality has indeed 
been proactive in its approach to the challenges [poverty and inequality] 
faced by our new developing and emerging democracy.” 
 Interviewee 3 (the former Chief Financial Officer of Modimolle 
Local Municipality): 
“Letšema Water and Sewer Projects is a good initiative to create 
employment for unskilled labourers in Modimolle... it has just won the 
Municipality the Vuna Awards and through hard work and team work we 
can achieve even more.” 
 Interviewee 4 (the former Director Corporate Services Modimolle 
Local Municipality and currently (2012) Senior Manager at 
SALGA Limpopo who suggested the term “Letšema” at 
Management and Council, which was adopted as an extension to all 
labour-intensive projects in Modimolle): 
“Letšema projects was [sic] a trend setter, the best model ever in Limpopo 
that changed people‟s lives through income redistribution through wages and 
purchasing of all materials and equipment from local suppliers, skills levels 
were too low before the programme but through training that was provided 
people left the programme well equipped and skilful.” 
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 Interviewee 5 (former Chief Whip and Councillor at Modimolle 
Local Municipality): 
“With Letšema Projects we like to thank management for coming up with 
this great idea... it has created jobs for people in various wards in the 
Municipality and we will like to make commitment [sic] that as long as we 
are still in charge we will support it.” 
 Interviewee 6 (former Speaker and Councillor at Modimolle Local 
Municipality): 
“Letšema Projects has „put us on the map‟, we are proud as Councillors and 
we walk tall because of its success. At the beginning I was not sure that it 
will work, but I will like to thank you officials [sic] for all the hard work and 
dedication you have put together... in particular the Municipal Manager as 
the head of administration.” 
 Interviewee 7 (a Director and Shareholder of a Consulting 
Engineering firm): 
“In the consultancy work he is providing to Limpopo Province and the 
municipalities in the province, the Modimolle projects were unique and were 
well structured and well implemented.” 
 Interviewee 8 (Project Manager on the Modimolle programme 
recruited from the Gundo Lashu programme): 
“Labour-intensive projects are considered poverty alleviation projects in that 
they target mainly rural areas. They also provide long-term road 
maintenance. Lesotho Department of Rural Roads [equivalent to Department 
of Public Works in South Africa], is using strategies of labour-intensive 
projects from construction and up to maintenance of their roads. 
Modimolle Local Municipality labour-intensive projects were targeting 
people residing in low-cost housing of which the majority had no jobs. These 
were projects that provided a sustainable income over a period of years. 
The economic livelihoods of the people involved in the projects were 
remarkable, most would work on targets like painting their houses, buying 
furniture, minor house improvements like paving, putting ceramic tiles etc. 
The improvement was remarkable. 
The skills transfers in the projects were very much remarkable [sic] as most 
labour-intensive beneficiaries ended up working in the Municipality. Most 
Municipalities have Local Economic Development programmes where use of 
local suppliers and contractors was encouraged... as Modimolle Local 
Municipality was small and the grants received from the Municipal 
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Infrastructure Grant were limited, most construction-based projects were 
labour-intensive based and the Municipality was the contractor, huge savings 
were done [sic] on these projects in terms of time, resources and red tape 
involving tendering processes. 
It would be ideal if most municipalities would follow similar routes as the 
ageing infrastructure is in need of maintenance... instead of procuring 
services of contractors for maintenance purposes, labour-intensive projects 
could be implemented for roads and storm water, road marking, grass 
cutting, replacing asbestos-cement pipes, paving, painting etc.” 
 Interviewee 9 (a student from the Vaal University of Technology, 
who did her in-service (practical training) at Modimolle from July 
2003 to June 2005 to meet the University’s requirements for her 
Civil Engineering Diploma). This interviewee worked on the 
Phagameng Extension 7 project on the main outfall sewer portion and 
also on the Phagameng Extension 8 water and sewer project as a Site 
Agent: 
“I believe that it was a good impression [sic] to get the local labourers to be 
involved in the projects than getting contractors. It saved time and money 
because we were able to finish the project before the estimated completion 
date. It also created opportunities for the local labourers because they were 
able to get skills which benefited and enabled them to easily get other jobs in 
future.” 
 Interviewee 10 (the owner of a materials supplier in Modimolle): 
“I think it is a good thing that Council is doing the projects themselves, apart 
from us benefiting as the Local Businesses, the Local Community is also 
benefiting and this is good for the local economy.” 
 Interviewee 11 (the manager of a materials supplier in Modimolle): 
“I think [it] is a good thing that Council is doing the project in-house, this 
create[s] job opportunities for local[s] and reduce[s] crime... They should do 
more of this [sic] type of projects.” 
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 Interviewee 12 (a general worker at Letšema Projects from March 
2003 to March 2007): 
“with Letšema our councillors have done a good thing and I am going to vote 
as long as our councillors when we vote for them don‟t only think of 
themselves but for us the people who voted them [sic]. I also want to thank 
you Mr Hlabela for bringing Letšema to Nylstroom, we (workers) call you 
„Letšema Manager‟.” 
 Interviewee 13 (a supervisor of Letšema): 
“I am 49 years old and before Letšema I was struggling to take care of my 
family but currently I am working and even my kids are like other kids at 
school. I thank our Municipality for giving us such an opportunity and hope 
and pray that Letšema must not come to an end.” 
The achievements highlighted above demonstrate the practical implementation of a 
“force account” system (direct employment by employer) to execute projects labour 
intensively, with the major focus being on building capacity in-house, while creating 
employment for local residents. 
6.3 EXTENT TO WHICH COUNCIL’S OBJECTIVES WERE 
MET 
The Modimolle projects may be considered successful because: 
 The objective with regard to alleviating unemployment by imple-
menting projects using labour-intensive methods of construction was 
achieved. 
 Labour-intensive methods of construction were effective, efficient and 
well promoted and therefore this objective was met. 
 Training of local labourers that ensured skills transfer through on-the-
job training was achieved by training the trainer. 
 Extensive training (both formal and informal) which was sponsored by 
the Department of Labour at all levels assisted Council to achieve its 
objective. 
 The fact that a total of 154 022 man-days of employment was achieved 
on the programme, focusing on water, sewer (excluding electricity, 
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roads and storm water), indicates the success with regard to local 
employment creation. 
 The proportion of expenditure that went to labour increased as the team 
worked together for a long period, with the greatest achievement of 
65.88% being recorded. This achievement meant that Council had 
achieved its objectives. 
 The involvement of the local community through Council‟s IDP, at all 
stages of the projects (project life cycle) was achieved. 
 The fact that all the equipment, material or services that were available 
locally were sourced locally indicates the success of Council meeting 
its objective with regard to support of local businesses. 
 Quality of the end product was very high in all the completed projects 
implemented labour intensively, indicating the extent to which this 
objective was met. 
These successes are summarised in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Modimolle: comparison of all completed water and sewer projects 
 
Project name 
 
Planned 
duration 
(months) 
Actual 
duration 
(months) 
Planned  
budget 
(ZAR) 
(million) 
Actual 
expenditure 
(ZAR) 
(million) 
Number  
of  
households 
planned 
to benefit  
(stands) 
Number of 
households 
actually 
benefited 
(stands) 
Quality 
of end 
product 
Number 
of jobs 
created 
(man-
days) 
Money 
that went 
to labour  
(%) 
Amount 
paid 
as 
wages 
per 
project 
(ZAR) 
Phagameng Extension 5 
& 6 water project 
8 5 1     0.56 520 520 High 1 848 13.64 68 200 
Phagameng Extension 7 
water & sewer project 
12 12 6.84 5.64 755 732 High 31 680 28.58 1 201 200 
Phagameng Extension 8 
water & sewer project 
12 15 3.74 4.74 1 592 1 592 High 42 570 42.61 1 716 750 
Phagameng Extension 9 
water project 
6 9 3.90 2.9   1 003 1 003 High 24 948 65.88 1 422 450 
Mabatlane Extension 4 
water project* 
6 9  2.25 2.2   503 503 High 6 732 23.22 394 020 
Leseding sewer project* 9 12  6.68 6.84 1 066 1 000 High 8 976  11.83 659 280 
Modimolle Town 
Letšema Water Project 
36 21 3     3     3 227 3 227 High 37 268  **71.92 2 049 740 
Total 77 83 27.41  25.68 8 666 8 577 High 154 022 29.25 7 511 640 
  *Hard rock conditions were encountered on these projects, necessitating the use of machinery to overcome the problems. 
**This figure is not a true reflection of the situation as the actual direct construction cost was considerably reduced as it was not necessary to purchase the full amount of material required as  
surplus pipes and materials from previous projects were used on this project. 
Source: Summary of researcher‟s project notes. 
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6.4 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODIMOLLE PROJECTS 
There were several shortcomings in the Modimolle projects: 
 The pilot project was too short: experts and experience (Gertzen 1999; 
McCutcheon 1993; Mthombeni 1996) indicate that a minimum of one 
(1) year is required for a pilot project at Municipal level. This was 
evident when, on average, one labourer was able to complete a 
minimum of three (3) tasks per day and is indicative of failure to 
properly determine or set tasks, which were a “fair day‟s wage for a fair 
day‟s task”. 
 The first 40 labourers‟ contracts were supposed to be terminated at the 
beginning of the Phagameng Extension 8 project because the labourers 
had already worked for 15 months on the programme and the Special 
Public Works Programme guidelines (RSA 2002) do not permit 
labourers to work more than 24 months in a five (5) year period. 
Initially the Phagameng Extension 8 project was estimated to be 
implemented over 12 months. So, by renewing their contracts, the 
labourers were already guaranteed that they were going to exceed the 
maximum time allocated by three (3) months at the end of the 
Phagameng Extension 8 project. The worst case was that some of the 
labourers who had worked on the pilot project, worked throughout the 
entire programme, which brought their total duration of employment to 
more than 48 months continuously. This indicates a shortcoming. 
 Non-compliance with regard to Special Public Works Programme 
guidelines (RSA 2002) indicates that although the Modimolle Town 
Council achieved successful implementation of their labour-intensive 
programme, they were reluctant to terminate labourers‟ contracts after a 
period of two (2) years – hence there were labourers who had worked 
four (4) years without a break (the only break these labourers received 
was during the South African Construction Industry December/January 
shutdown). 
 Even though team balancing was performed before the start of the pilot 
project and the programme, it was not effective as, after the successful 
implementation of the first project, no further adjustments were made 
to the composition of the team. This should not necessarily be seen as 
an inadequacy, given that the daily rate on which the task was set was 
below the minimum wage prescribed by Government. 
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 While focus was put on the creation of jobs (by using a “force account” 
system) and training of local labourers, little was done to promote 
SMMEs, despite this being a priority within Council‟s IDP and budget. 
6.4.1 NEGATIVE INTERVIEWS FROM VARIOUS ROLE PLAYERS 
Below are comments made to the researcher by four (4) individuals in the 
construction industry to whom he spoke: 
 Interviewee 14 (an owner of an emerging local contractor): 
“I think it is not fair how the municipality is currently running projects... we 
are being denied the opportunity of contracting in our own municipality as 
they are implementing the jobs in-house. I think the correct way should be 
that the municipality should contract the work out and only do supervisions 
[sic].” 
 Interviewee 15) (a manager for expenditure at Modimolle Local 
Municipality): 
“Letšema project is creating more work for us as Finance Department... the 
projects must be contracted out and Council should appoint competent 
contractors to deliver infrastructure. This will save us time of paying wages 
every fortnight, which become [sic] even more hectic if the fortnight for 
wages coincides with the payment of permanent Council staff.” 
 Interviewee 16 (a salary clerk in Modimolle Local Municipality): 
“This Letšema thing is making extra work for us [Finance Department] and 
you management don‟t even bothered [sic] to pay us additional money [for] 
the extra effort... I think it should be stopped and the work be contracted 
out.” 
 Interviewee 17 (an emerging contractor in Modimolle Local 
Municipality): 
“You [Modimolle] cannot be a referee and a player at the same time; you 
[Modimolle] should contract all these works out that you are currently doing 
and remain the Client and leave contract work to contractors.” 
Having analysed the Modimolle projects and discussed their successes and 
shortcomings, the conclusions and recommendations of the research are presented in 
Chapter 7. 
160 
 
CHAPTER 7:  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter 1 (the Introduction) of this research report has provided a background, the 
problem statement, a definition of labour-intensive construction, the scope of study, 
the methodology, objectives and purpose of the research project, and the limitations 
of the study. 
Chapter 2 provided a literature review from a regional perspective (Malaŵi, Lesotho, 
Ghana, Kenya and Botswana) on labour-intensive methods of construction. 
Chapter 3 provided a similar review from a South African perspective (the Strategic 
Oil Fund, the Community-based Public Works Programme 1994 to 1996, and the 
Expanded Public Works Programme Phase 1 April 2004 to March 2009). 
In Chapter 4 the Modimolle Local Municipality pilot project was documented and 
analysed. 
The information gathered during the pilot (water) project (Chapter 4) was 
implemented in Modimolle Local Municipality‟s labour-intensive five (5) water 
projects and three (3) sewer projects as detailed in Chapter 5. These eight (8) projects 
were documented and analysed in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 documented the shortcomings of the Modimolle Local Municipality‟s 
labour-intensive projects and all factors that contributed to the success of these 
projects. 
This final chapter of the research report draws conclusions based on the successes of 
the pilot project and all the evaluated Modimolle Local Municipality labour-intensive 
projects. Lessons learnt, suggestions and recommendations for future projects of a 
similar nature based on the Modimolle Local Municipality experiences are also 
documented. 
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7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
A number of conclusions was reached after analysing the findings from the 
Modimolle pilot project and the eight (8) labour-intensive projects: 
 The time allocated for the pilot project, was much shorter than that 
normally recommended by experts, namely, a minimum of one (1) year 
for a municipal project. 
 Training of supervisors and/or gang leaders played a major role in the 
success of the Modimolle Local Municipality projects, while the 
training of unskilled labourers on various technical aspects increased 
productivity. 
 The concept of labour-intensive construction was adequately promoted 
prior to, and during, implementation of the projects and consensus was 
reached by all stakeholders with regard to the method of construction. 
 The IDP processes ensured that community participation prior to, and 
during, construction was fully achieved. Community participation is a 
formal procedure that is documented and guides the processes of 
implementing the projects, in Modimolle. 
 During construction, the increase in productivity resulted mainly from: 
 Effective training of Supervisors and labourers. 
 Payment of labourers on time (every two weeks). 
 Timeous delivery of material and payment of all material  
suppliers on time. 
 Strict application of the “no work, no pay” principle. 
 Absenteeism was very low due to strict control measures which were 
in place and the discipline on site. 
 The parties involved (including the residents in the Townships) 
encouraged the labourers because they were consulted on the 
projects prior to their implementation. 
 The good morale among the labourers as they were able to exceed 
the single task set per day and thus earned higher wages for 
increased production. 
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 Effective health and safety training resulted in few injuries or near-miss 
incidents occurring on these projects. 
 Long-term political support played a major role towards the success of 
these projects. 
 The availability of local labour and their willingness to work as 
unskilled labourers also played an important role in the success of these 
projects. 
 The project was run by the Municipality on a direct employment 
approach (“force account” system), creating more job opportunities 
than when projects are outsourced to emerging contractors. 
 The Council objectives were very clear and specific and they did not 
want the “business as usual” scenario described by McCutcheon (1992) 
because that would have stifled the programme. 
 The time allocated for the programme was sufficient even though the 
practice of non-compliance with the Special Public Works Programme 
guidelines should be condemned. 
 Long-term financial support by various funding agencies also played a 
major role towards the success of the programme. 
 The introduction by the national Government of awards (such as the 
Vuna and Govan Mbeki awards) was a motivating factor for Council, 
because the more awards they won, the more awards they competed 
for. 
 Lack of rotation of local labourers after two (2) years of continual 
employment benefited the Council negatively, because skills transfer 
and poverty were alleviated for fewer people than initially intended. 
 The fact that 114 320 man-days were created on only the water and 
sewer projects over a period of four (4) years, indicates that labour-
intensive construction methods, when used productively, can alleviate 
poverty and unemployment in South Africa. 
 Overall there was a great improvement in production over time, 
because extensive training took place on this programme. 
It can be concluded that labour-intensive construction methods can create a 
significant number of jobs in water and sewer infrastructure projects using a “force 
account” system without compromising the project cost, quality and time. This is 
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only on condition that all parties involved are fully committed to the objectives of the 
programme; the programme must commence with pilot projects and extensive 
training at all levels (in particular at supervisory level), and if a long-term 
perspective is followed. 
7.2 LESSONS LEARNT 
Several lessons were learnt from the projects: 
 The time allowed for the pilot project was short and this did not work in 
favour of Council because the final task set was far less than the 
international standard and experiences indicated. 
 Technical research and development was carried out. However, too 
little time was allocated to identify the physical work to be carried out 
so that aspect was not handled well, with the result that too low a daily 
task target was agreed upon throughout the implementation of all 
projects. 
 The fact that the wage rate was kept low, below the principal wage rate, 
assisted to ensure that the project budgets were not overrun, despite the 
low task targets. 
 Training was effective at all levels and the long-term financial support 
by the Department of Labour contributed positively toward the success 
of this programme. 
 Experts (such as Emeritus Professor McCutcheon) with extensive 
experience in labour-intensive construction were consulted – hence the 
programme was a success. 
 Quality control was not neglected, field tests were carried out – hence 
the programme resulted in a product of high-quality standard. 
 The overall productivity of labour was generally higher than those 
predicted by McCutcheon (1983), Simpson (1980) and de Veen (1980, 
1983). It was also much higher than those achieved in established 
programmes internationally. 
 The projects run by the Municipality were generally of higher quality 
standard than those outsourced to contractors. 
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 The direct employment approach (client-based) proved to be the most 
successful approach in reaching the goal of employing as high a 
percentage of labourers as possible. 
 The effort to achieve full community participation was not 
underestimated or undermined throughout the life-cycle stages of the 
projects (at identification, conceptualisation, implementation and close-
out). Thus, in all completed projects, there was support from the local 
community. 
 The fact that all water and sewer projects were implemented using 
labour-intensive construction methods between November 2002 and 
March 2007 indicates the Council‟s success, willingness and 
commitment to reduce unemployment. 
 Projects were generally properly managed as a result of good planning, 
training and institutional development that took place prior to 
implementation. 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The long-term nature of the programme allowed for improvement in labour-intensive 
construction methods and long-term financial support. It is recommended that 
enough time be allowed for adequate research and development (of a pilot project) at 
the beginning of a programme. 
 Training was adequate, the success of the Modimolle projects and other 
successful international programmes was as a result of training at all 
levels. It is recommended that to replicate a programme of this type 
training at all levels must be given priority. 
 The establishment of a Training College or Centre in South Africa 
should be a priority as they have contributed towards the success of 
programmes in Kenya and Botswana and elsewhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 Long-term political support is crucial for any programme success, and 
it is therefore recommended that political support be obtained in order 
to implement a programme of this type successfully. 
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 Community participation played a major role in the success of the 
Modimolle projects and it is recommended that the community be in-
volved at all stages of the programmes and projects. 
 Attention needs to be paid to the time allocated to the pilot project 
especially considering the fact that task determinations are done at this 
stage. To avoid failure in programmes and projects of this nature, a 
minimum of one (1) year should be considered or allocated for a muni-
cipal pilot project as per experts‟ recommendations. 
 Institutional development played a major role in the success of the 
Modimolle Local Municipality projects. It is therefore recommended 
that any labour-intensive programmes or projects should focus on it. 
 It is recommended that quality control and training be adequately 
monitored and budgeted for, whether the projects are implemented 
labour intensively or capital intensively, because the success of every 
project is measured on the quality of the final product. 
 Health and safety issues have become one of the most important issues 
in construction since the 1990s and it is recommended that emphasis 
and focus be put on this. 
 The direct employment approach does not only benefit the local 
community but it also benefits the client or employer by developing 
skills in-house and effecting cost savings, so it is recommended. 
 It is recommended that experts, with extensive international experience 
in labour-intensive construction, be consulted when planning or consid-
ering implementing programmes of this nature as was the case in 
Modimolle. 
 A great deal of research has been documented and there are many 
lessons to be learnt from similar programmes throughout the world. 
Countries with huge unemployment problems need to research and 
replicate effective labour-intensive construction methods. 
 In Modimolle Local Municipality the wage levels were set below the 
minimum to attract the poorest of the poor, which was adopted from the 
successful programmes elsewhere in Africa. However, although it is 
recommended that wages be kept low, they should not be too low in 
order to attract the targeted group. 
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 The successes achieved in the Modimolle projects are neither new nor 
unique. All the successful programmes implemented elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa followed the same route. For any country faced with 
unemployment and poverty it is recommended that they adopt carefully 
thought out, labour-intensive construction methods. 
 The effort required to achieve full community participation and support 
cannot be over-emphasised. It played a major role in ensuring the 
Modimolle projects‟ successes and it is recommended that it be given 
priority when planning future labour-intensive projects. 
It must, however, be noted that any programmes or projects will have their own 
challenges, whether labour-intensive or conventional construction methods are to be 
used. However, it is recommended that the project team members be trained and 
acquire relevant skills to address any difficulties that might be encountered as this 
research has demonstrated that it is possible to implement a labour-intensive project 
under many conditions and circumstances. 
7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research needs to be done in the following areas: 
 The development and training of emerging contractors to implement 
labour-intensive construction projects. 
 The maximum duration permissible for local labourers to work on 
labour-intensive projects. 
 The comparison of a “force account” system and the development of 
SMMEs in labour-intensive projects in South Africa. 
 The analysis and evaluation of EPWP Phase 1 and Phase 2. Critical 
investigation and analysis are required to check whether it has reached 
its original stated objectives – in particular, with regard to the number 
of man-days of employment generated and the quality and quantity of 
assets created. 
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ANNEXURE A:   
RESUMÉ OF MS MPHO LEKOLOANE 
Briefly about the Project Manager, Ms Mpho Lekoloane: 
Ms Mpho Lekoloane was a Project Manager at Modimolle labour-intensive programme. She was 
trained on labour-intensive construction methods in Lesotho, through the Province of Limpopo under 
the programme “Gundo Lashu”. 
 
Training received: 
Ms Lekoloane attended a “labour-intensive based methods of road construction” course at Lesotho 
Department of Rural Roads as an initiative of the Limpopo Public Works, Road Agency Limpopo 
(formerly Northern Province Road Agency) and the International Labour Organisation between 
February 2002 and July 2002. She was trained as a Technical Assistant for Nenis Construction. The 
training she covered when in Lesotho includes: supervision of works, setting out using labour-
intensive methods, management of labour-intensive construction for roads, site administration for 
labour-intensive works, tendering for labour-intensive works, monitoring work programmes for 
labour-intensive work, and using task rates and measurements of task as an incentive for production. 
 
Projects undertaken: 
Regravelling of roads using labour-intensive methods at Ha-Koali/Sebekela Village at Teyateyaneng 
in Lesotho. 
At Nenis Construction Ms Lekoloane was appointed as a Site Agent. 
 
The list of her duties between August 2002 and November 2003 was: 
Overall management of site/works and all inputs (labour, tools, materials, fuel and equipment); setting 
out of works prior to construction as well as measurements of tasks; site administration; liaison with 
the Community Liaison Officer on behalf of social facilitators and the Project Steering Committee; 
construction supervision; monitoring work progress and updating work plans; tendering for labour-
intensive works on behalf of the contractor. 
 
Projects undertaken: 
Regravelling of roads using labour-intensive methods at Tswaing/Lesetsi Village at Ga-Mphahlele 
(Lepelle-Nkumpi Municipality Region). Project value:  ~ZAR980 000. 
 
Additional information about the Gundo Lashu programme: 
Ngebulana (2007) notes the achievement of Gundo Lashu was that 24 contractors were trained under 
the programme and 2 400 people who had no income received a monthly remuneration through the 
creation of 320 000 work-days that were created through the programme. It is further indicated that 
the contractor employed between 60 and 100 local workers on a task-based payment system and that 
on average 51 % of workers were women, 58 % youth. By 2004, the budget for the programme was 
R50 million and it was achieving a 600 % increase in employment compared to similar conventional 
machine-intensive road works without increasing the overall cost per kilometre (Phillips, 2004 quoted 
in Ngebulana 2007). 
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ANNEXURE B:   
EXAMPLE OF A TIMESHEET 
MARCH 2005 
An example of a time sheet used for a fortnight during March 2005 is provided on 
the next page. 
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ANNEXURE C:   
EXAMPLE OF A TIMESHEET 
JULY/AUGUST 2006 
An example of a time sheet used for a fortnight during July/August 2006 is provided 
on the next page. 
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